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This dissertation is concerned with the estimation of structural models of the labour market
and the application of these models in both evaluating policy reforms, and exploring their
implications for taxation design. The programme that is at the centre of much of the empirical
exploration in this thesis is the British Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), which during its
lifetime, provided the main form of in-work support for lower income families with children.
The ﬁrst chapter of this thesis estimates a discrete choice hours of work model using data
from before and after the introduction of WFTC. To the extent that behavioural responses
to tax reforms are informative about preferences, it uses the estimated model directly to
explore problems related to the optimal design of the tax and transfer system. It derives new
theoretical results and empirically explores the extent to which the tax authorities may wish to
condition the tax schedule on age of children. Given the use of hours contingent payments in
the UK tax credit system, it also investigates the desirability of including a measure of hours
of work in the tax base.
The second and third chapters of this thesis ﬁrstly develop the methodology, and then
consider how our view of programmes such as WFTC is affected once the presence of labour
market frictions and the importance of job search activity is acknowledged. In doing so, it
greatly extends the empirical equilibrium job search literature. By introducing the monop-
sonistic behaviour of ﬁrms, it considers how these ﬁrms may optimally adjust their wages
following the introduction of programmes which encourage work, such as WFTC. The equi-
librium impact of the reform on a range of outcomes for both WFTC-eligible and non-eligible
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This dissertation is concerned with the estimation of structural models of the labour market,
and the application of these models in both evaluating policy reforms, and exploring their
implications for taxation design. It is motivated by the secular decline in the relative wages
of low skilled workers and the growth in single-parent households, which has resulted in the
emergence of a number of programmes which aim to enhance the labour market attachment
of such workers. The particular programme that is at the centre of much of the empirical
exploration in this thesis is the British Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), which during its
lifetime, provided the main form of in-work support for lower income families with children.
Tax credit programmes like the British WFTC, and the similar Earned Income Tax Credit
programme in the U.S., have been studied extensively in the economics literature and attract
considerable attention among policy makers. The broad employment impacts of these pro-
grammes has been evaluated in a large number of empirical studies, and there is a general
consensus in the literature that these programmes have been particularly effective in raising
the employment of lone mothers, one of the main beneﬁciaries of these programmes. One
objective of this thesis is to contribute to this literature.
This thesis is comprised of three self-contained chapters. The ﬁrst chapter of this thesis,
Employment, Hours of Work and the Optimal Taxation of Low Income Families (joint with Richard
Blundell) estimates a stochastic discrete choice hours of work model using data from before
and after the introduction of WFTC. To the extent that behavioural responses to tax reforms
are informative about preferences, it uses the estimated model directly to explore problems
related to the optimal design of the tax and transfer system. The use of a structural model
to consider optimal design problems contrasts to the usual approach taken in the theoretical
optimal tax research. In this literature, formulae for optimal marginal tax rates are typically
derived in terms of quantities including labour supply elasticities, the distribution of worker
types, and the preferences of the government. The advantage of this structural approach to
optimal taxation is that it introduces a consistency between the labour supply model and
the optimal tax model. Moreover, features which are emphasised in the micro-econometric
labour supply literature – such as unobserved heterogeneity, ﬁxed work related costs of work,
child-care expenditure, and the detailed non-convexities of the tax and transfer system – are
all allowed to inﬂuence the choice of the tax policy.Introduction 14
New theoretical results which are useful for solving this class of problem are derived, and
the extent to which the tax schedule may vary with the age of children is explored. The paper
shows that pure tax credits (that is, negative marginal effective tax rates) may be optimal for
mothers with older children. Given the use of hours contingent payments both in the tax
credit system of the UK and in other countries, the chapter also explores how the optimal
schedule changes once the partial observability of hours of work is explicitly incorporated.
In contrast to the design of the current UK system, a case for primarily rewarding full-time
workers is presented, and the welfare gains from doing so are shown to be potentially large for
families with older children. The paper then demonstrates that the realisation of appreciable
welfare gains from using hours of work information is contingent upon this information being
accurately observed.
The type of structural model developed in Employment, Hours of Work and the Optimal
Taxation of Low Income Families ruled out the presence of any equilibrium effects. The second
and third chapters of this thesis introduce a very different class of structural model to con-
sider the impact of programmes like WFTC. They begin with the premise that labour market
frictions and job search activity are important. Empirically they are considered important
because it takes individuals time to ﬁnd a suitable job, and because the largest adjustments in
both wages and working hours typically occur when individuals change their employer. The
presence of these frictions may also have implications for our understanding of reforms like
WFTC. In particular, if ﬁrms set wages then the presence of search frictions tends to bestow
some degree of monopsony power upon ﬁrms. Should labour supply increase following a
reform like WFTC, then ﬁrms may respond to this by lowering the wages that they offer. This
would effectively reduce the transfer given to eligible families, while non-eligible families may
be made worse off if they compete within the same labour market. Understanding the quanti-
tative importance of these equilibrium effects is therefore an essential part of any assessment
of policies that are designed to encourage work.
Before applying these models to study the impact of WFTC, the second chapter of this
thesis, Wage Posting with Two-Sided Heterogeneity provides a methodological review of empiri-
cal search models. It begins by constructing an equilibrium model of the labour market with
heterogeneous workers and ﬁrms: workers differ in their unobserved work opportunity costs,
while ﬁrms differ in their productivity. It provides a synthesis of the existing literature and
extends it by allowing the arrival rates of job offers – one of the key structural parameters in
these models – to vary with employment status. It also demonstrates how to introduce further
within market heterogeneity, which both allows the model to better account for differences
in labour market outcomes across individuals, and also permits differential responses follow-
ing policy reforms. Theoretical properties of the model are derived, numerical simulations
are presented, and the model is shown to be empirically tractable. In particular, the type
of semi-parametric estimation technique that has been used in simpler job search models isIntroduction 15
generalized to this setting. Estimation results using UK data are presented, and the results
obtained from the proposed semi-parametric procedure and alternative parametric speciﬁ-
cations are compared. Illustrative simulations are then presented which use the estimated
model to explore the equilibrium impact of actual UK minimum wage legislation.
The theoretical and empirical framework developed in the second chapter is extended
and applied in the ﬁnal chapter of this thesis, Equilibrium Search and Tax Credit Reform, which
uses an equilibrium job search model with wage posting to analyse the labour market impact
of the WFTC reform. The model allows for a rich characterisation of the labour market, by
incorporating hours responses, accurate representations of the UK tax and transfer system,
and both worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity. Here, workers may differ in their opportunity costs
of work, as well as their transitional parameters and the tax and transfer system that they face.
In addition to setting wages, ﬁrms also choose a recruiting effort intensity, which allows the
arrival rate of job offers to be endogenized at the macroeconomic level, and thereby introduces
a further equilibrium channel. The model is estimated using pre-reform longitudinal survey
data using an extension of the semi-parametric estimation proposed in the previous chapter,
and the impact of actual tax reform policies is then simulated.
The main simulation and estimation results are performed under the assumption that
all family types (including those who are both eligible and ineligible for tax credits), are
operating within a single integrated market. In this setting, the model predicts that WFTC
(and the contemporaneous reforms) increased employment, with lone mothers experiencing
the largest employment increase. While equilibrium effects do play a role in this reform,
they are found to be small, with the changes in employment, earnings and working hours,
being primarily due to the direct effect of the changing job acceptance behaviour of workers.
Indeed, the predicted employment impacts are comparable with those obtained in the quasi-
experimental literature, which is consistent with the view that these equilibrium effects are
not large. One reason why these monopsonistic equilibrium effects are relatively small is
because ﬁrms may be reluctant to reduce wages if doing so adversely affects the number of
non-eligible workers that they may attract. It is demonstrated that the equilibrium effects
of the same reforms may be much larger if the labour market is solely comprised of lone
mothers, one of the main beneﬁciaries of WFTC.
The analysis of tax policy necessitates a detailed characterisation of the tax and transfer
system. The UK system is particularly complicated due to the way that many elements of the
tax and transfer system interact with each other. To facilitate the empirical analyses performed
in this thesis, a very efﬁcient and ﬂexible micro-simulation tax library called FORTAX has been
developed, which allows very detailed components of income to be simulated under a range
of actual and hypothetical tax and transfer systems. This model was applied extensively in
both Employment, Hours of Work and the Optimal Taxation of Low Income Families and Equilibrium
Search and Tax Credit Reform, and is described in the appendix to this thesis. The entire codeIntroduction 16
has been made freely available under the GNU General Public License version 3 (GPLv3),
with the hope that it will encourage other researchers to perform detailed empirical analysis
of tax policy.Chapter 1
Employment, Hours of Work, and the
Optimal Taxation of Low Income Families1
1.1 Introduction
The empirical analysis of labour supply behaviour has strong implications for the design
of earnings taxation. Our aim here is to use a microeconometric labour supply model to
assess the design of tax rate reforms for the low paid. In particular, to examine policies that
aim at reducing the effective tax rates on work for low income families, as in the signiﬁcant
expansions of earned income tax credits in the UK and the US.2
Tax credit reforms have been evaluated extensively in the UK and elsewhere. The ev-
idence that tax credit policies encourage work is compelling and the positive impact on
employment has been found to be particularly strong for single mothers, see for example
Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Blundell et al. (2000). These and other studies tell us about the
labour supply impact of tax credit reforms. Given that such labour supply responses also
help us to learn about preferences, it is possible to move beyond the evaluation of particular
reforms, and consider problems related to the optimal design of the tax and transfer system.
In the spirit of Mirrlees (1971), we shall ask: how should the government best allocate a ﬁxed
amount of revenue to the design of earnings taxation?
The analysis draws on the microeconometric and the optimal taxation literature. In the
microeconometric literature certain common and robust features of estimated labour sup-
ply responses of the low paid have emerged. Speciﬁcally, the importance of distinguishing
between the intensive margin of hours of work and the extensive margin where the work
decision is made. Labour supply elasticities appear to be much larger at the extensive margin,
at least for certain household demographic types, see Blundell and Macurdy (1999).
The optimal taxation literature explores consequences for design. In parallel with the em-
pirical regularities, the literature on the design of tax and transfer systems has increasingly fo-
cussed on the extensive margin and the use of work conditions, see for example Beaudry et al.
1This chapter based on work conducted jointly with Richard Blundell.
2See Blundell and Hoynes (2004), for example.1.1. Introduction 18
(2009), Besley and Coate (1992), Chon´ e and Laroque (2005), Laroque (2005), Mofﬁtt (2006),
Phelps (1994) and Saez (2001, 2002). Our approach is closest to that by Saez (2002) who,
building on earlier work by Diamond (1980), examines the optimality of tax credit designs
within a Mirrlees framework but one which acknowledges the distinction between the exten-
sive margin and intensive margin of labour supply. Indeed, Saez (2002) derives approximate
optimal tax formula in terms of representative labour supply elasticities at the extensive and
intensive margin. Recently, Immervoll et al. (2007) implement this approach and suggest that
for reasonable welfare weights, tax credits would be an optimal policy across a wide set of
economies. As part of the Mirrlees Review, Brewer et al. (2009) use this approach to explore
the taxation of families in the UK.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we take the structural model of employ-
ment and hours of work seriously in designing the structure of taxes and transfers, allowing
the distribution of earnings, ﬁxed costs of work and demographic differences to inﬂuence the
design of tax policy. Second, we consider the case where hours of work are partially observ-
able to the tax authorities and consider the case for hours contingent reforms. Third, we assess
the role of conditioning on the age of children in the rate schedule for earnings taxation.
Our exploration of hours contingent reforms is motivated by the common use of hours
based eligibility in the tax credit systems of countries like the UK, Ireland and New Zealand.
Hours information is also used in the design of work conditioned earnings supplements, for
example in the Canadian Self-Sufﬁciency Project (Card and Robins, 1998) and in the TANF
programme of welfare payment in the US (Mofﬁtt, 2003). It has also been proposed as a
mechanism for improving tax design, see Keane (1995), although not within an optimal tax
framework. Given the likely difﬁculties in recording and monitoring hours of work, our
analysis also considers scenarios where hours are subject to measurement error, or where
individuals may directly misreporting their hours of work to the tax authorities.
The microeconometric analysis is based on a stochastic discrete choice labour supply
model (Hoynes, 1996; Keane and Mofﬁtt, 1998; Blundell et al., 2000; van Soest et al., 2002).
This model allows for discrete choices over non-linear budget constraints and ﬁxed costs of
work to re-examine the optimal design problem. The optimal tax model is then derived
directly from the labour supply model together with the estimated distribution of earnings,
ﬁxed costs of work, childcare costs, demographic differences and unobserved heterogeneity.3
The analysis is set in a static environment with ﬁxed costs of work and stigma costs of
accessing welfare beneﬁts. We are therefore ignoring dynamic effects in both labour supply
choices and in the design of the tax structure. Our focus is on the design of the tax schedule
for low earners and the role of tax credits. Although an experience pay-off in earnings would
change the optimal structure, we think our approach captures the most important aspects of
design for this group. The evidence points to relatively low or negligible experience effects
3An alternative model which incorporates constraints on labour supply choices in an optimal design problem is
developed in Aaberge and Colombino (2008).1.2. The Optimal Design Problem 19
for low earnings single parents, see Card and Hyslop (2005) and Gladden and Taber (2000).
A more subtle dynamic effect may act through fertility decisions. Keane and Wolpin (2007)
note that fertility effects may largely counteract the direct impact on labour supply. However,
the effect of tax reform on fertility behaviour is generally found to be signiﬁcant but small,
see Hoynes (2009). A further key dynamic aspect of tax design is the interaction with sav-
ings taxation and the taxation of lifetime income. In certain circumstances, the taxation of
saving can be used to relax the incentive compatibility constraint on earnings taxation (see
Banks and Diamond, 2009). However, with ﬁxed costs of work, credit constraints and earn-
ings uncertainty there is likely to remain a strong role for nonlinear earnings tax design of the
type described here.
The results of our analysis point to marginal tax rates that are broadly increasing in
earnings, and that are lower than under the current UK system. Moreover, we show that
heterogeneity is important. In particular, we present a case for pure tax credits at low earn-
ings but only for mothers with school aged children. It is also found that hours contingent
payments can improve design. Indeed, if hours can be accurately observed, we present an
empirical case for using a full-time work rule rather than the part-time rule currently in place
for parents in the UK. While this is found to be a more effective instrument, the welfare gains
remain modest in size for all but parents with older children. These welfare gains are also
shown to reduce signiﬁcantly with moderate amounts of misreporting or measurement error.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop the analytical framework
for optimal design within a stochastic structural labour supply model. In Section 1.3 we out-
line the WFTC reform in the UK and its impact on work incentives. Section 1.4 outlines the
structural microeconometric model, while in Section 1.5 we describe the data and model es-
timates. Section 1.6 uses these model estimates to derive optimal tax schedules. We provide
evidence for lowering the marginal rates at lower incomes and also document the importance
of allowing the tax schedule to depend on the age of children. We also discuss how introduc-
ing hours rules affects tax credit design, and how important these are likely to be in terms of
social welfare. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Optimal Design Problem
The policy analysis here concerns the choice of a tax schedule in which the government is
attempting to allocate a ﬁxed amount of revenue R to a speciﬁc demographic group – single
mothers – in a way which will maximise the social welfare for this group. Such a schedule bal-
ances redistributive objectives with efﬁciency considerations. Redistributive preferences are
represented through the social welfare function deﬁned as the sum of transformed individual
utilities, where the choice of transformation reﬂects the desire for equality.
In this section we develop an analytical framework for the design of tax and transfer
policy that allows for two scenarios. In the ﬁrst only earnings are observable by the tax
authority, in the second we allow for partial observability of hours of work. Rather than1.2. The Optimal Design Problem 20
assuming that individuals are unconstrained in their choice of hours, we suppose that only a
ﬁnite number of hours choices are available, with hours of work h chosen from the ﬁnite set
H = {h0,...hJ}. The formulation of the optimal tax design problem will depend upon what
information is observable to the tax authorities. We always assume that the government can
observe earnings wh and worker characteristics X, and we shall also allow for the possibility
of observing some hours of work information. In much of our analysis we will assume that
rather than necessarily observing the actual hours h that are chosen, the tax authorities is
assumed to only be able to observe that they belong to some closed interval h = [h,h] ∈ H
with h ≤ h ≤ h. For example, the tax authorities may be able to observe whether individuals
are working at least hB hours per week, but conditional on this, not how many. Depending
on the size of the interval, this framework nests two important special cases; (i) when hours
are perfectly observable h = h = h for all h ∈ H; (ii) only earnings information is observed
h = H++ for all h > 0. In general this is viewed as a problem of partial observability since
actual hours h are always contained in the interval h. In our later analysis in Section 1.6.3 we
will explore the effect that both random hours measurement error, and possible direct hours
misreporting have upon the optimal design problem.
Work decisions by individuals are determined by their preferences over consumption c
and labour hours h, as well as possible childcare requirements, ﬁxed costs of work, and the
tax and transfer system. Preferences are indexed by observable characteristics X, including
the number and age of her children, and vectors of unobservable (to the econometrician)
characteristics ǫ and ε; the distinction between these vectors will be made in Section 1.4. We
let U(c,h;X,ǫ,ε) represent the utility of a single mother who consumes c and works h hours.
We will assume that she consumes her net income which comprises the product of hours of
work h and the gross hourly wage w plus non-labour income and transfer payments, less
taxes paid, childcare expenditure, and ﬁxed costs of work. In what follows we let F denote
the distribution of state speciﬁc errors ε, and G denote the joint distribution of (X,ǫ).4
In our later empirical analysis individual utilities U(c,h;X,ǫ,ε) will be described by a
parametric utility function and a parametric distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (ǫ,ε).
Similarly, a parametric form will be assumed for the stochastic process determining ﬁxed
costs of work and childcare expenditure. To maintain focus on the optimal design problem,
we delay this discussion regarding the econometric modelling until Section 1.4; for now it
sufﬁces to write consumption c at hours h as c(h;T,X,ǫ),5 where T(wh,h;X) represents the
tax and transfer system. Non-labour income, such as child maintenance payments, enter the
tax and transfer schedule T through the set of demographics X, and for notational simplicity
we abstract from the potential dependence of the tax and transfer system on childcare expen-
diture. Taking the schedule T as given, each single mother is assumed to choose her hours of
4Throughout our analysis we assume that ε is independent of both ǫ and X.
5The assumptions that we later make regarding the error term ε ensure that consumption will not depend on ε for
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work h∗ ∈ H to maximize her utility. That is:
h∗ = argmax
h∈H
U(c(h;T,X,ǫ),h;X,ǫ,ε). (1.1)
We assume that the government chooses the tax schedule T to maximize a social welfare
function W that is represented by the sum of transformed utilities:
W(T) =
 
X,ǫ
 
ε
Υ(U(c(h∗;T,X,ǫ),h∗;X,ǫ,ε))dF(ε)dG(X,ǫ) (1.2)
where for a given cardinal representation of U, the utility transformation function Υ deter-
mines the governments relative preference for the equality of utilities.6 This maximization is
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint which states that lone mothers choose their
hours of work optimally given T (equation 1.1) and the government resource constraint:
 
X,ǫ
 
ε
T(wh∗,h∗;X)dF(ε)dG(X,ǫ) ≥ T(≡ −R). (1.3)
In our empirical application we will restrict T to belong to a particular parametric class of tax
functions. This is discussed in Section 1.6 when we examine the optimal design of the tax and
transfer schedule.
1.3 Tax Credit Reform
The increasing reliance on tax-credit policies during the 1980s and 1990s, especially in the
UK and the US, reﬂected the secular decline in the relative wages of low skilled workers
with low labour market attachment together with the growth in single-parent households
(see Blundell, 2001, and references therein). The speciﬁc policy context for this paper is the
Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) reform which took place in the UK at the end of 1999.
A novel feature of the British tax credit system is that it makes use of hours conditions in
addition to an earnings condition. Speciﬁcally WFTC eligibility required a working parent to
record at least 16 hours of work per week. Moreover there was a further hours contingent
bonus for working 30 hours or more.
As in the US, the UK has a long history of in-work beneﬁts, starting with the introduction
Family Income Support (FIS) in 1971. Over the years, these programmes became more gener-
ous, and in October 1999, Working Families’ Tax Credit was introduced, replacing a similar,
but less generous, tax credit programme called Family Credit (see Blundell et al., 2008, for
example). As noted above, an important feature of British programmes of in-work support
since their inception – and in contrast with programmes such as the US Earned Income Tax
Credit – is that awards depend not only on earned and unearned income and family char-
acteristics, but also on a minimum weekly hours of work requirement. In April 1992, the
6Given the presence of preference heterogeneity, a more general formulation would allow the utility transforma-
tion function Υ to vary with individual characteristics.1.3. Tax Credit Reform 22
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Figure 1.1: Female hours of work by survey year. Figure shows the distribution of usual hours
of work for women by year and presence of children. Sample is restricted to women aged 18–
45. Calculated using UK Labour Force Survey data (for 1991) and UK Quarterly Labour Force
Survey data (1995 and 2002). Horizontal axes measure weekly hours of work; the vertical line
indicates the minimum hours eligibility.
minimum hours requirement fell from 24 to 16 hours a week. The impact of this reform on
single parents’ labour supply is ambiguous: those working more than 16 hours a week had
an incentive to reduce their hours to (no less than) 16, while those previously working fewer
than 16 hours had an incentive to increase their labour supply to (at least) the new cut-off.
Figure 1.1 shows that the pattern of observed hours of work over this period strongly reﬂects
these incentives. Single women without children were ineligible.7
The tax design problem we discuss here relates directly to the features of the WFTC.
Indeed we assess the reliability of our labour supply model in terms of its ability to explain
behaviour before and after the reform. There were essentially ﬁve ways in which WFTC
7In 1995, there was another reform to Family Credit, in the form of an additional (smaller) credit for those adults
working full time (deﬁned as 30 or more hours a week).1.3. Tax Credit Reform 23
Table 1.1: Parameters of FC/WFTC
April 1999 October 1999 June 2000 June 2002
(FC) (WFTC) (WFTC) (WFTC)
Basic Credit 49.80 52.30 53.15 62.50
Child Credit
under 11 15.15 19.85 25.60 26.45
11 to 16 20.90 20.90 25.60 26.45
over 16 25.95 25.95 26.35 27.20
30 hour credit 11.05 11.05 11.25 11.65
Threshold 80.65 90.00 91.45 94.50
Taper rate 70% after income tax
and National Insur-
ance
55% after income tax
and National Insur-
ance
55% after income tax
and National Insur-
ance
55% after income tax
and National Insur-
ance
Childcare Expenses up to £60
(£100) for 1 (more
than 1) child under
12 disregarded when
calculating income
70% of total expenses
up to £100 (£150) for
1 (more than 1) child
under 15
70% of total expenses
up to £100 (£150) for
1 (more than 1) child
under 15
70% of total expenses
up to £135 (£200) for
1 (more than 1) child
under 15
Notes: All monetary amounts are in pounds per week and expressed in nominal terms. Minimum FC/WFTC award
is 50p per week in all years above.
increased the level of in-work support relative to the previous FC system: (i) it offered higher
credits, especially for families with younger children; (ii) the increase in the threshold meant
that families could earn more before it was phased out; (iii) the tax credit withdrawal rate was
reduced from 70% to 55%; (iv) it provided more support for formal childcare costs through
a new childcare credit; (v) all child maintenance payments were disregarded from income
when calculating tax credit entitlement. The main parameters of FC and WFTC are presented
in Table 1.1.
The WFTC reform increased the attractiveness of working 16 or more hours a week com-
pared to working fewer hours, and the largest potential beneﬁciaries of WFTC were those
families who were just at the end of the FC beneﬁt withdrawal taper. Conditional on work-
ing 16 or more hours, the theoretical impact of WFTC is as follows: (i) people receiving the
maximum FC award will face an income effect away from work, but not below 16 hours a
week; (ii) people working more than 16 hours and not on maximum FC will face an income
effect away from work (but not below 16 hours a week), and a substitution effect towards
work; (iii) people working more than 16 hours and earning too much to be entitled to FC but
not WFTC will face income and substitution effects away from work if they claim WFTC (see
Blundell and Hoynes, 2004).
When analyzing the effect of the WFTC programme it is necessary to take an integrated
view of the tax system. This is because tax credit awards are counted as income when calculat-
ing entitlements to other beneﬁts, such as Housing Beneﬁt and Council Tax Beneﬁt. Families
in receipt of such beneﬁts would gain less from the WFTC reform than otherwise equivalent
families not receiving these beneﬁts; Figure 1.2 illustrates how the various policies impact1.4. A Structural Labour Supply Model 24
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Figure 1.2: Tax and transfer system interactions. Figure shows interaction of tax and transfer
system under April 2002 system for a lone parent with a single child aged 5, average band
C council tax, £40 per week housing costs, and no childcare costs. All incomes expressed in
April 2002 prices. Calculated using FORTAX.
on the budget constraint for a low wage lone parent. Moreover, there were other important
changes to the tax system affecting families with children that coincided with the expansion
of tax credits, and which make the potential labour supply responses considerably more com-
plex. In particular, there were increases in the generosity of Child Beneﬁt (a cash beneﬁt
available to all families with children regardless of income), as well as notable increases in
the child additions in Income Support (a welfare beneﬁt for low income families working less
than 16 hours a week).8
1.4 A Structural Labour Supply Model
The labour supply speciﬁcation develops from earlier studies of structural labour supply that
use discrete choice techniques and incorporate non-participation in transfer programmes,
speciﬁcally Hoynes (1996) and Keane and Mofﬁtt (1998). Our aim is to construct a credi-
ble model of labour supply behaviour that adequately allows for individual heterogeneity in
preferences and can well describe observed labour market outcomes. As initially discussed
in Section 1.2, lone mothers have preferences deﬁned over consumption c and hours of work
h. Hours of work h are chosen from some ﬁnite set H, which in our empirical application
will correspond to the discrete weekly hours points H = {0,10,19,26,33,40}.9 We augment
the model discussed in Section 1.2 to allow the take-up of tax-credits to have a direct impact
8For many families with children, these increases in out-of-work income meant that, despite the increased gen-
erosity of in-work tax credits, replacement rates remained relatively stable. There were also changes to the tax system
that affected families both with and without dependent children during the lifetime of WFTC: a new 10% starting
rate of income tax was introduced; the basic rate of income tax was reduced from 23% to 22%; there was a real rise
in the point at which National Insurance (payroll tax) becomes payable.
9These hours points correspond to the empirical hours ranges 0, 1–15, 16–22, 23–29, 30–36 and 37+ respectively.1.4. A Structural Labour Supply Model 25
on preferences through the presence of some stigma or hassle cost (discussed further below),
and we use P (equal to one if tax credits are received, zero otherwise) to denote the en-
dogenous programme participation decision.10 These preferences may vary with observable
demographic characteristics X (such as age, region, the number and age of children), and vec-
tors of unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics ǫ and ε. Here ε is used speciﬁcally
to denote the additive state speciﬁc errors which are attached to each discrete hours point and
are assumed to follow a standard Type-I extreme value distribution so that:
U(c,h, P;X,ǫ,ε) = u(c,h, P;X,ǫ)+ εh.
While we will later consider alternative preference speciﬁcations, our results will largely as-
sume Box-Cox preferences of the form:
u(c,h, P;X,ǫ) = αy(X,ǫ)
cθy − 1
θy
+ αl(X,ǫ)
(1− h/H)θl − 1
θl
+ αyl(X)
cθy − 1
θy
(1 − h/H)θl − 1
θl
− Pη(X,ǫ) (1.4)
where H = 168 denotes the total weekly time endowment, and where the set of functions
αy(X,ǫ), αl(X,ǫ), αyl(X) and η(X,ǫ) capture observed and unobserved preference hetero-
geneity. The function η(X,ǫ) is included to reﬂect the possible disutility associated with
claiming in-work tax credits (P = 1), and its presence allows us to rationalize less then com-
plete take-up of tax credit programmes. In each case we allow observed and unobserved het-
erogeneity to inﬂuence the preference shifter functions through appropriate index restrictions.
We assume that αyl(X) = X′
ylβyl, logαy(X,ǫ) = X′
yβy + ǫy and logαl(X,ǫ) = X′
lβl + ǫl, with
programme participation costs also assumed to be linear in parameters, η(X,ǫ) = X′
ηβη + ǫη.
We do not impose concavity on the utility function.
The choice of hours of work h affects consumption c through two main channels: ﬁrstly,
through its direct effect on labour market earnings and its interactions with the tax and trans-
fer system; secondly, working mothers may be required to purchase childcare for their chil-
dren which varies with maternal hours of employment. Given the rather limited information
that our data contains on the types of childcare use, we take a similarly limited approach to
modelling, whereby hours of childcare use hc is essentially viewed as a constraint: working
mothers are required to purchase a minimum level of childcare hc ≥ αc(h,X,ǫ) which varies
stochastically with hours of work and demographic characteristics. Since we observe a mass
of working mothers across the hours of work distribution who do not use any childcare, a lin-
ear relationship (as in Blundell et al., 2000) is unlikely to be appropriate. Instead, we assume
the presence of some underlying latent variable that governs both the selection mechanism
and the value of required childcare itself. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the total childcare
10All other transfer programmes are assumed to have complete take-up.1.4. A Structural Labour Supply Model 26
hours constraint is given by:
αc(h,X,ǫ) = 1(h > 0) × 1(ǫcX > −βcXh − γcX) × (γcX + βcXh + ǫcX) (1.5)
where 1( ) is the indicator function, and where the explicit conditioning of the parameters
and the unobservables on demographic characteristics X reﬂects the speciﬁcation we adopt
in our estimation, where we allow the parameters of this stochastic relationship to vary with
a subset of observable characteristics Xc (speciﬁcally, the number and age composition of
children). Total weekly childcare expenditure is then given by pchc with pc denoting the
hourly price of childcare. Empirically, we observe a large amount of dispersion in childcare
prices, with this distribution varying systematically with the age composition of children.
This is modelled by assuming that pc follows some distribution pc ∼ Fc( ;Xc) which again
varies with demographic characteristics. We approximate this distribution by discretizing the
empirical childcare price distribution including zero price and conditional on Xc.
Individuals are assumed to face a budget constraint, determined by a ﬁxed gross hourly
wage rate (assumed to be generated by a log-linear relationship of the form logw = X′
wβw +
ǫw) and the tax and transfer system. We arrive at our measure of consumption by subtracting
both childcare expenditure pchc (which also interacts with the tax and transfer system) and
ﬁxed work-related costs from net-income. These ﬁxed work-related costs help provide a
potentially important wedge that separates the intensive and extensive margin. They reﬂect
the actual and psychological costs that an individual has to pay to get to work. We model
work-related costs as a ﬁxed, one-off, weekly cost subtracted from net income at positive
values of working time: f = αf(h;X,ǫ) = 1(h > 0) × (X′
fβf + ǫf). It then follows that
consumption at a given hours and programme participation choice is given by:
c(h, P;T,X,ǫ) = wh − T(wh,h, P;X)− pchc − f (1.6)
where non-labour income, such as child maintenance payments, enter the tax and transfer
schedule T through the set of demographic characteristics X, and with the explicit condition-
ing of T on childcare expenditure suppressed for notational simplicity.
In order to fully describe the utility maximization problem of lone mothers, we denote
P∗(h) ∈ {0,E(h;X,ǫ)} as the optimal choice of programme participation for given hours of
work h, where E(h;X,ǫ) = 1 if the individual is eligible to receive tax credits at hours h, and
zero otherwise. Assuming eligibility, it then follows that P∗(h) = 1 if and only if the following
condition holds:
u(c(h, P = 1;T,X,ǫ),h, P = 1;X,ǫ) ≥ u(c(h, P = 0;T,X,ǫ),h, P = 0;X,ǫ) (1.7)
where c(h, P;X,ǫ) is as deﬁned in equation 1.6. It then follows that the optimal choice of1.5. Data and Estimation 27
hours h∗ ∈ H maximizes U(c(h, P∗(h);T,X,ǫ),h, P∗(h);X,ǫ,ε) subject to the constraints as
detailed above.
1.5 Data and Estimation
1.5.1 Data
We use six repeated cross-sections from the Family Resources Survey (FRS), from the ﬁnancial
year 1997/8 through to 2002/3, which covers the introduction and subsequent expansion
of WFTC. The FRS is a cross-section household-based survey drawn from postcode records
across Great Britain: around 30,000 families with and without children each year are asked
detailed questions about earnings, other forms of income and receipt of state beneﬁts. Our
sample is restricted to lone mothers who are aged between 18 and 45 at the interview date, not
residing in a multiple tax unit household, and not in receipt of any disability related beneﬁts.
Dropping families with missing observations of crucial variables, and those observed during
the WFTC phase-in period of October 1999 to March 2000 inclusive, restricts our estimation
sample to 7,110 lone mothers.
1.5.2 Estimation
The full model (preferences, wages, and childcare) is estimated simultaneously by simulated
maximum likelihood; the likelihood function is presented in Appendix 1.A.11 We incorporate
highly detailed representations of the tax and transfer system using FORTAX (see Appendix
A.1 in this thesis). The budget constraints vary accurately with individual circumstances, and
reﬂect the complex interactions between the many components of the tax and transfer system.
To facilitate the estimation procedure, the actual tax and transfer schedules are modiﬁed
slightly to ensure that there are no discontinuities in net-income as either the gross wage
or child care expenditure vary for given hours of work. We do not attempt to describe the
full UK system here, but the interested reader may consult Adam and Browne (2009) and
O’Dea et al. (2007) for recent surveys; see Appendix A.1 in this thesis for a discussion of the
implementation of the UK system in FORTAX.
For the purpose of modelling childcare, we deﬁne six groups by the age of youngest
child (0–4, 5–10, and 11–18) and by the number of children (1 and 2 or more). The stochastic
relationship determining hours of required childcare αc(h,X,ǫ) varies within each of these
groups, as does the child care price distribution Fc( ;Xc). Using data from the entire sam-
ple period, the childcare price distribution is discretized into either four price points (if the
youngest child is aged 0–4 or 5–10) or 2 points (if the youngest child is aged 11-18). In each
case, the zero price point is included, and the probability that lone mothers face each of these
discrete price points is estimated.
11This simultaneous estimation procedure contrasts with existing UK-centric labour supply studies that have used
discrete choice techniques. Perhaps largely owing to the complexity of the UK transfer system, these existing studies
(such as Blundell et al., 2000) typically pre-estimate wages which allows net-incomes to be computed prior to the
main preference estimation. In addition to the usual efﬁciency arguments, the simultaneous estimation here imposes
internal coherency with regards to the various selection mechanisms.1.5. Data and Estimation 28
The unobserved wage component ǫw and the random preference heterogeneity terms
(ǫy,ǫl,ǫf,ǫη,ǫcX) are assumed to be normally distributed. Given the difﬁculty in identifying
ﬂexible correlation structures from observed outcomes (see Keane, 1992), we allow ǫy to be
correlated with ǫw, but otherwise assume that the errors are independent. In the later results
presented we additionally restrict the standard deviation of both ǫl and ǫf to be zero as we
found them to be both very small in magnitude and imprecisely estimated. The integrals
over ǫ in the log-likelihood function are approximated using simulation methods (see Train,
2003); we use 400 quasi-random draws generated using Neiderreiter’s method. The model is
estimated using a sequential quadratic programming method.
1.5.3 Speciﬁcation and Structural Parameter Estimates
The estimates of the parameters of our structural model are presented in Table 1.2. The age
of the youngest child has a signiﬁcant impact on the estimated ﬁxed costs of work αf; ﬁxed
work related costs are higher by around £15 per week if the youngest child is of pre-school age.
The presence of young children also has a highly signiﬁcant effect on the interacted leisure-
consumption parameter αyl, but does not have any quantitatively large or signiﬁcant effect on
the linear preference terms αy and αl. Whilst the age of the youngest child is important, the
actual number of children does not have a signiﬁcant effect upon the preference parameters.
Lone mothers who are older are estimated to have a lower preference for both consump-
tion and leisure, but higher costs of claiming in-work support. Meanwhile, the main impact
of education comes primarily on the preference for leisure αl; mothers who have completed
compulsory schooling have a lower preference for leisure. Ethnicity enters the model through
both ﬁxed costs of work and programme participation costs η; we ﬁnd that programme par-
ticipation costs are signiﬁcantly higher for non-white lone mothers. Programme participation
costs are found to fall signiﬁcantly following the introduction of WFTC, although the reduc-
tion in the ﬁrst year is small (as captured by the inclusion of a variable equal to one in the
ﬁrst year of WFTC).
Both the intercept γc and the slope coefﬁcient βc in the child care equation are lower
for those with older children. This reﬂects the fact that lone mothers with older children
use child care less, and that the total childcare required varies less with maternal hours of
work. To rationalize the observed distributions, we require that the standard deviation σc is
also larger for those with older children. The price distribution of childcare for each group
was discretized in such a way that amongst those mothers using paid childcare, there are
equal numbers in each discrete price group. Our estimates attach greater probability on the
relatively high childcare prices (and less on zero price) than in our raw data. Individuals who
do not work are therefore more likely to face relatively expensive childcare were they to work.
The hourly log-wage equation includes years of education completed (which enters pos-
itively), and both age and age squared (potential wages are increasing in age, but at a dimin-
ishing rate). Lone mothers who reside in the Greater London area have signiﬁcantly higher1
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Table 1.2: Simulated maximum likelihood estimation results
Preference parameters
constant youngest youngest number of age compuslory non-white London WFTC year
child 0-4 child 5-10 children-1 schooling period 2000
αy 1.566 -0.104 -0.029 -0.010 -0.010 -0.027 – – – –
(0.131) (0.119) (0.108) (0.031) (0.005) (0.083) – – – –
αl 2.781 0.030 0.024 0.057 -0.047 -(0.407) – – – –
(0.187) (0.168) (0.157) (0.044) (0.007) (0.085) – – – –
αyl 4.112 7.578 3.587 – – – – – – –
(1.630) (2.065) (1.849) – – – – – – –
θy 0.302 – – – – – – – – –
(0.111) – – – – – – – – –
θl 2.813 – – – – – – – – –
(0.816) – – – – – – – – –
αf 0.284 0.151 0.043 0.044 0.006 0.081 -0.035 0.228 – –
(0.083) (0.084) (0.068) (0.032) (0.005) (0.063) (0.053) (0.046) – –
η 0.760 – – – 0.028 -0.058 0.328 – -0.475 0.394
(0.177) – – – (0.008) (0.146) (0.153) – (0.102) (0.114)
Continued . ..1
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Table 1.2: (continued)
Childcare parameters
1 child 1 child 1 child 2 children 2 children 2 children
youngest age 0-4 youngest age 5-10 youngest age 11-18 youngest age 0-4 youngest age 5-10 youngest age 11-18
γc 4.481 -7.767 -27.833 5.035 -25.872 -58.522
(2.041) (1.494) (5.354) (3.646) (3.319) (11.016)
βc 0.701 0.672 0.309 1.163 1.308 0.639
(0.066) (0.049) (0.157) (0.133) (0.115) (0.323)
σc 13.171 11.783 24.814 26.944 27.420 42.667
(0.466) (0.312) (2.274) (0.905) (0.868) (3.757)
Pr(p1
cc) 0.181 0.172 0.153 0.159 0.133 0.178
(0.019) (0.018) (0.036) (0.019) (0.016) (0.049)
Pr(p2
cc) 0.205 0.179 – 0.194 0.146 –
(0.021) (0.019) – (0.023) (0.018) –
Pr(p3
cc) 0.240 0.194 – 0.267 0.164 –
(0.023) (0.020) – (0.028) (0.020) –
p0
cc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p1
cc 0.972 0.810 1.820 0.541 0.570 1.658
p2
cc 2.172 1.594 – 1.555 1.474 –
p3
cc 3.436 2.576 – 2.942 2.474 –
Wage equation
constant education age age squared London non-white 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 σw
0.250 0.081 0.052 -0.054 0.191 -0.030 -0.013 0.028 0.130 0.138 0.146 0.406
0.043 (0.002) (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.005)
Notes: All parameters estimated simultaneously by simulated maximum likelihood, using FRS data and with sample selection as detailed in Section 1.5. Incomes are expressed in hundreds of
pounds per week in April 2002 prices. Age and age squared are deﬁned in terms of deviations from the median value; age squared is divided by one hundred. Compulsory schooling is equal to
1 if the individual completed school at age 16 or above. Education measures years of education completed. London is equal to one if resident in the Greater London area. WFTC period is equal
to one if individual is interviewed post-October 1999. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.1.5. Data and Estimation 31
Table 1.3: Predicted and empirical frequencies by age of youngest child
All 0-4 5-10 11-18
Predicted Empirical Predicted Empirical Predicted Empirical Predicted Empirical
0 hours 0.551 0.550 0.709 0.708 0.491 0.488 0.319 0.320
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
10 hours 0.069 0.068 0.053 0.050 0.080 0.082 0.080 0.081
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
19 hours 0.101 0.121 0.085 0.099 0.114 0.139 0.114 0.130
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009)
26 hours 0.081 0.070 0.056 0.044 0.093 0.084 0.113 0.098
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)
33 hours 0.092 0.077 0.051 0.042 0.105 0.087 0.157 0.136
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
40 hours 0.106 0.115 0.046 0.058 0.117 0.120 0.217 0.235
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
Take-up 0.766 0.765 0.822 0.788 0.767 0.783 0.709 0.715
rate (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Notes: Empirical frequencies calculated using FRS data with sample selection as detailed in Section 1.5. The discrete
points 0, 10, 19, 26, 33 and 40 correspond to the hours ranges 0, 1–15, 16–22, 23–29, 30–36 and 37+ respectively.
Empirical take-up rates calculated using reported receipt of FC/WFTC with entitlement simulated using FORTAX.
Predicted frequencies are calculated using FRS data and the maximum likelihood estimates from Table 1.2. Standard
errors are in parentheses, and calculated for the predicted frequencies by sampling 500 times from the distribution
of parameter estimates and conditional on the sample distribution of observables.
wages, and the inclusion of time dummies track the general increase in real wages over time.
Unsurprisingly, there is considerable dispersion in the unobserved component of log-wages.
The within sample ﬁt of the model is presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. We match the
observed employment states and the take-up rate over the entire sample period very well (see
the ﬁrst column of Table 1.3). We slightly under predict the number of lone mothers working
19 hours per week, and slightly over predict the number working either 26 or 33 hours per
week, but the difference is not quantitatively large. Similarly, we obtain very good ﬁt by age
of youngest child. The ﬁt to the employment rate is particularly good, and the difference
between predicted and empirical hours frequencies never differs by more than around two
percentage points.
The ﬁt of the model over time is presented in Table 1.4. Fitting the model over time
is more challenging given that time only enters our speciﬁcation in a very limited manner -
through the wage equation and via the change in the stigma costs of the accessing the tax
credit. Despite this we are able to replicate the 9 percentage point increase in employment
between 1997/98 and 2002/03 reasonably well with our model, although we do slightly under
predict the growth in part-time employment over this period.
To understand what our parameter estimates mean for labour supply behaviour we sim-
ulate labour supply elasticities under the actual 2002 tax system across a range of earnings
and household types. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 1.5. Participation elas-
ticities are lowest for single mothers whose youngest child is under 4 (an elasticity of 0.57),
while they are signiﬁcantly higher for mothers with school aged children (0.82 if youngest
child is aged 5-10; 0.72 if the youngest child is aged 11-18). Across all child age groups, ex-1.5. Data and Estimation 32
Table 1.4: Predicted and empirical frequencies: 1997-2002
1997 2002
Predicted Empirical Predicted Empirical
0 hours 0.592 0.600 0.507 0.508
(0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013)
10 hours 0.071 0.080 0.069 0.062
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
19 hours 0.092 0.100 0.114 0.140
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
26 hours 0.072 0.052 0.091 0.079
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
33 hours 0.080 0.064 0.103 0.093
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008)
40 hours 0.094 0.104 0.115 0.120
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
Take-up 0.716 0.688 0.817 0.838
rate (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010)
Notes: Empirical frequencies calculated using FRS data with sample selection as detailed in Section 1.5. The discrete
points 0, 10, 19, 26, 33 and 40 correspond to the hours ranges 0, 1–15, 16–22, 23–29, 30–36 and 37+ respectively.
Empirical take-up rates calculated using reported receipt of FC/WFTC with entitlement simulated using FORTAX.
Predicted frequencies are calculated using FRS data and the maximum likelihood estimates from Table 1.2. Standard
errors are in parentheses, and calculated for the predicted frequencies by sampling 500 times from the distribution
of parameter estimates and conditional on the sample distribution of observables.
tensive elasticities are higher than intensive elasticities at low earnings, but at higher earnings
levels the intensive elasticities dominate.12 Intensive elasticities are typically higher for lone
mothers with older children, as are the extensive elasticities except at low earnings levels;
extensive elasticities are very similar for lone mothers whose youngest child is aged 5-10 or
aged 11-18. The individual behaviour that these summary elasticity measures reﬂect will have
implications for the optimal design of the tax and transfer system (see Section 1.6).
1.5.4 Simulating the WFTC Reform
Before we proceed to consider optimal design problems using our structural model, we ﬁrst
provide an evaluation of the impact of the WFTC reform discussed in Section 1.3 above on
single mothers. This exercise considers the impact of replacing the actual 2002 tax systems
with the April 1997 tax system on the 2002 population. This exercise is slightly different
to simply examining the change in predicted states over this time period as it removes the
inﬂuence of changing demographic characteristics.
The results of this policy reform simulation are presented in Table 1.6. Overall we pre-
dict that employment increased by 4 percentage points as a result of these reforms, with the
increase due to movements into both part-time and full-time employment. Comparing with
Table 1.4 we ﬁnd the reform explains a little under half of the rise in employment over this
period. The predicted increase in take-up of tax credits is also substantial, with this increase
driven both by the changing entitlement and the estimated reduction in programme partici-
pation costs.
12See the note accompanying Table 1.5 for a precise deﬁnition of these elasticities.1.5. Data and Estimation 33
Table 1.5: Simulated elasticities by age of youngest child
Weekly 0-4 5-10 11-18
Earnings Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
50 0.168 0.025 0.205 0.085 0.144 0.130
(0.017) (0.003) (0.020) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016)
100 0.128 0.055 0.178 0.177 0.151 0.269
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.030)
150 0.100 0.077 0.155 0.239 0.153 0.387
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.025) (0.008) (0.042)
200 0.067 0.076 0.112 0.231 0.116 0.394
(0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.024) (0.005) (0.041)
250 0.043 0.066 0.074 0.194 0.077 0.340
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.035)
300 0.027 0.051 0.046 0.147 0.045 0.252
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.024)
350 0.016 0.035 0.028 0.102 0.025 0.170
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.015)
400 0.024 0.034 0.039 0.094 0.028 0.140
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.011)
Participation 0.566 0.820 0.720
elasticity (0.047) (0.042) (0.036)
Notes: All elasticities simulated under actual 2002 tax systems with complete take-up of WFTC. Earnings are in
pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices. Participation elasticities simulated by increasing con-
sumption at all positive hours choices by 1%. Extensive and intensive earnings elasticities simulated by increasing
consumption at the hours point closest to the respective earnings point. Extensive elasticities measure the increase in
the employment rate following a 1% increase in consumption at the respective level of earnings. Intensive elasticities
measure the increase in the proportion of individuals at each earnings point from any positive hours point following
a 1% increase in consumption at the respective level of earnings. Standard errors are in parentheses, and calculated
by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter estimates and conditional on the sample distribution of
observables.
Table 1.6: Impact of reforms: 1997-2002
2002 system 1997 system change
0 hours 0.507 0.547 -0.039
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003)
10 hours 0.069 0.072 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
19 hours 0.114 0.098 0.015
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
26 hours 0.091 0.078 0.013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
33 hours 0.103 0.089 0.014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
40 hours 0.115 0.117 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Take-up 0.817 0.683 0.134
rate (0.008) (0.019) (0.015)
Notes: impact of tax and transfer system reforms on hours of work and take-up simulated using FRS 2002 data by
replacing actual 2002 tax systems with the April 1997 tax system. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calcu-
lated by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter estimates and conditional on the sample distribution
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1.6 The Optimal Design of the Tax and Transfer Schedule
In this section we use our structural model to examine the design of the tax and transfer
schedule. We show the importance of allowing the schedule to depend on the age of children.
One of the key results is that marginal rates should be lower for low earnings families with
older children. Given the use of a minimum hours condition for eligibility in the British tax
credit system, we also consider the design in the case of a minimum hours rule. We show
that if hours of work are partially (but otherwise accurately) observable, then there can be
non-trivial welfare gains from introducing an hours rule for lone mothers with older children.
However, accurately observing hours of work is crucial for this result. Our results suggest
that if hours of work are subject to measurement error – whether this be random or due to
direct misreporting – then the welfare gains that can be realised may be much reduced. Our
analysis here therefore supports the informal discussion regarding the inclusion of hours in
the tax base in Banks and Diamond (2009). Before detailing these results, we ﬁrst turn to
the choice of social welfare transformation and the parameterisation of the tax and transfer
schedule.
1.6.1 Optimal Tax Speciﬁcation
We have shown that using parameter estimates from a structural model of labour supply, the
behaviour of individuals can be simulated as the tax and transfer system is varied. With these
heterogeneous labour supply responses allowed for, the structural model provides all the nec-
essary information to maximise an arbitrary social welfare function, subject to a government
budget constraint. Note that our analysis here integrates that tax and transfer system.
To implement the optimal design analysis we approximate the underlying non-
parametric optimal schedule by a piecewise linear tax schedule that is characterized by a
level of out-of-work income (income support), and seven different marginal tax rates. These
marginal tax rates, which are restricted to lie between -100% and 100%, apply to weekly earn-
ings from £0 to £300 in increments of £50, and then all weekly earnings above £300. We do not
tax any non-labour sources of income, and do not allow childcare usage to interact with tax
and transfer schedule unless explicitly stated. When we later allow for partial observability
of hours we introduce additional payments that are received only if the individual fulﬁlls the
relevant hours criteria.
The optimal tax schedule is solved separately for three different groups on the basis of
the age of youngest child: under 4, aged 5 to 10 and 11 to 18. For these illustrations, we
have also conditioned upon the presence of a single child. For each of these groups we set
the value of government expenditure equal to the predicted expenditure on this group within
our sample.13 Conditioning upon this level of expenditure we calculate the tax and transfer
schedule that maximizes social welfare in each of these groups. We adopt the following utility
13To date we have made no attempt to calculate what the optimal division of overall expenditure is between these
three groups. This therefore makes an implicit assumption regarding the value that the government attaches on the
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transformation in the social welfare function:
Υ(U;θ) =
(expU)θ − 1
θ
(1.8)
which controls the preference for equality by the one dimensional parameter θ and also per-
mits negative utilities which is important in our analysis given that the state speciﬁc errors
ε can span the entire real line. When θ is negative, the function (1.8) favours the equality of
utilities; when θ is positive the reverse is true. By L’Hˆ opital’s rule θ = 0 corresponds to the
linear case. We solve the schedule for a set of parameter values θ = {−0.4,−0.2,0.0} and then
derive the social weights that characterise these redistributive preferences. We do not consider
cases where θ > 0. The presence of state speciﬁc Type-I extreme value errors, together with
our above choice of utility transformation has some particularly convenient properties, as the
follow Proposition now demonstrates.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the utility transformation function is as speciﬁed in equation 1.8. If
θ = 0 then conditional on X and ǫ the integral over (Type-I extreme value) state speciﬁc errors ε in
equation 1.2 is given by:
log
 
∑
h∈H
exp(u(c(h;T,X,ǫ),h;X,ǫ))
 
+ γ
where γ ≈ 0.57721 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. If θ < 0 then conditional on X and ǫ the
integral over state speciﬁc errors is given by:
1
θ

Γ(1 − θ) ×
 
∑
h∈H
exp(u(c(h;T,X,ǫ),h;X,ǫ))
 θ
− 1


where Γ is the gamma function.
Proof. The result for θ = 0 follows directly from an application of L’Hˆ opital’s rule, and the
well known result for expected utility in the presence of Type-I extreme value errors (see
McFadden, 1978). See Appendix 1.B for a proof in the case where θ < 0.
This proposition, which essentially generalizes the result of McFadden (1978), facilitates
the numerical analysis as the integral over state speciﬁc errors does not require simulating.
Moreover, the relationship between the utilities in each state, and the contribution to social
welfare for given (X,ǫ) is made explicit and transparent.
1.6.2 Implications for the Tax Schedule
The underlying properties from the labour supply model, together with the choice of social
welfare weights, are the key ingredients in the empirical design problem. We have seen from
Table 1.5 that the intensive and extensive labour supply responses differ substantially. They
also vary with the age of the youngest child. As expected this is reﬂected in the optimal1.6. The Optimal Design of the Tax and Transfer Schedule 36
Table 1.7: Social welfare weights under optimal system by age of youngest child
Weekly 0-4 5-10 11-18
Earnings θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0
0 1.226 1.208 1.143 1.493 1.418 1.228 1.701 1.539 1.238
0–50 1.034 0.966 0.856 1.381 1.282 1.076 1.680 1.497 1.174
50–100 0.838 0.837 0.784 1.103 1.092 0.968 1.352 1.284 1.047
100–150 0.643 0.714 0.802 0.886 0.950 0.952 1.119 1.140 1.016
150–200 0.524 0.647 0.851 0.704 0.828 0.969 0.883 0.980 1.015
200–250 0.423 0.563 0.842 0.562 0.707 0.929 0.705 0.834 0.971
250–300 0.335 0.483 0.883 0.440 0.595 0.912 0.549 0.702 0.948
300+ 0.202 0.331 0.775 0.253 0.397 0.860 0.323 0.479 0.905
Notes: Table presents social welfare weights under optimal structure of marginal tax rates and out-of-work income
by age of child and under range of distributional taste parameters θ as presented in Table 1.8. All incomes are in
pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices. Social weights are normalized so that the sum of weights
multiplied by earnings density under optimal system is equal to unity.
tax results. For the choice of utility transformation function in equation 1.8 we examine the
impact of alternative θ values. In Table 1.7 we present the underlying social welfare weights
evaluated at the optimal schedule (discussed below) across the different child age groups
according to these alternative θ values. For all three values of θ considered here the weights
are broadly downward sloping. For the most part we focus our discussion here on the -0.2
value, although we do provide a sensitivity of our results to the choice of θ and ﬁnd the broad
conclusions are robust to this choice.
In Table 1.8 we present the optimal tax and transfer schedules across the alternative
θ values and for all child age groups (also see Figure 1.3(a)–(c) for θ = −0.2). In all the
simulations performed here, the structure of marginal tax rates is broadly progressive with
lower rates at lower earnings levels. In particular, marginal rates are typically much lower
in the ﬁrst tax bracket (earnings up to £50 per-week) and for lone mothers with a child aged
between 11 and 18 we obtain pure tax credits (negative marginal tax rates) in this bracket.
Marginal tax rates are typically much higher in the second bracket (weekly earnings between
£50 and £100), but then fall before proceeding to generally increase with labour earnings. As
we increase the value of θ (corresponding to less redistributive concern), we obtain reductions
in the value of out-of-work income. This is accompanied by broad decreases in marginal tax
rates, except in the ﬁrst tax bracket where marginal tax rates increase. The social welfare
weights presented in Table 1.7 reﬂect these changes.
Our optimal tax simulations reveal some important differences by the age of children. In
particular, marginal tax rates tend to be higher at low earnings for lone mothers with younger
children, but lower at high earnings. There are two important observations to make here.
Firstly, there are far fewer lone mothers with young children who obtain high earnings under
the respective optimal tax and transfer systems: only around 25% of lone mothers whose child
is aged 0–4 have earnings that exceed £100 per week; in contrast, around 70% of lone mothers
with children in the oldest age group have earnings exceeding this amount. Secondly, the1.6. The Optimal Design of the Tax and Transfer Schedule 37
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Figure 1.3: Optimal tax schedules with hours bonuses. All schedules are calculated with
θ = −0.2 and assuming an hourly wage of £6. All incomes are measured in April 2002 prices.
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Table 1.8: Optimal marginal tax schedules by age of youngest child
Weekly 0-4 5-10 11-18
Earnings θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0
0–50 0.107 0.150 0.241 0.020 0.043 0.120 -0.045 -0.028 0.060
(0.026) (0.021) (0.029) (0.034) (0.023) (0.020) (0.056) (0.040) (0.028)
50–100 0.618 0.486 0.205 0.631 0.470 0.154 0.552 0.369 0.101
(0.045) (0.046) (0.057) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.034)
100–150 0.239 0.177 -0.024 0.325 0.259 0.043 0.407 0.322 0.080
(0.023) (0.025) (0.037) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
150–200 0.424 0.367 0.144 0.513 0.437 0.127 0.565 0.468 0.098
(0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.012) (0.016) (0.034) (0.015) (0.019) (0.040)
200–250 0.444 0.407 0.136 0.523 0.476 0.202 0.582 0.522 0.219
(0.010) (0.012) (0.029) (0.009) (0.012) (0.035) (0.011) (0.013) (0.041)
250–300 0.384 0.338 0.118 0.517 0.461 0.096 0.580 0.507 0.094
(0.015) (0.016) (0.038) (0.011) (0.015) (0.038) (0.014) (0.018) (0.044)
300+ 0.559 0.542 0.343 0.602 0.575 0.298 0.663 0.631 0.335
(0.010) (0.010) (0.032) (0.008) (0.009) (0.040) (0.008) (0.009) (0.044)
Out-of-work 142.545 141.401 133.762 135.548 131.041 108.591 123.733 114.296 79.458
income (1.273) (1.188) (1.270) (1.833) (1.752) (3.200) (3.579) (3.451) (4.651)
Notes: Table presents optimal structure of marginal tax rates and out-of-work income by age of child and under range
of distributional taste parameters θ. All incomes are in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter
estimates and conditional on the sample distribution of observables.
childcare requirements of mothers with young children are considerably higher (see Table
1.2). As such, the marginal rates presented in Table 1.8 understate the effective marginal
tax rates that mothers with young children face. If we explicitly allow the tax system to
subsidize childcare expenditure (we consider a 70% subsidy, which corresponds to the formal
childcare subsidy rate under WFTC), then the level of out-of-work income remains effectively
unchanged (since non-working mothers do not require childcare in our structural model),
while marginal tax rates increase across the entire distribution of earnings for mothers with
very young children. There are small increases for mothers with children aged 5–10, and
effectively no change for mothers with children aged 11–18. Full results are available upon
request.
In the simulation results in Table 1.8 we also present standard errors for the parameters
of the optimal tax schedule. We obtain these by sampling 500 times from the distribution of
parameter estimates and re-solving for the optimal schedule conditional on the sample dis-
tribution of covariates. The standard errors that we obtain are typically quite small, but this
does raise some concern that our results may be sensitive to our particular speciﬁcation of
the utility function. Before proceeding further, we consider the robustness of our main results
to the utility function parameterization by estimating our labour supply model with differ-
ent preference representations, and then exploring the implications for design under each of
these. We consider two alternative representations: (i) modify the utility function presented in
equation 1.4 by adding squared Box-Cox transformations of consumption and leisure (hence-
forth referred to as utility 2); (ii) preferences that are quadratic in leisure and consumption14
14That is: u(c,h, P;X,ǫ) = αyc2 + αll2 + αlycl + βyc + βll − Pη, with observable heterogeneity X inﬂuencing the
coefﬁcients through linear index restrictions, and with unobserved preference heterogeneity ǫ entering the model1.6. The Optimal Design of the Tax and Transfer Schedule 39
Table 1.9: Optimal marginal tax schedules by age of youngest child (robustness exercise)
Weekly 0-4 5-10 11-18
Earnings Utility
1
Utility
2
Utility
3
Utility
1
Utility
2
Utility
3
Utility
1
Utility
2
Utility
3
0–50 0.150 0.181 0.125 0.043 0.019 0.015 -0.028 0.006 0.014
(0.021) (0.029) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.030) (0.040) (0.063) (0.060)
50–100 0.486 0.596 0.335 0.470 0.439 0.257 0.369 0.327 0.247
(0.046) (0.062) (0.044) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.093) (0.063)
100–150 0.177 0.170 0.261 0.259 0.220 0.271 0.322 0.298 0.309
(0.025) (0.055) (0.015) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.064) (0.027)
150–200 0.367 0.362 0.361 0.437 0.413 0.374 0.468 0.453 0.432
(0.016) (0.027) (0.022) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.069) (0.023)
200–250 0.407 0.411 0.410 0.476 0.461 0.452 0.522 0.510 0.512
(0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.070) (0.020)
250–300 0.338 0.353 0.353 0.461 0.447 0.416 0.507 0.495 0.477
(0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.020)
300+ 0.542 0.564 0.557 0.575 0.570 0.583 0.631 0.622 0.646
(0.010) (0.014) (0.025) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020)
Out-of-work 141.401 141.276 140.637 131.041 129.398 125.817 114.296 113.329 111.085
income (1.188) (1.407) (1.217) (1.752) (1.954) (2.292) (3.451) (6.336) (4.966)
Notes: Table presents optimal structure of marginal tax rates and out-of-work income by age of child and range of
utility function speciﬁcations (utility 1, utility 2, and utility 3 – see Section 1.6 for details) with θ = −0.2. All incomes
are in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated
by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter estimates and conditional on the sample distribution of
observables.
as in Blundell et al. (2000) (referred to as utility 3). The results of this robustness exercise are
presented in Table 1.9 in the case when θ = −0.2. Across all the different age groups, we ﬁnd
that the schedules are very similar to those arrived at using our original utility representation
(referred to as utility 1 in the table). This therefore suggests that the results we present are not
too dependent upon our choice of utility function.
1.6.3 Introducing an Hours Rule
For several decades the UK’s tax credits and welfare beneﬁts have made use of rules related to
weekly hours of work. As discussed in Section 1.3, individuals must work at least 16 hours a
week to be eligible for in-work tax credits, and receive a further smaller credit when working
30 or more hours. While many theoretical models rule out the observability of any hours
information, this design feature motivates us to explore the optimal structure of the tax and
transfer system when hours can be partially observed as set out in Section 1.2. We begin by
assuming that the tax authority is able to observe whether individuals are working 19 hours
or more, which roughly corresponds to the placement of the main 16 hours condition in the
British tax-credit system, and for now we do not allow for any form of measurement error. In
this case the tax authority is able to condition an additional payment on individuals working
such hours. When the tax authority is only able to observe earnings, it is unable to infer
whether an individual with a given level of earnings is low wage-high hours, or high wage-
low hours. Since the government may value redistribution more highly in the former case, it
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may be able to better achieve its goals by introducing an hours rule into the system.
The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 1.3(a)–(c) with θ = −0.2 and assuming
an hourly wage rate of £6 for all child age groups. The ﬁgures show that the size of the hours
bonus exhibits a very pronounced age gradient; we obtain a weekly hours bonus equal to
£23, £38 and £45 for lone mothers with children aged 0–4, 5–10 and 11–18 respectively.15 It
therefore appears that there is a much smaller requirement for a part-time hours bonus for
families with children aged below 5. But as the children age the optimal schedule changes
quite dramatically with a strong move towards an hours bonus.
Relative to the optimal system when such a rule is not implementable, the hours bonus
increases marginal rates in the part of the earnings distribution where this hours rule would
roughly come into effect (particularly in the £50 to £100 earnings bracket) while marginal
rates further up the distribution, as well as the level of out-of-work support, are essentially
unchanged. As a result of this, some non-workers with low potential wages may be induced
to work part-time, while some low hours individuals will either not work or increase their
hours. Similarly, some high earnings individuals will reduce their hours to that required for
the bonus. The hours bonus is sufﬁciently large for lone mothers with school aged children,
that it implies a negative participation tax rate at 19 hours when earning the minimum wage
rate.
Although there are some notable changes in the structure of the constraint when hours
information is partially observable (particularly for lone mothers with older children), it does
not follow that it necessarily leads to a large improvement in social welfare. Indeed, in the
absence of the hours conditioning, there are only few individuals working less than 19 hours
(see Figure 1.4(a)–(c)) so the potential that it offers to improve social welfare appears limited.
We now attempt to provide some guidance concerning the size of the welfare gain from
introducing hours rules. The exact experiment we perform is as follows: we calculate the
level of social welfare under the optimal schedule with hours contingent payments, and then
determine the increase in expenditure per-person that is required to obtain the same level of
social welfare in the absence of such hours conditioning. In conducting this experiment we
allow all the parameters of the (earnings) tax schedule to vary so this is obtained at least cost.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1.10. Unsurprisingly, when children
are aged less than 5 the increased expenditure required to achieve the level of social welfare
obtained under the 19 hour rule is negligible. However, even when children are of school
age, the required increased expenditure is found to be small (and is clearly negligible when
the less redistributive preferences are considered). Even without allowing for any form of
measurement error, it follows that unless the costs of partial hours observability is sufﬁciently
low, it would appear difﬁcult to advocate the use of a 19 hour rule based upon this analysis.
15We also explore the impact that varying the redistributive taste parameter θ has on the size of the hours bonus at
19 hours and on the overall structure of the budget constraint: when θ = −0.4 there is little change in the size of the
bonus; when θ = 0.0 the optimal bonus is approximately halved for all child age groups.1.6. The Optimal Design of the Tax and Transfer Schedule 41
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Figure 1.4: Hours distributions under optimal schedules. Hours distributions are calculated
under the respective optimal tax systems with θ = −0.2. Horizontal axis measures hours of
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Table 1.10: Quantifying the welfare gain of hours rules
19 hours optimal hours
θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0
0–4 0.250 0.213 0.05 0.782 0.854 0.956
(0.2%) (0.2%) (0.0%) (0.7%) (0.7%) (0.8%)
5–10 1.118 0.884 0.130 2.760 2.711 1.476
(1.3%) (1.0%) (0.2%) (3.2%) (3.2%) (1.7%)
11–18 1.592 1.083 0.08 5.016 4.471 1.720
(3.0%) (2.1%) (0.2%) (9.5%) (8.5%) (3.3%)
Notes: Table shows the additional expenditure requirement per person by age of child and under range of distribu-
tional taste parameters θ that is necessary to achieve the same level of social welfare as under the respective hours
rules with a schedule that varies only with earnings. All incomes are in pounds per week and are expressed in April
2002 prices. Figures in parentheses correspond to the proportional increase in required expenditure.
This has very important policy implications given that the UK tax credit system makes heavy
use of very similar hours conditions.16
An Optimal Hours Rule?
The social welfare gains from introducing a 19 hours rule appear to be only very modest in
size at best. In this section we explore whether there are potentially larger gains by allowing
the choice of the point at which the hours rule becomes effective to be part of the optimal
design problem. The optimal schedules with θ = −0.2 are also shown in Figure 1.3(a)–(c).
In all cases, we get an optimal hours rule at the ﬁfth (out of six) discrete hours point, which
corresponds to 33 hours per week.17 We also note that the size of the optimally placed hours
bonus always exceeds that calculated when the hours rule became effective at 19 hours per
week. The age gradient that we observed previously is still preserved. Introducing an hours
rule further up the hours distribution allows the government to become more effective in
distinguishing between high wage/low effort and high effort/low wage individuals than at
19 hours to the extent that few higher wage individuals would choose to work very few
hours. Relative to the schedule when the hours rule is set at around 19 hours, this alternative
placement tends to make people with low and high earnings better off, while people in the
middle range lose. While we again ﬁnd that very little happens to the level of out-of-work
income, there are much more pronounced changes to the overall structure of marginal rates.
In particular, there are large reductions in the marginal tax rate in the ﬁrst tax bracket for all
groups (there is now a tax credit of −0.20 for lone mothers with children aged 11–18, and
−0.08 for lone mothers with children aged 5–10), while marginal rates now become higher
at higher earnings (especially in the presence of older children). Figure 1.4(a)–(c) show the
16This ﬁnding contrasts with Keane and Mofﬁtt (1998) which considered introducing a work subsidy in a model
with three employment states (non-workers, part-time and full-time work) and multiple beneﬁt take-up. Even small
subsidies were found to increase labour supply and to reduce dependence on welfare beneﬁts. In contrast to our
application (where we are moving from a base with marginal rates well below 100% at low earnings), their simulations
considered introducing the subsidy in an environment where many workers faced marginal effective tax rates which
often exceeded 100%.
17As was the case with the 19 hours rule, we ﬁnd that with θ = −0.4 there is essentially no change in either the size
or placement of the hours bonus. However, when θ = 0.0 we ﬁnd that the size of the optimal bonus is approximately
halved for all child age groups, whilst the optimal placement shifts to 40 hours per-week.1.6. The Optimal Design of the Tax and Transfer Schedule 43
resulting impact on the hours distribution.
As before, we attempt to quantify the beneﬁts from allowing for hours conditioning.
Performing the same experiment as we conducted under the 19 hours rule we ﬁnd that the
required increase in expenditure is considerably larger than that obtained previously (again,
see Table 1.10). For lone parents with children aged 11–18, an 8.5% increase in expenditure
would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare when θ = −0.2. We believe that
if hours can be accurately observed (as this analysis so far assumes), then this represents a
non-trivial welfare gain. For lone mothers with younger children, the welfare gains are far
more modest. In any case, if the government wishes to maintain the use of hours conditional
eligibility, the analysis here suggests that it may be able to improve design by shifting towards
a system that primarily rewards full-time rather than part-time work.18
1.6.4 Measurement Error and Hours Misreporting
The results presented so far have not allowed for any form of measurement error. While
earnings may not always be perfectly measured, it seems likely that there is more scope for
mismeasurement of hours as they are conceivably harder to monitor and verify. Indeed, the
presence of hours rules in the tax and transfer system presents individuals with an incentive to
not truthfully declare whether they satisfy the relevant hours criteria. Relative to when hours
are always accurately reported, this would seem to weaken the case for introducing a measure
of hours in the tax base. In this section we quantify the importance of such measurement
error by considering two alternative scenarios: ﬁrstly, we consider the case where hours are
imperfectly observed due to random measurement error; secondly, we allow individuals to
directly misreport their hours of work to the tax authorities.
In performing this analysis it is necessary to modify our analytical framework from Sec-
tion 1.2 to distinguish between actual hours of work h, and reported hours of work hR. While
actual hours continue to determine both leisure and earnings, reported hours of work directly
affect consumption through the tax schedule, with T = T(wh,hR;X). They will also have a
direct impact on utility when we allow for individual hours misreporting (discussed below).
Measurement Error
We allow for random measurement error by adding an independent and normally distributed
error term ν to work hours h to form a pseudo reported hours measure, ˜ hR = h + ν. Actual
reported hours hR are then given by the nearest discrete hours point in the set of hours H++.
We assume that ν has zero mean, and in Table 1.11 we show how the size of the hours bonus
and the associated welfare gain, vary as the standard deviation of the measurement error
term σν increases in value. A clear pattern emerges. Across all groups, the optimal size
of the hours bonus declines as reported hours become less informative. Furthermore, the
18We also considered alternative social welfare functions where the government places an explicit weight on em-
ployment. In these simulations we obtained lower out-of-work income, together with lower marginal tax rates at low
earnings. However, such considerations did not have a large impact on either the size or placement of the optimal
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Table 1.11: The effect of random measurement error on the optimal hours bonus
Standard 0–4 5–10 11–18
Deviation bonus hours welfare bonus hours welfare bonus hours welfare
0 39.54 33 0.7% 51.02 33 3.2% 60.42 33 8.5%
2 37.90 33 0.7% 49.42 33 3.0% 58.87 33 8.2%
4 33.87 33 0.6% 43.38 33 2.5% 52.07 33 6.9%
6 29.13 33 0.5% 36.99 33 2.0% 43.52 33 5.4%
8 23.88 33 0.3% 29.91 33 1.4% 33.42 33 3.7%
10 19.24 33 0.3% 23.83 33 1.1% 30.44 26 2.8%
12 15.06 33 0.2% 20.13 26 0.8% 24.26 26 2.1%
14 13.07 33 0.1% 17.49 26 0.6% 20.76 26 1.7%
16 11.70 26 0.1% 15.73 26 0.6% 18.24 26 1.4%
Notes: Table shows how the optimal placement and size of hours contingent payments varies with random hours
measurement error by age of youngest child and with θ = −0.2. Standard Deviation refers to the standard deviation
of the additive independent normally distributed hours measurement error term. The columns “welfare” refer to the
percentage increase in required expenditure to achieve the same level of social welfare compared to when no hours
conditioning is performed. All incomes are in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices.
placement of the optimal hours rule is reduced from 33 to 26 hours for relatively high values
of σν. In the simulations where the standard deviation of the error term is equal to 8 (so
that a single standard deviation results in reported hours differing from actual hours by a
single category), the welfare gain from using hours information is more than halved relative
to no measurement error. The presence of random measurement error clearly reduces the
desirability of conditioning upon hours, and if it is modest or large in size, then the welfare
gains that are achievable are only small, even amongst lone mothers with older children.
Hours Misreporting
We have shown that random measurement error reduces the extent to which the government
may wish to condition upon hours of work, and it also diminishes the welfare gains that are
achievable. In the case of hours conditioning, it is plausible that the form of misreporting is
likely to be more systematic than random measurement error. Here we modify our setup to
allow individuals to directly misreport their reported hours of work. We let hB be the required
hours of work to receive a bonus (received if h ≥ hB), and we continue to let hR denote
reported hours of work. Misreporting is only possible if h > 0, so that the tax authorities can
always accurately observe employment status. If individuals misreport their hours of work
then they must incur a utility cost, which is assumed to depend upon the distance hR − h.
Since misreporting hours is costly, it is only necessary to consider the cases when hours are
truthfully revealed hR = h, or when hR = hB > h.
We therefore modify the individual utility function by including hR − h as an explicit
argument, so that U = u(c,h,hR −h;X,ǫ)+εh. This modiﬁed utility function is as in equation
1.4 but now with the additional cost term b × (hR − h) subtracted from u whenever hR > h.19
If misreporting is not possible, then this is equivalent to b = ∞. We do not allow individuals
19In practice misreporting costs are likely to vary with both observed and unobserved worker characteristics. While
it is sufﬁcient to model this as a single cost for the purpose of our discussion and simulations here, our framework
can easily be extended to incorporate such heterogeneity.1.7. Conclusions 45
Table 1.12: The effect of hours misreporting on the optimal hours bonus
Misreporting 0–4 5–10 11–18
Cost bonus hours welfare bonus hours welfare bonus hours welfare
∞ 39.54 33 0.7% 51.02 33 3.2% 60.42 33 8.5%
0.64 39.54 33 0.7% 51.01 33 3.2% 60.41 33 8.5%
0.32 38.54 33 0.7% 49.03 33 3.1% 57.92 33 8.4%
0.16 29.85 33 0.6% 34.12 33 2.6% 41.38 33 7.0%
0.08 17.35 33 0.4% 19.50 33 1.7% 23.44 33 4.6%
0.04 8.58 33 0.2% 11.04 33 1.0% 12.14 33 2.6%
0.02 5.30 33 0.1% 6.16 33 0.6% 6.73 33 1.5%
0.01 2.75 33 0.1% 3.22 33 0.3% 3.77 33 0.8%
Notes: Table shows how the optimal placement and size of hours contingent payments varies with the utility cost of
hours misreporting by age of youngest child and with θ = −0.2. “Misreporting Cost” refers to the additive utility
cost associated with misreporting, and is measured per-hour overstated and relative to standard deviation of the state
speciﬁc error ε. The columns “welfare” refer to the percentage increase in required expenditure to achieve the same
level of social welfare compared to when no hours conditioning is performed. All incomes are in pounds per week
and are expressed in April 2002 prices.
to manipulate their earnings wh. At a given actual hours of work h < hB individuals will
report their hours as hR = hB if and only if the utility gain exceeds the cost. That is:
u(c(h,T(wh,hB;X),X,ǫ),h,hB − h;X,ǫ) > u(c(h,T(wh,h;X),X,ǫ),h,0;X,ǫ).
We refer to the parameter b as the misreporting cost, and in the results presented in Table
1.12 this is measured relative to the standard deviation of the state speciﬁc error ε. With
an hours bonus payable at 33 hours per week (for example), a value of b = 0.16 would
mean that the utility cost of reporting 33 hours when actual hours are 26 is equivalent to a
0.16× (33− 26) = 1.12 standard deviation change in the realisation of the state speciﬁc error.
The table illustrates that as the utility cost of misreporting becomes very low, the welfare gain
from using reported hours of work effectively disappears (but the optimal placement remains
at 33 hours for all values considered). Again, this suggests that the welfare gains from using
hours of work information may be small unless the scope for misreporting hours of work is
limited.
1.7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to examine the optimal schedule of marginal tax rates and
design of earned income tax credits. The context for this design problem has been the tax and
transfer schedule for lone parents in Britain. To address this tax design problem we developed
a structural labour supply model which incorporated unobserved heterogeneity and the non-
convexities of the tax and welfare system as well as allowing for childcare costs and ﬁxed
costs of work. We also explicitly allow for different labour supply responses at the intensive
and extensive margins.
To mirror the hours contingent nature of the British tax credit system we developed an
analytical framework that explicitly allowed for the tax authorities to have partial observabil-1.A. Likelihood Function 46
ity of hours of work. We contrasted this to the standard case in which only earnings (and
employment) are revealed to the tax authority.
The structural labour supply model appeared reliable and the estimated model suggested
that lone parents with very young children are much less responsive to changes in ﬁnancial
work incentives than are lone parents with children of school age. This has implications for
tax design. For those with very young children – where the marginal value of leisure is high –
the optimal policy design suggests it is better to offer high levels of income support together
with higher marginal tax rates when in work. In contrast, for those with school age children,
where leisure is valued less highly, the results suggest a move to a lower level of income
support but also lower marginal tax rates, increasing the incentives to work.
Our results highlight a role for conditioning effective tax rates on the age of children. Tax
credits being found to be most important for low earning families with school age children.
Hours contingent payments, as feature in the British tax credit system, are also found to lead
to improvements in the tax design at least for those parents with school age children. If the
tax authorities are able to choose the lower limit on working hours that trigger eligibility
for such families, then we ﬁnd an empirical case for using a full-time work rule rather than
the part-time rule currently in place for parents in the UK. While this is found to be a more
effective instrument, the welfare gains remain modest in size for all but parents with older
children. These welfare gains are also shown to reduce signiﬁcantly with moderate amounts
of misreporting or measurement error.
Chapter 1 Appendix
1.A Likelihood Function
In what follows let Pj(X, pck,ǫ) ≡ Pr(h = hj|X, pck,ǫ) denote the probability of choosing hours
hj ∈ H conditional on demographics X, the childcare price pck, and the vector of unobserved
preference heterogeneity ǫ = (ǫw,ǫcX,ǫy,ǫl,ǫf,ǫη). Given the presence of state speciﬁc Type-I
extreme value errors, this choice probability takes the familiar conditional logit form. We also
use πk(X) ≡ Pr(pc = pck|X) to denote the probability of the lone mother with characteristics
X facing childcare price pck. In the case of non-workers (h = h0), neither wages nor childcare
are observed so that the likelihood contribution is simply given by:
∑
k
πk(X)
 
ǫ
P0(X, pck,ǫ)dG(ǫ).
Now consider the case for workers when both wages and childcare information is observed
so that hc is not censored at zero. Using Eh ≡ E(h;X, pc,ǫ) to denote eligibility for in-work
support we deﬁne the indicator D(e, p) = 1(Eh = e, P = p). We also let ∆u(hj|pck,X,ǫ|ǫη=0)
denote the (possibly negative) utility gain from claiming in-work support at hours hj, condi-
tional on demographics X, the childcare price pck, and the vector of unobserved preference1.B. Proof of Proposition 47
heterogeneity ǫ with ǫη = 0. Suppressing the explicit conditioning for notational simplicity,
the likelihood contribution is given by:
∏
k
πk(X)
1(pc=pck)
   
ǫy,ǫl,ǫf

 
 
D(1,1)
 
ǫη<∆u
∏
j
Pj(X, pck,ǫ)1(h=hj)
+D(1,0)
 
ǫη>∆u
∏
j
Pj(X, pck,ǫ)1(h=hj) + D(0,0)
 
ǫη
∏
j
Pj(X, pck,ǫ)1(h=hj)

 
 
dG(ǫ|ǫw = logw − X′
wβw,ǫc = hc − γcX − βcXh)
gw,c(logw − X′
wβw,hc − γcX − βcXh).
If working mothers are not observed using childcare, then hc is censored at zero and the
childcare price also unobserved. If ǫc = −γcX − βcXh, then the likelihood contribution is
given by:
∑
k
πk(X)
    
ǫc<ǫc,ǫy,ǫl,ǫf

 
 
D(1,1)
 
ǫη<∆u
∏
j
Pj(X, pck,ǫ)1(h=hj)
+D(1,0)
 
ǫη>∆u
∏
j
Pj(X, pck,ǫ)1(h=hj) + D(0,0)
 
ǫη
∏
j
Pj(X, pck,ǫ)1(h=hj)

 
 
dG(ǫ|ǫw = logw − X′
wβw)gw(logw − X′
wβw).
Our estimation also allows for workers with missing wages. This takes a similar form to the
above, except that it is now necessary to also integrate over the unobserved component of
wages ǫw.
1.B Proof of Proposition
For notational simplicity we abstract from the explicit conditioning of utility on observed and
unobserved preference heterogeneity and let u(h) ≡ u(c(h),h;X,ǫ). We then deﬁne V as the
integral of transformed utility over state speciﬁc errors conditional on (X,ǫ):
V ≡
 
ε
Υ
 
max
h∈H
[u(h) + εh]
 
dF(ε). (1.9)
To prove this result we ﬁrst differentiate V with respect to u(h):
∂V
∂u(h)
=
 
ε
 
∂Υ(maxh∈H [u(h) + εh])
∂u(h)
 
dF(ε)
=
 
ε
Υ′ (u(h) + εh) × 1
 
h = argmax
h′∈H
 
u(h′) + εh′
 
 
dF(ε).1.B. Proof of Proposition 48
Given our choice of utility transformation function in equation 1.8 and our distributional
assumptions concerning ε the above becomes:
∂V
∂u(h)
=
  ∞
εh=−∞
 
e(u(h)+εh)
 θ
 
∏
h′ =h
e−e−{εh+u(h)−u(h′)}
 
× e−εhe−e−εhdεh
=
 
eu(h)
 θ   ∞
εh=−∞
{eεh}
θ × exp
 
−e−εh ∑
h′∈H
e−(u(h)−u(h′))
 
e−εhdεh.
We proceed by using the change of variable t = exp(−εh) so that the above partial derivative
becomes:
∂V
∂u(h)
=
 
eu(h)
 θ   ∞
t=0
t−θ × exp
 
−t ∑
h′∈H
e−(u(h)−u(h′))
 
dt.
By deﬁning z ≡ t×∑h′∈H e−(u(h)−u(h′)) we can once again perform a simple change of variable
and express the above as:
∂V
∂u(h)
=
 
eu(h)
 θ  
∑h′∈H e−(u(h)−u(h′))
 θ−1   ∞
z=0
z−θe−zdz
= eu(h)
 
∑h′∈H eu(h′)
 θ−1   ∞
z=0
z−θe−zdz
= eu(h)
 
∑h′∈H eu(h′)
 θ−1
Γ(1− θ) (1.10)
where the third equality follows directly from the deﬁnition of the Gamma function Γ( ).
Note that this integral will always converge given that we are considering cases where θ < 0.
Integrating equation 1.10 we obtain:
V =
1
θ

Γ(1 − θ) ×
 
∑
h′∈H
exp
 
u(h′)
 
 θ
− 1

 (1.11)
where the constant of integration is easily obtained by considering the case of a degenerate
choice set and directly integrating 1.9. This completes our proof of the Proposition.Chapter 2
Wage Posting with Two-sided
Heterogeneity
2.1 Introduction
Partial job search models provide a natural framework for studying many features of modern
labour markets. While these models may be useful in describing a number of stylized facts,
the appropriateness of such models when performing policy analysis is limited because equi-
librium responses by ﬁrms are ruled out by assumption. A logical extension of this literature
is provided by the theoretical and empirical research on equilibrium job search. In this litera-
ture, the behaviour of ﬁrms is explicitly modelled. Here, the competition between ﬁrms acts
as the fundamental determinant of wages, with the extent of this competition limited by the
presence of informational frictions in the economy.
This paper considers an equilibrium job search model with a speciﬁc form of wage deter-
mination: ﬁrms post wage offers prior to meeting potential employees, which workers may
then either accept or reject without any possibility of bargaining. This is known as wage post-
ing. We contribute to this literature by ﬁrst developing and estimating a wage posting model
with on-the-job search and unobserved worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity. Firms may differ with
respect to their productivity whilst workers differ with respect to their opportunity costs of
employment. While such a model was analysed by Bontemps et al. (1999), this was conducted
under the restriction that the arrival rate of job offers was independent of employment status.
In their empirical analysis, this over identifying restriction lead to a poor ﬁt of unemploy-
ment durations, which is perhaps why this model had been little exploited in the literature.
The model we consider here is one which has been referred to as either being intractable,
or particular difﬁcult to estimate (see, for example, van den Berg, 1999). While many of the
theoretical properties of this model are indeed difﬁcult to characterise analytically, this paper
demonstrates that it remains empirically tractable and provides a useful benchmark model
for conducting many types of policy experiment.
While the importance of on-the-job search as a source of wage growth for employees
is well documented (see, for example, Topel and Ward, 1992), simultaneously allowing for2.1. Introduction 50
worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity allows the model to explain both the dispersion of wages, and
individual employment histories. Similarly, allowing the arrival rates of job offers to vary
by employment status also allows durations to be better explained. Of course, simply ﬁtting
empirical distributions and durations is a very limited objective of an equilibrium job search
model. The value of such models is perhaps greatest when they are applied as tools for
understanding the impact of policy reform. In these models the existence of search frictions
gives ﬁrms some degree of monopsony power, which means that labour market outcomes can
differ from the those of a competitive model. In particular, reforms such as minimum wage
legislation (which we shall consider in our application in this paper) and tax programmes
designed to encourage labour market participation (see Chapter 3), can all have potentially
very rich effects. To better understand the value that is introduced by these features, we ﬁrst
provide a brief survey of the literature.
The starting point of this literature is Diamond (1971). In this model all workers are
assumed identical and there is no possibility of searching for a better job once employed.
Unemployed workers sequentially sample job offers from some wage offer distribution. Since
workers are homogeneous they will all follow the same reservation wage strategy, accepting
any wage that is greater than the the common reservation wage. In such a model no ﬁrm
would set a wage below the common reservation wage as they would attract no workers. By
the same logic, no ﬁrm would offer a wage above the reservation wage as doing so will not
attract any more workers. In this case the distribution of wages would collapse to a degenerate
distribution equal to the reservation wage. The Diamond result generated much criticism of
the basic search model, and this ultimately led to the emergence of the equilibrium job search
literature.
Within this class of job search model, there are two standard ways of generating wage
dispersion as an equilibrium outcome. While the mechanisms are very different, both ap-
proaches generate an upward sloping labour supply curve at the level of the ﬁrm. Since, in
Diamond (1971), equilibrium wages are equal to the reservation wage of unemployed work-
ers, it may be possible to generate wage dispersion should workers differ in their reservation
wages. Albrecht and Axell (1984) maintain the same core assumptions as in Diamond, but
allow workers to differ in their opportunity costs of employment. In this model, workers
with higher employment opportunity costs will be those with higher reservation wages. This
creates the possibility of wage dispersion in equilibrium as it means that ﬁrms face a trade-
off between proﬁts per work, and the number of workers employed by the ﬁrm. Thus, even
amongst identical ﬁrms, some may choose to offer a high wage (earning a small proﬁt mar-
gin per worker, but with a large workforce), whilst others may offer a lower wage (earning a
higher proﬁt per worker, but with a smaller workforce). Therefore there is an upward sloping
labour supply curve at the level of the ﬁrm.
The second approach maintains the assumption that workers (and ﬁrms) are homoge-2.1. Introduction 51
neous, but allows workers to continue searching for a better job when they are employed
(Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). For employed workers, their reservation wage will equal their
current wage. Firms now have an incentive to increase their wage offer because by doing they
are able to attract workers from lower paying jobs. Thus, at the level of the ﬁrm there is again
an upward sloping labour supply curve which allows ﬁrms with the same productivity level
to offer distinct wages in equilibrium.
While both of the above approaches are successful in the sense that they generate wage
dispersion as an equilibrium outcome, they provide an unsatisfactory ﬁt to empirical wage
distributions. In Albrecht and Axell (1984) each point of support in the wage distribution
must correspond to a point of support in the distribution of reservation wages,1 while in
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) the theoretical distributions of wage offers and wage earnings
both have increasing densities. The apparent empirical failings of Burdett and Mortensen
can be overcome to some extent by introducing ﬁrm level heterogeneity. Building upon the
original demonstration by Mortensen (1990) that more productive ﬁrms offer higher wages
in equilibrium, Bontemps et al. (2000) provided a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the
Burdett and Mortensen model with a continuous distribution of ﬁrm productivity. They
showed that the model may induce empirical wage distributions by allowing for an appro-
priately skewed distribution of ﬁrm productivity, and proposed a simple three-step semi-
parametric estimation procedure for this model.
Both the original Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model and the extension analysed in
Bontemps et al. (2000) imply a constant exit rate out of unemployment. While the model
of Albrecht and Axell (1984) clearly does not provide any role for job-to-job transitions as a
source of wage growth, it does display negative unemployment duration dependence at the
aggregate.2,3 Bontemps et al. (1999) combine both approaches by allowing for continuous dis-
tributions of both ﬁrm productivity and work opportunity costs under the restriction that the
arrival rate of job offers is the same for unemployed and employed workers. This over iden-
tifying restriction simpliﬁes the analysis as it implies that the optimal strategy of workers is
independent of the equilibrium wage offer distribution (see the later discussion in Section 2.2).
However, in their empirical application this ultimately led to a poor ﬁt to the unemployment
duration data.
Simultaneously allowing for heterogeneity in both ﬁrm productivity and reservation
wages, together with potentially different search efﬁciency on- and off-the-job, is therefore
desirable as it allows us to explain the dispersion of wages, durations, and heterogeneity in
unemployment histories. Moreover, it is particularly useful in terms of performing policy
1To understand this, note that by deﬁnition of the reservation wage, if a ﬁrm was offering a wage strictly between
two reservation wages, then it could always increase its proﬁts by reducing the wage it offered to the lower of the
two reservation wages: there would be no change in employment, but proﬁts per worker would increase.
2See Machin and Manning (1999) for European evidence on duration dependence.
3Note that there is no true duration dependence, but rather this is a purely compositional effect due to workers
differing in the wage offers that they are willing to accept. Negative duration dependence will be observed regardless
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analysis as reservation wage heterogeneity essentially introduces a labour supply dimension.
To understand this, note that in the homogeneous worker model of Bontemps et al. (2000) all
workers accept all jobs. This means that the imposition of a legal minimum wage (for exam-
ple) will either have no effect on unemployment, or will have a negative effect if the number
of ﬁrms active in the labour market is reduced. In contrast, if some workers are selective in
the wages that they are willing to accept, then higher wage offers will, other things equal,
increase job acceptance behaviour. The effect of a minimum wage on employment outcomes
is therefore potentially much richer, and is a priori ambiguous. Similarly, wage subsidy or tax
credit type programmes designed to boost employment would have no effect on employment
in the basic homogeneous worker model, but could have sizeable impacts in a model with
worker heterogeneity (see Chapter 3 of this thesis).
The starting point of this paper is therefore to extend the analysis of Bontemps et al.
(1999) to cases where no restrictions are placed on the relative efﬁciency of on- and off-the-
job search. In Section 2.2 we describe the model, characterise the equilibrium, and perform
some simple comparative static exercises. Section 2.3 discusses the identiﬁcation of the model
using longitudinal survey data, and proposes alternative estimation techniques. In Section
2.4 we present some estimation results, and compare and contrast the results obtained under
the proposed parametric and semi-parametric estimators. An extension of the model which
introduces further within market heterogeneity is described in Section 2.5, and in Section
2.6 we apply this model in our analysis of the introduction of actual UK minimum wage
legislation. Finally, in Section 2.7 we conclude.
2.2 Basic Model
In this section we set out a model with wage posting and on-the-job search, where workers
are heterogeneous with respect to their opportunity cost of employment. The model pre-
sented here is a direct extension of Bontemps et al. (1999) to allow for the arrival rate of job
offers to potentially vary with employment status. As such, the exposition follows that of
Bontemps et al. closely. We begin by setting out the core assumptions and describe the opti-
mal job acceptance strategy of workers. We then characterise the steady state ﬂows, describe
the optimal wage setting behaviour of ﬁrms, and discuss properties of the equilibrium. We
end this section by performing some comparative static exercises.
2.2.1 Model Assumptions
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals with a population size normalized to
unity. Time is continuous and individuals live forever with the constant discount rate ρ >
0. These individuals (or workers) can be either employed or unemployed, and both search
for jobs. While workers are assumed to be equally productive at a given ﬁrm (see below),
they differ in their opportunity cost of employment b which has the cumulative distribution
function H on support [b,b], with −∞ ≤ b < b ≤ ∞. To simplify some of the exposition we2.2. Basic Model 53
shall always assume that b is sufﬁciently low, so that in the absence of any binding minimum
wage, all ﬁrms are active in the labour market. We assume that H is continuous with strictly
positive density on the entire support.
Jobs are completely characterised by a wage rate w that is assumed to be constant
throughout an individuals employment spell within a given ﬁrm. Individuals sequentially
sample these job offers at the exogenous Poisson rate λu > 0 when unemployed, and λe ≥ 0
when employed. We place no restrictions on the relative magnitude of these quantities. Work-
ers sample these jobs from a wage offer distribution F with support [w,w] and we let f ≡ F′
denote the corresponding density function.4 Upon receiving a job offer, workers may choose
to either accept or reject it. There is no bargaining. Regardless of the current wage, all em-
ployment spells end at the Poisson rate δ > 0 and there is no recall of past job offers. In
the following we let κe = λe/δ and κu = λu/δ. As emphasized by van den Berg and Ridder
(2003), the parameters κe and κu can be thought of as labour market friction parameters. In
particular, κe is the number of job offers an individual can expect to receive when employed,
before exiting to unemployment.
Worker Strategies
The ﬂow utility of an employed worker earning wage w is given by ve(w) = w. Similarly, the
ﬂow utility of an unemployed worker is simply equal to their work opportunity cost: vu = b.5
The value of b (which is the only source of worker heterogeneity) should be interpreted as
representing both the value of unemployment beneﬁt and other non-pecuniary costs/beneﬁts
associated with unemployment. It is straightforward to verify that the value from employ-
ment is strictly increasing in the wage w, which implies the existence of a reservation wage
policy: employed workers will accept any wage that is strictly greater than their current wage
w; unemployed workers with opportunity cost b will accept any job offer w that is greater
than or equal to some value φ(b). As demonstrated by Mortensen and Neumann (1988), the
reservation wage for unemployed workers φ(b) is implicitly deﬁned as:
φ(b) = b + (κu − κe)
  w
φ(b)
F(w)
1+ ρ/δ + κeF(w)
dw (2.1)
where F ≡ 1 − F. Note that in the case that κu = κe we have φ(b) = b so that the optimal
strategy of workers is independent of the equilibrium wage offer distribution. The signiﬁcance
of this assumption is that it implies that there is no feedback from the strategy of ﬁrms to the
strategy of workers. This was the model analysed in Bontemps et al. (1999).
2.2.2 Steady State Flows
This section characterises the steady state of the labour market by using ﬂow equations. For
now, we treat the wage offer distribution F as given. In Section 2.2.3 we describe how this
4To avoid some technical complications, we shall assume from the outset that the distribution of wage offers is
continuous. See Bontemps (1998) and Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) for further details.
5We are implicitly assuming that there is no access to either saving or borrowing technology.2.2. Basic Model 54
distribution emerges in equilibrium.
Distribution of Reservation Wages
In deriving the steady state ﬂows it is necessary to consider the distribution of reservation
wages. This distribution in the whole population (that is, among both unemployed and em-
ployed workers) is denoted A and it is related to the distribution of work opportunity costs
through the inverse reservation wage equation φ−1:6
A(x) = H(φ−1(x)) = H
 
x − (κu − κe)
  w
x
F(w)
1 + ρ/δ + κeF(w)
dw
 
. (2.2)
The distribution of reservation wages amongst the stock of unemployed and employed work-
ers are similarly deﬁned as Au and Ae respectively. Since workers who are unemployed
(employed) will have higher (lower) reservation wages on average, it must be true that
Au(x) ≤ A(x) ≤ Ae(x). These distributions are related to A according to:
A(x) = uAu(x) + (1− u)Ae(x) (2.3)
where u is the steady state unemployment rate and 1 − u the steady state employment rate.
It is necessary to consider these distributions when describing the equilibrium of the labour
market. In particular, the distribution of reservation wages amongst the unemployed Au is
required to describe the ﬂows from the unemployment pool into employment at a given wage.
In steady state we require that the ﬂow of individuals with a reservation wage less than or
equal to φ who exit the employment pool due to their job being exogenously destroyed must
exactly the ﬂow of such workers who enter employment. That is,
δ(1− u)Ae(φ) =

    
    
λuuAu(φ) if φ ≤ w
λuuAu(w) + λuu
  φ
w
F(w)dAu(w) if φ > w.
(2.4)
Differentiating equation 2.4 using Leibniz’s rule we obtain δ(1 − u)A′
e(x) = λuF(x)uA′
u(x),
which when combined with equation 2.3 implies A′(x) = uA′
u(x)(1+κuF(x)) so that we may
then write:
uAu(φ) =

    
    
1
1 + κu
A(φ) if φ ≤ w
1
1 + κu
A(w) +
  φ
w
dA(w)
1 + κuF(w)
if φ > w
(2.5)
and where we note that the density of the reservation wage distribution (obtained by differ-
6In the special case that κu = κe these distributions coincide. That is: A(x) = H(φ−1(x)) = H(x).2.2. Basic Model 55
enetiating equation 2.2) is given by:
A′(x) = H′
 
x − (κu − κe)
  w
x
F(w)
1+ ρ/δ + κeF(w)
dw
  
1 + ρ/δ + κuF(x)
1 + ρ/δ + κeF(x)
 
. (2.6)
Remark An alternative way to derive uAu(φ) is to note that the unemployment rate of a
worker, conditional on their reservation wage w is given by (1 + κuF(w))−1. Integrating this
expression over the (whole population) distribution of reservation wages no greater than φ
then yields the result in equation 2.5.
Between Jobs and the Distribution of Wages
In what follows we let G(w) denote the fraction of employed workers with a wage no greater
than w, and denote the density of wages amongst the employed as g ≡ G′. This cumula-
tive distribution will dominate the distribution of wage offers F both because of on-the-job
search (workers gravitate to higher paying jobs) and because of reservation wage hetero-
geneity (workers are selective in the jobs that they are willing to accept). In a steady-state
equilibrium, the number of individuals who leave jobs paying a wage no greater than w (ei-
ther by their job being destroyed at Poisson rate δ or by gravitating to a higher paying job)
must exactly equal the number of individuals who exit the unemployment pool and receive
such wages. We therefore have:
 
δ + λeF(w)
 
(1− u)G(w) = λuF(w)uAu(w) + λuu
  w
w
(F(w) − F(x))dAu(x). (2.7)
To proceed further we note that the RHS of equation 2.7 above may be written as:
λuF(w)uAu(w) + λuu
  w
w
(F(x) − F(w))dAu(x)
= λuuAu(w) + λuu
  w
w
F(x)dAu(x) − λuF(w)uAu(w)
= δ(1 − u)Ae(w) − λuF(w)uAu(w)
= δA(w) − uAu(w)[δ+ λuF(w)]
where the second equality follows from equation 2.4 and the third equality from equation 2.3.
Substituting this expression into equation 2.7 and dividing through by δ we then obtain:
 
1 + κeF(w)
 
(1− u)G(w) = A(w) −
 
1+ κuF(w)
 
uAu(w) (2.8)
or equivalently,
G(w) =
A(w) − (1+ κuF(w))
 
1
1+κu A(w) +
  w
w
dA(x)
1+κuF(x)
 
 
1+ κeF(w)
 
(1− u)
(2.9)
which expresses the distribution of wage earnings in terms of the distribution of reservation2.2. Basic Model 56
wages, wage offers, and transitional parameters. Note that the distribution of wage earnings
presented above in equation 2.9 is essentially the same as that which appear in Proposition
2 of Bontemps et al. (1999). They only differ to the extent that we have the reservation wage
distribution appearing in place of the underlying opportunity cost distribution (these are the
same in their model) and that differential arrival rates appear where relevant.
Unemployment
Finally, we derive the steady state unemployment rate u. This may be obtained by letting
φ → ∞ in equation 2.5, which yields:
u =
1
1 + κu
A(w) +
  w
w
dA(x)
1+ κuF(w)
+ (1 − A(w)). (2.10)
This equation decomposes the steady state unemployment rate into the contribution by three
(endogenously determined) groups of workers: those who accept all offers; those who accept
some and reject others; and those who reject all. The unemployment rate u is bounded below
by (1 + κu)−1, which is the unemployment rate that would prevail in the absence of any
reservation wage heterogeneity. In contrast to the homogeneous worker model, note that κe
affects u through two channels: the direct effect through changes in worker reservation wages
and the indirect effect through its potential impact on the equilibrium wage offer distribution
F.
2.2.3 Firm Behaviour
In order to make this an equilibrium model we specify the behaviour of ﬁrms. As will become
clear, it is the proﬁt maximising behaviour of ﬁrms, taking as given the optimal strategies of
both workers and other ﬁrms, that determines the equilibrium distribution of wage offers F.
Firms may differ with respect to their (exogenously determined) productivity level p. The
fraction of ﬁrms with productivity no greater than p is given by the cumulative distribution
function Γ(p) on support [p, p]. We normalize the total number of ﬁrms to unity, and assume
that Γ is continuous, with productivity density γ ≡ Γ′ that is strictly positive on its entire
support.
We assume that there is wage posting: each productivity p ﬁrm posts a single wage
w prior to forming matches with potential employees, who can then either accept or reject
the wage offer.7 Matching is assumed to be random, so that the probability of encountering
a given ﬁrm is independent of ﬁrm size and depends only upon the distribution of ﬁrm
productivity types. This means that F(w) also measures the number of ﬁrms offering a wage
less than w.
The production technology of ﬁrms is characterized by constant returns to scale so that
the interpretation of p is the (ﬁrm speciﬁc) marginal product of labour. Firms chooses a single
wage w and maximize steady state proﬁt ﬂow subject to its production technology, and taking
7See Bontemps et al. (1999) for a discussion on the assumption that ﬁrms offer a single wage to all employees.2.2. Basic Model 57
as given the behaviour of both other ﬁrms and workers. If we let l(w) denote the steady state
ﬁrm size at wage w, then the steady state proﬁt ﬂow may be written as:
π(p,w) = (p − w)l(w). (2.11)
We may determine l(w) by using ﬂow equations. In particular, the number of workers who
leave a ﬁrm paying wage w (either by their employment spell being destroyed at rate δ, or by
a job-to-job transition to a higher wage ﬁrm) must exactly equal the number who accept such
a wage (from either the unemployment or employment pools). That is:
l(w)[δ + λeF(w)] = λuuAu(w) + λe(1 − u)G(w)
so that l(w) is clearly non-decreasing in w. This arises because ﬁrms which pay higher
wages attract more workers from both the unemployment pool (the mechanism in
Albrecht and Axell, 1984) and lower wage ﬁrms (the mechanism in Burdett and Mortensen,
1998). Using equations 2.5 and 2.9 we may then rewrite this ﬂow equation as:
l(w) =
κeA(w)
(1+ κeF(w))2 +
(κu − κe)
(1+ κeF(w))2
 
1
1 + κu
A(w) +
  w
w
dA(x)
1+ κuF(x)
 
. (2.12)
In contrast to models without reservation wage heterogeneity, the absence of on-the-job
search (that is, κe = 0) does not imply that employment is uniformly distributed across ﬁrms
when matching is random. This is intuitive because low wage ﬁrms are only able to attract
low reservation wage workers (it is straightforward to show that l(w) is proportional to Au(w)
in this case). More generally, note that the denominator in equation 2.12 may be written as
κuuAu(w) + κe(1 − u)Ae(w) so that steady state ﬁrm size l(w) depends on the number of
unemployed and employed workers with a reservation wage no greater than w weighted by
the respective arrival rates. When κu = κe = κ the denominator reduces to κA(w) = κH(w).
2.2.4 Characterization of Equilibrium
Wage Policy Function
To characterise the equilibrium we denote the optimal wage policy of a productivity p ﬁrm as
w = K(p), with K(p) = argmaxw π(p,w). First, we note that more productive ﬁrms must
offer higher wages in equilibrium8 so that F(K(p)) = Γ(p). A corollary of this is that more
productive ﬁrms also have larger ﬁrm size and earn higher proﬁts. Maximising equation 2.11
subject to equation 2.12, the optimal wage w for a type p ﬁrm must satisfy the ﬁrst order
8To see this suppose that p2 > p1 and let w2 = K(p2) and w1 = K(p1) denote the optimal wage policy of these
ﬁrms. By deﬁnition of proﬁt maximization it must be true that (p2 −w2)l(w2) ≥ (p2 − w1)l(w1) > (p1 − w1)l(w1) ≥
(p1 − w2)l(w2) which implies that (p2 − p1)l(w2) > (p2 − p1)l(w1). Since l(w) is increasing in w it then follows that
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condition:
κeA(w) + (κu − κe)uAu(w)
= (p − w)
 
2κef(w)(κeA(w) + (κu − κe)uAu(w))
1 + κeF(w)
+
κuA′(w)(1+ κeF(w))
1+ κuF(w)
 
(2.13)
which we will refer to in subsequent derivations. Noting that the proﬁts of a productivity
p ﬁrm are given by π(p) = π(p,K(p)) = (p − K(p))l(K(p)), from the envelope theorem it
immediately follows that π′(p) = l(K(p)). Since it has been established that l(w) is increasing
in w, and that K(p) is also increasing in p, it must be true that the equilibrium steady state
proﬁt ﬂow of ﬁrms’ is a convex function of p. Moreover, using this envelope result we are
able to express these equilibrium proﬁt ﬂows as:
π(p) = π(p) +
  p
p
l(K(x))dx
=
κu(p − w∗)A(w∗)
(1+ κu)(1+ κe)
+
  p
p
l(K(x))dx (2.14)
where w∗ = argmax w π(p,w) is the optimal wage policy of the least productive ﬁrm p. By
equating equation 2.14 to equation 2.11 (evaluated at w = K(p)) and then rearranging terms
we obtain the following implicit equation for the optimal wage policy function:
K(p) = p −



κu(p − w∗)A(w∗)
(1+ κu)(1+ κe)
+
p  
p
l(K(x))dx


×
1
l(K(p))
(2.15)
which is a form that we later exploit when solving for the equilibrium of the model. By
differentiating equation 2.15 it can be shown that whenever κe > 0 the optimal wage policy of
ﬁrms evolves according to:
K′(p) = 2κeγ(p) ×
 
1+ κeΓ(p)
p − K(p)
−
κuA′(K(p))
(1+ κuΓ(p))l(K(p))
 −1
(2.16)
which we will refer to in some of the later theoretical results.9 Once the wage policy function
K(p) has been solved, it is straightforward to derive a number of interesting equilibrium
9Equation 2.16 suggests an alternative way of solving for the equilibrium of the model. In particular, it is possible
to express the solution of the wage policy function as a boundary value problem. The equilibrium may then be solved
by providing an initial guess of the initial values (since A(w) depends on the entire distribution of wage offers and
is unknown) and then solving as an initial value problem. If the relevant boundary conditions are satisﬁed then the
initial values are consistent with an equilibrium of the wage posting game, otherwise update the guess of the initial
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objects. In particular, whenever κe > 0 the wage offer density is given by:
f(K(p)) =
1 + κeF(K(p))
2κe
 
1
p − K(p)
−
κuA′(K(p))(1+ κeF(K(p)))
(1+ κuF(K(p)))(κeA(K(p))+ (κu − κe)uAu(K(p)))
 
(2.17)
which when combined with the observation that F(w) = Γ(K(p)) allows all the objects intro-
duced in sections 2.2.1–2.2.3 to easily be computed.
Properties at w = w
Understanding the properties of the model at w are very important both when solving the
model numerically and when performing estimation (see the later discussion in Section 2.3).
The following proposition describes the properties of f(w) and g(w) at w = w.
Proposition 2. Suppose that A(w) < 1 and that κe > 0. If an equilibrium exists and there is no
binding minimum wage then f(w) = g(w) = 0; conversley if A(w) = 1 then f(w) = (1 + κe) ×
[2κe(p − w)]−1 > 0 and g(w) = f(w)[κuu/(1 − u) + κe] × (1 + κe)−1 > 0.
The proof of this proposition is provided in Appendix 2.A. The proposition states that if some
workers have reservation wages below the lowest equilibrium wage offer (A(w) < 1), then it
must be the case that the density of wage offers and earnings at w are both zero. By setting
f(w) = 0 in equation 2.13 it must be true that the lowest wage offer satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
condition:
(p − w∗)A′(w∗) = A(w∗) (2.18)
which from equation 2.16 also implies that K′(p) = +∞. The implication of this is that
if the empirical earnings density ˆ g(w) > 0 then this distribution of wage earnings is only
implementable as an equilibrium when all workers accept all equilibrium wages (A(w) = 1).
Thus, reservation wage heterogeneity imposes strong restrictions on the set of admissible
wage distributions. These conditions need not be true in the presence of a minimum wage,
however, and we discuss this case in Section 2.6.
Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
We now proceed to deﬁne equilibrium of the labour market in the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. A labour market equilibrium in the economy is deﬁned by a distribution of wage offers
F and reservation wage functions φ such that simultaneously:
1. Workers follow a reservation wage strategy: unemployed workers accept any wage offer at least as
high as φ(b) (where φ(b) is deﬁned in equation 2.1); employed workers accept any wage strictly
greater than their current wage.
2. The stratgey of each productivity p ﬁrm is to choose a wage w that maximizes proﬁts given the
strategies of other ﬁrms’ and workers’:
K(p) = argmax
w
π(p,w)2.2. Basic Model 60
where π(p,w) is as deﬁned in equation 2.11.
3. The distribution of wage offers in the economy satisﬁes: F(K(p)) = Γ(p).
Solving for the Labour Market Equilibrium
We solve for the equilibrium of the model by determining the wage policy function K(p). Once
this has been determined we are able to calculate all the relevant equilibrium functions. The
feedback that the strategy of ﬁrms has on the job acceptance behaviour of workers whenever
κu  = κe complicates the solution to the model. The numerical algorithm that is used to solve
for the equilibrium of the economy is presented in Appendix 2.B. Essentially this involves
discretizing the distribution of ﬁrm productivity and iterating on the wage policy function
using equation 2.15. At each iteration step we also update the guess of the lowest wage w∗ by
using equation 2.18. While we have not developed any formal existence or uniqueness proof,
such problems have never appeared during extensive numerical simulations.
2.2.5 Comparative Static Exercises
In wage posting models with two-sided heterogeneity as developed here, it is generally not
possible to determine analytically how the equilibrium functions vary with the structural
parameters. In order to provide some insight regarding their dependency, Bontemps et al.
(1999) performed a number of interesting comparative static exercises under the restriction
that κu = κe. Here we conduct a similar exercise. With the exception of the value taken by
κe we adopt the same speciﬁc parameter values and distributional assumptions as used in
their baseline model: we set κu = 20 and assume that work opportunity costs H are nor-
mally distributed with mean 2500 and standard deviation 1000; the productivity distribution
is assumed Pareto with p = 3000 and a Pareto parameter 2.8. We impose the additional
parametrization ρ/δ = 1 in all of the following simulations (the solution to the model is
invariant to the value of this ratio whenever κu = κe).
In Figure 2.1a we show how the wage policy function changes as we vary κe. In the
ﬁgure we consider three values: κe = 10, κe = κu = 20 and κe = 30. Since we are implicitly
holding the job destruction rate δ ﬁxed, this is equivalent to changing the arrival rate λe.
As κe increases the ﬁgure shows that there is increased wage dispersion: K(p) increases for
high p and decreases for low p. The intuition for this result is essentially the same as in the
model without employee heterogeneity: when κe is high, high productivity type ﬁrms have
a much larger incentive to offer a higher wage since doing attracts a larger ﬂow of workers.
Meanwhile, low productivity type ﬁrms have little incentive to offer high wages since workers
will exit to higher paying jobs more quickly. Figure 2.1b recasts these wage policy functions
into the monopsony power index 1−K(p)/p. Note that this index is not necessarily monotone
in p. Figure 2.1c shows directly that as we increase κe there is increasing dispersion of wage
offers. The distribution of wage earnings mirrors the increased dispersion of wage offers and
is shown in Figure 2.1d.2.2. Basic Model 61
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Figure 2.1: Impact of varying κe on equilibrium functions. Figure shows the impact of vary-
ing κe on the wage policy function, the monopsony power index, wage offers and earnings,
reservation wages for unemployed workers, and unemployment. The broken line in panel (f)
corresponds to the unemployment rate if workers accept all job offers. All other structural
parameters are held constant. See Section 2.2.5 for the parametrizations.2.3. Estimation 62
Changes in κe not only affect the rate at which employed workers gravitate to higher
paying jobs, but also affect the initial job acceptance decision of workers. For given F, when
the rate at which jobs arrive when employed increases, forward looking individuals are more
willing to accept a job paying a given wage since they now expect more wage progression via
job-to-job transitions before exiting employment and so value employment more. Hence in-
creasing κe shifts the reservation wage distribution to the left. In Figure 2.1e we show how the
distribution of reservation wages amongst the unemployed Au changes as κe is varied. Note
that this ﬁgure also incorporates for the feedback effect of changing job acceptance behaviour
on equilibrium wage offers F. The distribution of reservation wages amongst employed work-
ers (not shown) also experiences a similar leftward shift as κe increases.
Finally we note that for the three values of κe considered in the above ﬁgures, we obtain
unemployment rates of 12.8%, 7.3% and 5.3% respectively. Figure 2.1f also shows how the
unemployment rate varies continuously as we increase the value of κe from κe = 0 (a version
of the Albrecht and Axell (1984) model with a continuous distribution of work opportunity
costs) to κe = 100. The ﬁgure demonstrates that as κe increases in value, the unemployment
rate converges to the unemployment rate in the absence of reservation wage heterogeneity
(1 + κu)−1. While for a ﬁxed wage offer distribution F an increase in κe necessarily lowers
reservation wages and decreases unemployment, this is not necessarily true once the changes
in F (described above) are allowed for. The effect of this can be seen in the ﬁgure, which
shows that increases in κe cause an initial increase in unemployment.
Bontemps et al. (1999) also considers the impact of changes in the job destruction rate,
increases in the mean value of work opportunity costs, and imposition of a legal minimum
wage. The qualitative impact of these changes when κe  = κu is the same as when the arrival
rates are equal, so the same exercises are not repeated here. The interested reader should
consult Bontemps et al. for details.
2.3 Estimation
In this section we discuss the estimation and identiﬁcation of wage posting models with
two-sided heterogeneity using longitudinal survey data. In all cases we consider maximum
likelihood estimation. We do however, consider different approaches to obtaining an estimate
of the wage offer distribution F. Before doing this, we present the likelihood function.
2.3.1 Likelihood Function
We now derive the likelihood contribution for individuals in different labour market positions,
and with different initial transitions. The derivation closely follows that of Bontemps et al.
(1999), and here we continue to use u and e to index the respective states of unemployment
and employment. Note that we do not use any information beyond the ﬁrst observed transi-2.3. Estimation 63
tion. In what follows elapsed and residual durations are given by:
tub = elapsed unemployment duration
tuf = residual unemployment duration
dub = 1 if unemployment duration left-censored, otherwise 0
duf = 1 if unemployment duration right-censored, otherwise 0
teb = elapsed employment duration
tef = residual employment duration
deb = 1 if employment duration left-censored, otherwise 0
def = 1 if employment duration right-censored, otherwise 0
while earned and accepted wages are denoted as follows:
wu = wage accepted by unemployed individuals
du = 1 if wu unobserved, otherwise 0
we = wage of employees at date of ﬁrst interview
de = 1 if we unobserved, otherwise 0
and employed worker initial transitions are indexed by:
ve = 1 if employed experience a job-to-job transition, otherwise 0.
In constructing the initial conditions in the likelihood function we have used the steady state
distributions of earnings and unemployment rates. Implicitly this is assuming that all indi-
viduals have been operating in the labour market for inﬁnite time. Obviously, this is not a true
description of the labour market, but is somewhat less objectionable if individuals with only
a few years of potential labour market experience are excluded from the constructed sample
(see the sample selection used in Section 2.4.1).
Unemployed Workers
Using the above notation, we now derive the likelihood contribution for unemployed workers.
The exact form this will take will depend upon whether an accepted wage is observed, and
whether or not the unemployment durations are subject to censoring. If the accepted wage
wu is observed (so that we have du = 0 and duf = 0), the likelihood contribution is given by:
λ
2−dub
u exp
 
−λu(tub + tuf)
  A(w)
1+ κu
f(wu)
+
  wu
w
 
λuF(b)
 2−dub exp
 
−λuF(b)(tub + tuf)
  f(wu)
F(b)
dA(b)
1+ κuF(b)2.3. Estimation 64
where we have integrated over the range of possible reservations wages among unemployed
workers using equation 2.5.
If we do not observe a wage accepted by the unemployed (du = 1), but we nonetheless
have dub+duf < 2, then it still must be the case that the reservation wage of such an individual
is no greater than w. It therefore follows that their likelihood contribution is:
λ
2−dub−duf
u exp
 
−λu(tub + tuf)
  A(w)
1+ κu
+
  w
w
 
λuF(b)
 2−dub−duf exp
 
−λuF(b)(tub + tuf)
  dA(b)
1 + κuF(b)
.
Finally, if we have both du = 1 and dub + duf = 2, then individuals are never observed in
the employment state so we must also consider the probability that such individuals have a
reservation wage that is greater than w. The likelihood contribution then becomes:
exp
 
−λu(tub + tuf)
  A(w)
1 + κu
+
  w
w
exp
 
−λuF(b)(tub + tuf)
  dA(b)
1 + κuF(b)
+ [1 − A(w)].
Employed Workers
The likelihood contribution of an individual working at wage we is given by:
(1− u)g(we)
 
δ + λeF(we)
 2−deb−def
× exp
 
−
 
δ + λeF(we)
 
(teb + tef)
 
×
 
δ1−ve(λeF(we))ve
δ + λeF(we)
 1−def
.
Note that in the above we do not use any information on the wage accepted following a
job-to-job transition. The reason for adopting such a limited information approach is that
the model we have developed does not permit job-to-job transitions associated with lower
job values.10 Finally, if the wage of an employed worker were missing (de = 1), then the
likelihood contribution is simply given by the employment rate 1 − u.
2.3.2 Estimation Procedure
Semi-parametric Estimation
Bontemps et al. (1999) considered the model with κu  = κe to be intractable. Here we de-
scribe how to generalise the three step semi-parametric estimator that was proposed in
Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) to this setting. While we no longer have a simple inversion
between the observed earnings distributions and the unobserved wage offer distributions, it
nonetheless remains possible to perform an inversion by iterating on the relevant ﬂow equa-
tions. More speciﬁcally:
10This could be incorporated by allowing for wage measurement error in the estimation, or by introducing “real-
location shocks” as considered by Jolivet et al. (2006) and van den Berg and Ridder (1993, 1997). Reallocation shocks
are more complicated in a model with reservation wage heterogeneity as individuals may wish to exercise an option
to quit their reallocated job if it pays a wage below their reservation wage φ(b).2.3. Estimation 65
1. We estimate {w, w} as the sample minimum and maximum values of we. We then cal-
culate an estimate of the earnings density using non-parametric (kernel) techniques. We
denote this estimated density as ˆ g and the estimated cumulative distribution function as
ˆ G. If no binding legal minimum wage was operational during the sample period, then
the theoretical restriction that g(w) = 0 can be imposed by modifying the standard ker-
nel estimator in the neighbourhood of the estimated boundary (see the later discussion
in Section 2.4).
2. We assume a parametric form for the distribution of work opportunity costs H with the
ﬁnite parameter vector  θH. Conditional on the set of structural parameters {  θH,λu,λe,δ}
we wish to recover the wage offer distribution F that induces the estimated empirical
distribution ˆ g(w). First, we note that by differentiating equation 2.9 and rearranging
terms we may express the wage offer density as:
f(w) =
(1 − u)g(w)
 
δ + λeF(w)
 
λuuAu(w) + λe(1− u)G(w)
. (2.19)
To recover the wage offer distribution that induces our estimates of the empirical earn-
ings distributions, we replace g and G in equation 2.19 with our non-parametric esti-
mates ˆ g and ˆ G. We provide an initial guess of f, integrate this to obtain F, and then
iterate on this equation, exploiting the conditional linearity seen above. Note that both
the distribution of reservation wages amongst the unemployed Au and the unemploy-
ment rate u depend upon the entire distribution of wages offers. At each iteration step
we scale the wage offer density by a normalization factor to ensure that we have a proper
distribution function, and then verify that this normalization factors converge to unity.
Conditional on the set of transitional parameters and distribution of work opportunity
costs, we then obtain consistent estimates of the wage offer distribution and its density
which we denote as ˆ F and ˆ f respectively. These estimates, together with the estimated
wage earnings density ˆ g and the implied unemployment rate u and reservation wage
distribution A, are then substituted into the likelihood function presented in Section
2.3.1.
3. Given the non-parametric estimate of wage offers ˆ F and the other structural parameters
  θ, we obtain an estimate of the productivity level associated with each wage offer by
rewriting the ﬁrst order condition given in equation 2.13 to obtain:
K−1(w) = w +
 
κuA′(w)(1+ κeF(w))
(1 + κuF(w))(κeA(w) + (κu − κe)uAu(w))
+
2κe f(w)
1 + κeF(w)
 −1
(2.20)
The productivity density γ may then be obtained either by numerically differentiating
Γ or by exploiting the relationship F(w) = Γ(K−1(w)). In particular, since F(w) =
Γ(K−1(w)) it follows that γ(K−1(w)) = f(w)/(K−1)′(w). Differentiating equation 2.202.3. Estimation 66
this can be shown to be given by:
γ(K−1(w)) = f(w)
 
1−
 
K−1(w) − w
 2
 
2κe[f′(w)(1+ κeF(w)) + 2κe f(w)
2]
(1+ κeF(w))2
+
κu(1+ κeF(w))(A′′(w) − A′(w)/(K−1(w) − w))
(1 + κuF(w))(κeA(w) + (κu − κe)uAu(w))
+
κuA′(w)f(w)[κu(1+ κeF(w)) + κe(1+ κuF(w))]
(1+ κuF(w))2(κeA(w) + (κu − κe)uAu(w))
  −1
(2.21)
which depends on the derivative of the wage offer density. However, given an estimate
of g′(w) this can (by differentiating equation 2.19) be written as:
f′(w) =
(1 − u)g′(w)(1+ κeF(w)) − f(w)[2κe(1− u)g(w) + κuA′(w)/(1+ κuF(w))]
κuuAu(w) + κe(1− u)G(w)
(2.22)
We construct conﬁdence intervals by bootstrapping the entire three stage estimation pro-
cedure. The advantages of this three step procedure versus a completely parametric approach,
are essentially threefold. Firstly, it is considerably easier to perform this numerical inversion
than it is to solve the full model at every evaluation of the likelihood function. Second,
it permits greater ﬂexibility than simple parametric forms for the productivity distribution.
Thirdly, since this semi-parametric estimation procedure does not make assumptions regard-
ing the determination of F, both the estimate of F and the transitional parameters λu, λe and
δ are valid under a range of possible models.
The main potential difﬁculty with the semi-parametric approach detailed above, is that
the empirical distribution of wages ˆ g may not be implementable as an equilibrium of the
wage-posting model. This problem would manifest itself with an improper distribution of
ﬁrm productivity from the third step (that is, K−1(w) not being strictly increasing in w). This
would seemingly prevent the estimated model from being used for policy analysis, which is
often the ultimate objective of such an estimation. If the degree of non-monotonicity is not
“large”, then it may be possible to replace the third step productivity distribution estimate
with one which is “close”, subject to the requirement that it is a proper distribution function.
Of course, this proper distribution will not induce the ﬁrst step estimate ˆ g in equilibrium, but
it may still be sufﬁciently close for practical purposes.
Remark An alternative to step 2 in the above involves parametrically specifying a wage offer
distribution. If this distribution is described by the ﬁnite parameter vector   θF then the set of
structural parameters is now given by {  θF,  θH,λu,λe,δ}. Under this alternative approach, the
theoretical distribution of wage earnings given the parametric offer distribution (and other
structural parameters) will be substituted in place of the empirical distributions. Relative
to the above, this has the advantage that it is not necessary to numerically invert the ﬂow
equation given in equation 2.19. However, parametrically specifying F does not remove the2.3. Estimation 67
problem of implementability, which is the main disadvantage of the semi-parametric estima-
tion approach.
Parametric Estimation
The potential problem of implementability can be avoided by estimating the complete equi-
librium wage posting model parametrically. We now discuss this approach. This estimation
procedure involves ﬁrst specifying some parametric distribution of ﬁrm productivity (as char-
acterised by some ﬁnite parameter vector   θΓ), and then estimating the model by maximum
likelihood as before. At each evaluation of the likelihood function, we solve for the equilib-
rium of the wage posting game. The equilibrium wage offer and wage earnings distributions,
together with the unemployment rate, are then substituted in the likelihood function. The
numerical algorithm that is used to solve the model in estimation is presented alongside the
main algorithm in Appendix 2.B. The basic idea is to treat the empirical support of wages
[ ˆ w, ˆ w] as ﬁxed, and then solve for the inverse of the wage policy function K−1(w) that is
consistent with these. In contrast to the semi-parametric estimation approach, the empirical
distribution of wage earnings will not be matched perfectly by construction. However, the
ability of the model to ﬁt the empirical distribution of wages can be assessed by comparing
the equilibrium and empirical distributions and we do this in Section 2.4.
2.3.3 Non-parametric Identiﬁcation
Before presenting some results obtained using the proposed estimation procedures, we ﬁrst
explore the identiﬁcation of the model. An important advantage of wage posting models
in terms of empirical analysis is that they are structurally identiﬁed with only worker data
(that is, data on wages, transitions and durations). To better understand identiﬁcation of our
model, we ﬁrst consider the model of Bontemps et al. (2000). In this case, identiﬁcation of
the wage offer distribution (conditional on the set of transitional parameters) follows from a
simple steady-state relationship between the distribution of earnings and the distribution of
wage offers.
(1 − u)G(w)
 
δ + λeF(w)
 
= λuuF(w) (2.23)
which is a simpler form of equation 2.9 from earlier. This equation allows us to move from the
known G to the unknown F. Moreover, in such a setting all job offers will be accepted by all
unemployed workers so that the accepted wage distribution will also coincide with the wage
offer distribution. This special case of the model presented in Section 2.2 is therefore over
identiﬁed. Regardless of its source, once we allow for heterogeneity in the reservation wage
of unemployed workers the distribution of accepted wages will no longer equal the wage offer
distribution. This is because workers are selective in the wages that they are willing to accept,
so that the distribution of accepted wages will dominate F. We are still able to establish non-
parametric identiﬁcation in this context because we observe as many distributions (starting
wages and cross-sectional earnings) as distributions that we wish to recover. We now present2.3. Estimation 68
this argument more formally.
In what follows, we let GU denote the cumulative distribution function of wages ﬁrst
accepted by unemployed workers. Since individuals will accept any wage offer that is at least
as high as their reservation wage, it follows that:
GU(w) =
  w
−∞
Pr(W < w|W > x)dAu(x) =
  w
−∞
F(w) − F(x)
F(x)
dAu(x)
= Au(w) − F(w)
   w
w
dAu(x)
F(x)
+ Au(w)
 
.
If we combine the above expression with the density function of accepted wages gU ≡ GU′
,
we can write:
Au(w; F) = GU(w) +
F(w)gU(w)
f(w)
(2.24)
which therefore demonstrates that the distribution of reservation wages amongst the unem-
ployed on support [w,w] is identiﬁed given knowledge of the wage offer distribution function
F. To demonstrate identiﬁcation of F we can use the between job ﬂow equation from equation
2.19, eliminating the unobserved reservation wage distribution function to obtain the follow-
ing differential equation that governs the evolution of the wage offer distribution function:
f(w) =
(1− u)g(w)(1+ κeF(w)) − ugU(w)κuF(w)
κuuGU(w) + κe(1− u)G(w)
. (2.25)
Given these functions we are able to separately identify the transitional parameters by using
information on durations and transitions: λu is identiﬁed from unemployment durations; δ is
identiﬁed by transitions to the unemployment pool; λe is identiﬁed from job-to-job transitions.
We may identify A on the support of wages by using equation 2.5. In particular, we have:
A(w) = (1+ κu)uAu(w) + u
  w
w
(1+ κuF(x))dAu(x)
on [w,w]. The structure of the model then permits identiﬁcation of the leisure ﬂow distribu-
tion H, and distribution of ﬁrm productivity Γ.
Identiﬁcation Through Wage Growth
The discussion above suggests that we may again be able to establish over-identiﬁcation if
further distributions of wages are observed. We now demonstrate this to be the case by show-
ing that it is possible to recover the distribution of wage offers by considering the distribution
of wages that employed workers receive in their next job. This argument is valid regardless
of whether or not there is any heterogeneity in worker reservation wages. We denote the
cumulative distribution of upgraded wages as GE, which is given by:
GE(w) =
κe
η
  w
w
F(w) − F(x)
1 + κeF(x)
dG(x) (2.26)2.4. Estimation Results 69
where η measures the probability that the next transition for an employed worker selected at
random, is to another job. It is given by:
η =
  w
w
κeF(x)
1 + κeF(x)
dG(x). (2.27)
To demonstrate identiﬁcation we ﬁrst differentiate equation 2.26 using Leibniz’s rule, and
rearranging terms to obtain:
f(w) = ηgE(w) ×
   w
w
κedG(x)
1 + κeF(x)
 −1
(2.28)
where gE ≡ GE′ is the density function of upgraded wages. While this depends on the un-
known η we can easily eliminate this term by using equation 2.26 so that we have a differential
equation for f(w) with initial condition F(w) = 0. This establishes identiﬁcation of the wage
offer distribution F and this over-identiﬁcation result could, in principle, be used to test our
model. The useful of this further identiﬁcation result may be limited in many applications.
Unless there is substantial job-to-job mobility, then it will be necessary to follow individuals
for a considerable period of time to estimate the upgraded wage distribution. This is problem-
atic not just in terms of suitable data availability, but also because it may be difﬁcult to defend
the assumption that these data are generated from the same steady state. Furthermore, the
model as has been presented does not permit any job-to-job movements that are associated
with wage cuts.11
2.4 Estimation Results
In this section we present some illustrative estimation results that have been obtained using
UK survey data. We shall compare and contrast the estimation results that are derived under
both the semi-parametric and parametric estimation procedures as described in Section 2.3.2.
Before detailing these, we provide a brief description of our data.
2.4.1 Data
All the estimation results are obtained using a sub-sample of the UK Labour Force Survey
(LFS). The LFS is a quarterly survey of around 60,000 households in Great Britain, with these
households followed for ﬁve successive quarters or “waves”. When individuals ﬁrst enter the
survey they are in wave one, so that in any given quarter, there are roughly equal proportions
of individuals in each interview wave. This rolling panel structure means that there is ap-
proximately an 80% overlap in the samples for successive quarters. The LFS provides us with
very rich information concerning the respondents labour market status. Crucially, we observe
employment status and spell durations, together with earnings information (in the ﬁrst and
ﬁfth waves since 1997). In the application here we follow individuals who are observed in the
11The idea of using wage growth to achieve identiﬁcation is also explored by Barlevy (2008) and
Barlevy and Nagaraja (2006) who using record-value theory demonstrate identiﬁcation of the wage offer distribu-
tion by tracking the wage growth of workers as a function of past mobility.2.4. Estimation Results 70
ﬁrst quarter of 1997 until (at the latest) the ﬁrst quarter of 1998.
We classify individuals as being employed if they have a job, and non-employed if they
do not. The sample is restricted to males who are aged between 22 and 55 at the initial
interview date.12 Individuals who are self-employed are excluded from the sample, as are
part-time workers, and those in full-time education. Given the assumption that workers are
equally productive at any given ﬁrm, we additionally restrict our sample to those individuals
whose highest qualiﬁcation is O-level (or equivalent) or below, and assume that any higher
educated individuals operate in a separate labour market. After sample selection, we have
almost 9,800 observations.
2.4.2 Estimation Speciﬁcation
In all of the estimation results reported, worker opportunity costs are assumed to be normally
distributed with mean   and standard deviation σ. When we perform semi-parametric esti-
mation, we obtain our ﬁrst step estimate of the wage earnings distribution by using a Gaussian
kernel. Since no minimum wage operated during our sample period, we impose the theoret-
ical restriction that g(w) = 0 on our estimate by scaling the density estimate towards zero in
the neighbourhood of the estimated boundary.13 Speciﬁcally, we set:
ˆ g(w) =
 
1
nh
n
∑
i=1
φ
 
w − wi
h
   
1− exp
 
ˆ w − w
α
  
(2.29)
where wi, i = 1,...,n, is the sample of wages amongst the employed; h is the kernel band-
width; φ is the standard normal density; and α is a smoothing parameter that determines how
quickly the wages near the lower support are scaled towards zero. In the results presented
here we set α = 0.25 and h = 0.40. The estimation results are not particularly sensitive to
these values.
When estimating the model parametrically we consider alternative parameterizations of
the productivity distribution. In all cases, the truncation points of these distributions are
not parameters to be estimated using maximum likelihood, but are rather determined by
the requirement that the equilibrium support of wages given the structural parameter vector
{  θΓ,  θH,λu,λe,δ} coincides with the empirical support of wages.14 The ﬁrst distribution that
we consider is the Pareto distribution. In addition to the truncation points this distribution is
characterised by a single shape parameter,  θΓ = a. The productivity density is given by:
γ(p) =
apa
pa+1[1− (p/p)a]
.
12By restricting the sample to those individuals who have at least six years of potential labour market experience,
the use of steady state values when constructing the initial conditions in the likelihood function is somewhat less
objectionable.
13In the absence of a binding legal minimum wage, modifying the ﬁrst stage estimate in this way is a necessary
(but not sufﬁcient) condition for this estimate to be implementable as an equilibrium of the model. If this condition
is ignored during estimation, then the equilibrium wage distribution obtaining using the third step productivity
estimates will not coincide with the empirical distribution. However, provided that the uncorrected density estimate
ˆ g( ˆ w) is “close” to zero, the differences between these distributions is unlikely to be large.
14See both the algorithm and discussion in Appendix 2.B.2.4. Estimation Results 71
which is monotonically decreasing on its support. The second distribution we consider is
one which potentially offers much greater ﬂexibility. Speciﬁcally, we shall be considering the
Pearson IV distribution (Pearson, 1895). In addition to the truncation points, this distribution
is characterized by four parameters   θΓ = {k1,k2,k3,k4} which allows for varying degrees of
skewness and kurtosis. It is therefore ideally suited for many economic applications where
the distributions of interest are often asymmetric with extensive tails. Given the sparsity of
references to this distribution in the literature, Appendix 2.C discusses the properties of the
distribution and our implementation of it. The density of the distribution is given by:
γ(p) ∝
 
1 +
 
p − k4
k3
 2 −k1
exp
 
−k2 tan−1
 
p − k4
k3
  
(2.30)
where k1 and k2 jointly determine the degree of skewness and kurtosis, while k3 and k4 are
scale and location parameters.
2.4.3 Results
We now present the results obtained from the three sets of estimations performed: we refer to
these different estimation speciﬁcations as semi-parametric, Pareto, and Pearson. In all cases, the
parameter conﬁdence intervals are constructed by bootstrapping the estimation procedures
using 500 replications. In Table 2.1 we present the transitional parameter estimates, as well as
the estimated parameters of the work opportunity cost distribution. The estimate of the job
destruction rate δ is remarkably similar across speciﬁcations. The estimates imply that jobs are
destroyed on average around every 160 months (≈ 1/ˆ δ). Across all speciﬁcations we obtain
ˆ λu > ˆ λe so that job offers arrive more frequently for unemployed than employed workers.15
While the semi-parametric and Pearson speciﬁcations produce very similar arrival rate estimates
(both implying that jobs for unemployed workers arrive on average every 30 months, with jobs
for employed workers arriving on average about every 45 months), the estimates obtained
from the Pareto speciﬁcation are very different (14 and 25 months respectively). The estimated
distribution of work opportunity costs differs slightly across the speciﬁcations: the mean of
the distribution   is lowest (highest) under the semi-parametric (Pareto) speciﬁcation, while
the reverse pattern is true for the estimated standard deviation of the distribution σ. All
speciﬁcations imply that workers are selective in the wages that they are willing to accept.16
In Figure 2.2 we show what these parameter estimates imply for the distributions of
wage offers F and wage earnings G. Figure 2.2a demonstrates that very similar wage offer
distributions are obtained under both the semi-parametric and Pearson speciﬁcations. Results
from the Pareto speciﬁcation are very different, with a much higher concentration of low wage
offers. The observation that the Pearson speciﬁcation then induces a distribution of wage
15We reject the null hypothesis that λu = λe across all speciﬁcations.
16Accounting for reservation wage heterogeneity is important for our estimates of the structural parameters. In
particular, if we neglect it then the semi-parametric estimation procedure yields a much lower estimate of λu (0.014
compared to 0.032 with heterogeneity). Note however, that the latter “average job acceptance rate” for unemployed
workers λu
 
F(φ)dAu(φ) = 0.017 is very close to the no-heterogeneity estimate.2.4. Estimation Results 72
Table 2.1: Maximum likelihood estimation results
1/δ 1/λu 1/λe   σ
Semi-parametric 169.31 31.37 47.22 2.06 2.53
[161.75,177.27] [24.43,37.70] [39.73,54.21] [1.22,2.56] [2.02,3.25]
Pearson IV 167.55 28.72 44.49 2.41 2.13
[160.29,175.08] [23.50,33.36] [37.61,50.72] [2.12,2.68] [1.83,2.45]
Pareto 163.72 14.32 24.60 2.75 1.27
[158.06,170.04] [13.68,15.46] [22.30,28.03] [2.62,2.90] [1.15,1.38]
Notes: All durations are monthly. Incomes are measured in pounds per hour in April 1997 prices. The distribution
of work opportunity costs H is assumed to be Normal, with mean   and variance σ2. The 5th and 95th percentiles of
the bootstrap distribution of parameter estimates are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500 replications.
earnings that is very close to the non-parametric estimate is unsurprising given the similarity
of both the wage offer distribution and estimated transitional parameters to those obtained
from the semi-parametric approach. The Pareto speciﬁcation also provides a reasonable ﬁt to
the cross-sectional wage earnings distribution, although the ﬁt in the tails of the distribution
is considerably less good. With a higher concentration of low wage offers it is ﬁtting the
distribution of wage earnings by forcing the arrival rates of job offers to be much higher (see
Table 2.1).
When estimating the model using the semi-parametric approach, we recover the distri-
bution of ﬁrm productivity by using the ﬁrst order conditions from the ﬁrms’ maximisation
problem (see step 3 as described in Section 2.3.2). The point estimates from the semi-parametric
model imply a monotonically increasing relationship between ﬁrm productivity p and wages
w which means that the ﬁrst step estimate of the empirical distribution of wages ˆ g is im-
plementable as an equilibrium outcome of the model.17 The resulting distribution of ﬁrm
productivity is shown in Figure 2.3a, which also shows the distribution obtained from the
two parametric speciﬁcations.18 The reason why the Pareto speciﬁcation provides a poorer
ﬁt to the data than does Pearson can easily be seen from the ﬁgure. The single parameter
Pareto distribution has a probability density that is declining throughout its support which
is ultimately too restrictive. Distributions that simultaneously allow for the possibility of an
interior mode and a long right tail are much more likely to be successful in ﬁtting empirical
distributions and durations. Table 2.2 provides the estimates of the productivity parameters
  θΓ, while Figure 2.3b displays the wage policy function from the alternative speciﬁcations.
This exercise suggests that, in the case of parametric estimation, the shape of the assumed
productivity distribution does matter, and it may matter a lot. The theory developed provides
little guidance regarding suitable parametrizations of this distribution which is why the gen-
eralization of the semi-parametric estimation procedure proposed by Bontemps et al. (1999,
2000) is particularly appealing. As we have discussed, there may be situations where para-
metric estimation is either necessary or desirable, and in these cases it is judicious to compare
17This is certainly not true for all the bootstrap sample, so there remain implementability issues if attempting to
perform inference using the estimated model.
18In order to aid the visual comparison between the distributions, this ﬁgure has been truncated at productivity
levels exceeding p = 30.2.4. Estimation Results 73
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of wage offer- and wage earnings distributions when model is esti-
mated under the semi-parametric, Pareto, and Pearson speciﬁcations.2.4. Estimation Results 74
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of productivity distributions and wage policy functions when model
is estimated under the semi-parametric, Pareto, and Pearson speciﬁcations. The productivity
distribution is truncated at p = 30 in panel (a).2
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Table 2.2: Maximum likelihood estimation results (productivity distribution)
p p a k1 k2 k3 k4
Semi-parametric 3.02 359.57 – – – – –
[2.43,4.33] [231.39,496.54] – – – – –
Pearson IV 2.53 246.43 – 1.07 0.39 -1.34 3.89
[2.29,2.83] [196.38,303.18] – [1.02,1.12] [-0.20,0.83] [-1.82,-1.08] [3.59,4.26]
Pareto 1.80 489.62 0.06 – – – –
[1.78,1.88] [351.40,698.94] [0.06,0.07] – – – –
Notes: Incomes are measured in pounds per hour in April 1997 prices. The parameter a is the Pareto shape parameter; parameters {k1,k2,k3,k4} are parameters of the Pearson IV distribution. k1
and k2 jointly determine the degree of skewness and kurtosis, while k3 and k4 are scale and location parameters. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the bootstrap distribution of parameter estimates
are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500 replications.2.5. Demographic Heterogeneity 76
the empirical and equilibrium wage distributions, as well as the estimated transitional param-
eters to those obtained from the semi-parametric approach. If these differ substantially, then
a distribution which affords more ﬂexibility may be warranted. While we have considered
relatively parsimonious speciﬁcations of the productivity distribution in our application here,
approximating the distribution with say, a ﬁnite-dimensional sieve, is also possible.
2.5 Demographic Heterogeneity
In this section we consider an extension of the model presented in Section 2.2. Speciﬁcally
we shall discuss how demographic heterogeneity in worker structural parameters may be
introduced. The additional set of complications that this introduces will depend upon ones
view of the labour market. If workers of different types were to operate in distinct segmented
labour markets (between market heterogeneity), then both the model and available estimation
procedures are exactly the same as described in Sections 2.2–2.3, with the qualiﬁcation that
all the analysis is performed conditional on demographic type. The more interesting case
arises when workers of different types operate within a single labour market (within market
heterogeneity). This setting provides an alternative to the segmented markets approach of
van den Berg and Ridder (1998), and we now discuss this case.
2.5.1 Within Market Demographic Heterogeneity
Suppose that workers differ by their observable type, which we index by i. There are a total of
I observable types. Let ni denote the fraction of workers of a given type, with ∑i ni = 1. While
the set of worker structural parameters {  θHi,λui,λei,δi}i≤I may vary with i, all workers are
assumed to sample wage offers from the common wage offer distribution F. This reﬂects the
notion that all individuals are operating within the same labour market. From the perspective
of the worker, the problem is essentially the same as before. In particular, equations 2.1–2.10
continue to hold conditional on demographic type i (see also the later exposition in Chapter
3 of this thesis). The problem faced by ﬁrms is similar. They will continue to maximize their
steady state proﬁt ﬂow (p − w)l(w), with the qualiﬁcation that ﬁrm size is now given by
l(w) = ∑i nili(w) with li(w) is deﬁned as:
li(w) =
κeiAi(w)
(1 + κeiF(w))2 +
(κui − κei)
(1 + κeiF(w))2
 
1
1+ κui
Ai(w) +
  w
w
dAi(x)
1+ κuiF(x)
 
. (2.31)
The characterisation of the equilibrium is very similar to that as discussed in Section 2.2.
As before, it is necessary to calculate the wage policy function K(p) to determine the other
equilibrium functions of interest.19 In particular, the density of wage offers can be shown to
19It is straight forward to modify the algorithm presented in Appendix 2.B in the presence of within market
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be given by:
f(w) =
 
1
p − w ∑
i
ni
κeiAi(w) + (κui − κei)uiAui(w)
(1+ κeiF(w))2 −∑
i
niκuidAi(w)
(1+ κeiF(w))(1+ κuiF(w))
 
×
 
∑
i
ni
2κei(κeiAi(w) + (κui − κei)uiAui(w)
(1+ κeiF(w))3
 −1
where w = K(p).
2.5.2 Identiﬁcation and Estimation
Before proceeding to discuss estimation procedures in the presence of within market demo-
graphic heterogeneity, we note that exactly the same identiﬁcation argument as presented in
Section 2.3.3 continues to apply because the demographic type i is observed by the econo-
metrician. Similarly, very little changes when estimating the model parametrically: the set
of structural parameters {  θΓ,  θHi,λui,λei,δi}i≤I induces an equilibrium distribution of wage
offers F which is then substituted in the likelihood function, together with the conditional
distribution of earnings gi, unemployment ui, and reservation wages Ai.
While semi-parametric estimation remains feasible, it takes a slightly modiﬁed form. In
particular, if we were to perform the numerical inversion for each group i as described in Step
2 of Section 2.3.2, then we will typically obtain a different estimated F for each group even if
the data were generated using common F. While there are conceivably different approaches
that can be pursued in this context,20 the approach we propose essentially modiﬁes the three
step procedure so that we recover a non-parametric distribution of wage offers ˆ F that induces
the unconditional distribution of wages amongst the employed (that is, not conditional on
worker demographic type i). The procedure is as follows:
1b. The ﬁrst step is the same as before: {w, w} are estimated as the sample minimum
and maximum values of the wages of employed workers; a non-parametric estimate of
the earnings density is similarly obtained and is denoted ˆ g. None of these ﬁrst stage
estimates are calculated conditional on demographic type i.
2b. Conditional on the set of structural parameters {  θHi,λui,λei,δi}i≤I we wish to recover
the wage offer distribution that induces the estimated empirical distribution ˆ g(w). For
each demographic group i we have:
(1− ui)gi(w) = f(w)
 
κeAi(w) + (κui − κei)uiAui(w)
(1+ κeiF(w))2
 
which by averaging over the distribution of demographic types and then rearranging
20One such alternative could involve estimating the model on each group i in turn, and then combining the set of
estimates { ˆ Fi}i≤I into a single ˆ F. This single estimate of F can then be substituted into the ﬁrst order conditions of
ﬁrms to obtain an estimate of the productivity distribution as before.2.5. Demographic Heterogeneity 78
terms yields:
f(w) =
 
∑
i
ni(1− ui)gi(w)
 
×
 
∑
i
ni
κeAi(w) + (κui − κei)uiAui(w)
(1+ κeiF(w))2
 −1
.
This second step then essentially proceeds as before: we replace the term in parentheses
by (1 − u)ˆ g(w) where the aggregate equilibrium employment rate is given by 1 − u =
∑i ni(1 − ui). Conditional of the structural parameter vector   θ, an initial guess of f
and F is provided. We then iterate on f until we obtain a ﬁxed point. Our estimates
of the wage offer distribution and its density (denoted as ˆ F and ˆ f as before) are then
substituted into the likelihood function. These estimates are also used to determine the
conditional wage earnings distribution gi, unemployment rate ui and reservation wage
distribution Ai, which are all then substituted into the likelihood function.
3b. Given the non-parametric estimate of wage offers ˆ F and the vector of structural param-
eters   θ, we obtain an estimate of the productivity level associated with each wage offer
by rewriting the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrms maximization problem as:
K−1(w) = w +
1
l′(w) ∑
i
ni
κeiAi(w) + (κui − κei)uiAui(w)
(1+ κeiF(w))2
where l′(w) is given by:
l′(w) = ∑
i
ni
2κeif(w)[κeiAi(w) + (κui − κei)uiAui(w)]
(1+ κeiF(w))3
+∑
i
ni
κuiA′
i(w)
(1 + κuiF(w))(1+ κeiF(w))
.
2.5.3 Data and Estimation Results
As an illustrative example of how demographic heterogeneity may be introduced into the
model and estimation we continue to use the same data as described in Section 2.4.1, but now
allow the worker structural parameters to vary with age of the worker (at the initial interview
date). We allow for three age groups: age 22–30, age 31–40, and age 41–55. In both the
estimation and simulation the group that the individual belongs to is considered exogenous
and time invariant (so that the worker environment remains stationary), so it may be useful
to interpret these as being cohort rather than age categorizations.
We estimate the model under the same three speciﬁcations (semi-parametric, Pareto, and
Pearson) as we considered before. The transitional parameter estimates are presented in the
ﬁrst three columns of Table 2.3, and we again ﬁnd that the semi-parametric and Pearson speciﬁ-
cations yield very similar estimates. Across all speciﬁcations, a very pronounced age gradient
is apparent: younger workers both encounter job offers less frequently (lower λui and λei)
and also exit to unemployment more often (higher δi). Of course, since all groups of workers2.6. An Application to UK Minimum Wage Legislation 79
are (by assumption) sampling wage offers from the same distribution, the estimation may be
using the transitional parameters to explain differences in both the employment rate and the
cross-sectional distribution of earnings across groups. Indeed, an important between group
difference is that the youngest age group has somewhat lower and less dispersed wages.21
We are able to assess the extent that this is likely to be a concern by comparing these esti-
mates to those which we obtain when estimating the model on each group separately. In-
tuitively, if the model is correctly speciﬁed then we are able to obtain consistent estimates of
{  θHi,λui,λei,δi}i≤I and F by either estimating the models on each subgroup i, or by estimating
the model where all workers are restricted to sample from the same wage offer distribution
F. The extent to which they may or may not be similar can form the basis of a test.
Before we proceed we note that the extent to which the market may actually be considered
“integrated” is very much a maintained assumption, and is one that should typically be
justiﬁed by institutional features of the labour market (such as equal pay legislation). It is not
possible to test the assumption that the labour market is integrated per se when using data
from a single steady state, but only the weaker assertion that workers of differentdemographic
types i face the same wage offer distribution F. We follow this approach here. While these
distinctions are not important in terms of estimating the model, they have the potential to
be important when the model is used for counter-factual policy experiments (see the later
discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis).
We now consider the extent to which the data supports the assumption that workers
of different demographic types i face the same wage offer distribution. In the ﬁnal three
columns of Table 2.3 we present the estimated transitional parameters from the subgroup
estimations, and while there are some small differences, none of them are large relative to the
standard error of the estimates. In Figure 2.4 we compare the estimated wage offer and wage
earnings distribution from the semi-parametric speciﬁcation under the subgroup and common
F assumptions. A visual comparison of the ﬁgures suggests that the model is indeed capable
of explaining differences in the distribution of wages across groups through variation in the
other structural parameters of the model.
2.6 An Application to UK Minimum Wage Legislation
Structural models are arguably most valuable when applied as a tool for understanding the
impact of policy reforms. In this section we provide an illustrative application by consider-
ing how the equilibrium solution of the model changes as we introduce a minimum wage.
Speciﬁcally, we shall use our empirical estimates from the previous sections to consider the
effect of actual minimum wage legislation. The UK national minimum wage was introduced
on April 1 1999 at a rate of £3.60 for workers aged 22 years and older and £3 for those aged 18
to 21 years. This was the ﬁrst time that a national minimum wage operated in the UK. Given
21Mean average wages amongst employed workers aged 22–30, 31–40, and 41–55, are £6.08, £6.96, and £7.10 re-
spectively.2
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Table 2.3: Maximum likelihood estimation results with demographic heterogeneity
Common F Group speciﬁc Fi
1/δi 1/λui 1/λei 1/δi 1/λui 1/λei
Semi-parametric Age 22–30 97.99 25.02 45.99 100.39 26.97 44.43
[90.88,105.82] [19.59,31.86] [36.57,55.53] [92.61,108.31] [19.81,33.19] [34.49,55.12]
Age 31–40 178.46 30.30 46.06 174.06 32.90 55.88
[163.60,191.32] [21.34,38.57] [38.93,54.17] [159.45,186.72] [17.80,42.45] [34.82,70.73]
Age 41–55 247.70 50.75 64.91 241.34 38.30 56.86
[227.05,272.73] [35.27,70.98] [50.69,79.53] [223.46,261.85] [20.24,59.08] [34.67,72.25]
Pearson IV Age 22–30 96.78 25.83 49.03 98.05 23.90 42.84
[91.20,104.14] [22.12,32.13] [40.49,62.72] [91.40,107.81] [16.42,32.21] [29.78,51.83]
Age 31–40 175.37 31.04 49.45 171.12 28.32 51.94
[162.20,188.27] [25.11,39.67] [42.53,60.40] [157.52,184.75] [20.92,35.68] [39.68,64.74]
Age 41–55 251.55 59.39 65.66 239.83 39.78 60.94
[232.53,281.26] [43.21,93.70] [56.90,75.82] [222.42,260.26] [23.66,55.96] [42.95,76.74]
Pareto Age 22–30 93.16 8.90 22.23 91.26 9.39 26.02
[87.00,99.21] [7.82,10.53] [18.85,26.92] [85.88,97.78] [8.65,10.92] [21.30,34.71]
Age 31–40 168.97 11.90 22.63 168.32 13.96 27.32
[157.45,180.44] [10.37,13.71] [19.58,27.31] [157.24,179.49] [12.92,16.76] [23.58,35.06]
Age 41–55 236.02 20.05 31.00 238.14 20.46 30.04
[222.06,254.08] [18.22,22.79] [26.26,37.24] [223.84,255.63] [19.00,25.61] [24.75,41.74]
Notes: All durations are monthly. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the bootstrap distribution of parameter estimates are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500 replications.2.6. An Application to UK Minimum Wage Legislation 81
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Figure 2.4: Figure compares the distribution of wage offers and wage earnings by group.
Solid lines correspond to the distributions obtain with a common wage offer distribution F;
broken lines correspond to those distributions with group speciﬁc Fi. All ﬁgures calculated
using estimates from the semi-parametric speciﬁcation.2.6. An Application to UK Minimum Wage Legislation 82
our sample selection criteria (see Section 2.4.1), all workers in our sample will be eligible for
the higher rate. Since our sample pertains to a slightly earlier period than was the minimum
wage introduced, we reduce its introductory value in line with the growth in nominal Gross
Domestic Product over this period.22 This implies a main rate value of £3.21 in April 1997.
2.6.1 Theoretical Extensions
The model we presented in Section 2.2 and extended in Section 2.5 did not explicitly incor-
porate a minimum wage. In what follows we shall denote the value of this minimum wage
as wmin, and ﬁrst consider the case where wmin ≤ p. In this case all ﬁrms are able to remain
active in the market, so that the equilibrium conditions remain the same as before with the
qualiﬁcation that the lowest wage offer must now satisfy:
w = argmax
w≥wmin
(p − w)l(w).
If instead we have wmin > p then fraction Γ(wmin) of ﬁrms will not be active in the presence
of a minimum wage, and the distribution of productivity amongst active ﬁrms will be given
by: (Γ(p) − Γ(wmin))/(1 − Γ(wmin)). In contrast to the model without binding a minimum
wage where f(w) = 0 (see Proposition 2), by setting w = w = wmin in equation 2.17 it is
straightforward to verify that f(w) > 0. Moreover, whenever wmin ≥ p the productivity
of the least productive active ﬁrm will coincide with the minimum wage so that we have
f(w) = +∞.
2.6.2 Simulated Impact of the Reform
In the simulations we present in this section we allow the arrival rate of job offers to de-
pend upon the number of active ﬁrms in a very simple way: we set λ
wmin
ei = λei × Γ(wmin)
and λ
wmin
ui = λui × Γ(wmin), where λ
wmin
ui and λ
wmin
ei denote the arrival rates of job offers for
unemployed and employed workers in the presence of a legal minimum wage. In Table 2.6
we present the simulated impact of the introduction of the UK national minimum wage on
unemployment. We present results under the same three estimation speciﬁcations, both with
and without demographic heterogeneity incorporated. In the table we present bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals of the policy impact. Note that while the empirical distribution of wages
under the semi-parametric central estimates is implementable as an equilibrium of the model,
this is not true for all the bootstrap samples. This highlights the potential problems that the
semi-parametric estimation technique may introduce. To proceed with this exercise, we have
constructed a proper distribution of productivity from the third step estimates by applying a
rearrangement procedure on the estimate of K−1(w).
Under the semi-parametric speciﬁcation with demographic heterogeneity the model pre-
dicts a decrease in unemployment equal to around one percentage point. The impact is very
similar for the different age groups, and is also very close to what is obtained in the absence
22This is obtained using Gross Domestic Product at current prices, UK National Statistics series YBEU.2.7. Conclusion 83
Table 2.4: Impact of minimum wage on unemployment
Demographic heterogeneity No demographic
Age 22–30 Age 31–40 Age 41–55 Age 22–55 Age 22–55
Semi-parametric -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009
[-0.010,0.001] [-0.009,0.002] [-0.017,-0.004] [-0.011,-0.001] [-0.011,-0.003]
Pearson IV -0.008 -0.010 -0.016 -0.012 -0.005
[-0.009,-0.004] [-0.014,-0.007] [-0.030,-0.010] [-0.018,-0.008] [-0.008,-0.002]
Pareto 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.005
[0.005,0.011] [0.003,0.008] [-0.001,0.002] [0.003,0.005] [0.004,0.006]
Notes: Incomes are measured in pounds per hour in April 1997 prices. The parameter a is the Pareto shape parameter;
parameters {k1,k2,k3,k4} are parameters of the Pearson IV distribution. k1 and k2 jointly determine the degree of
skewness and kurtosis, while k3 and k4 are scale and location parameters. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the bootstrap
distribution of parameter estimates are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500 replications.
of any within market demographic heterogeneity. The results from the Pearson speciﬁcation
predict a similar decrease in unemployment, but a slight age gradient now emerges with
a larger decrease in unemployment (in absolute terms) for the older groups. If we neglect
demographic heterogeneity then this speciﬁcation produces a somewhat smaller decrease in
unemployment. In contrast, the impact simulated under the Pareto speciﬁcation is very differ-
ent: it predicts an increase in unemployment for the youngest two age groups, with essentially
no employment impact for oldest group.
We show the impact of the imposition of the minimum wage on some equilibrium func-
tions in Figure 2.5. All these ﬁgures were obtained using the central estimates from the
semi-parametric speciﬁcation with within market demographic heterogeneity. Since wmin > ˆ p
there is a mass point at the minimum wage which is visible in both the wage offer distribution
(Figure 2.5a) and the wage earnings distribution (Figure 2.5b). In Figure 2.5c we show the im-
pact on the wage policy function. From this ﬁgure we can see that there are spill-over effects
on wages above the minimum wage, although these do tend to be quite localized. Finally, in
Figure 2.5d we show how the overall unemployment rate (plotted with the point-wise 90%
conﬁdence band) varies as we increase the value of the minimum wage. At very low values,
the minimum wage is not-binding so there is no effect on unemployment, as it increases, un-
employment ﬁrst falls (due to increased job acceptance), and then it begins to increase sharply
as dominant effect is coming through the number of active ﬁrms is declining. Interesting, the
value of the introductory minimum wage (under this speciﬁcation) is very close to level which
minimises the level of unemployment.23
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has provided a synthesis of the existing literature on empirical equilibrium job
search with wage posting. We develop and estimate a wage posting model with on-the-job
search and unobserved worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity; ﬁrms may differ with respect to their
productivity whilst workers differ with respect to their opportunity costs of employment. In
23For a discussion of the quasi-experimental evidence of the impact of the UK minimum wage see, amongst others,
Dickens and Manning (2004), Metcalf (2008) and Stewart (2004a,b).2.7. Conclusion 84
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Figure 2.5: Simulated impact of the UK minimum wage on equilibrium functions under semi-
parametric speciﬁcation with within market heterogeneity. Broken line in panel (d) plots the
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contrast to Bontemps et al. (1999), we conduct this analysis without imposing restrictive as-
sumptions on job offer arrival rates. We have provided a characterization of the equilibrium,
presented illustrative numerical simulations, and shown how the model can be further ex-
tended to incorporate within market demographic heterogeneity. We have demonstrated that
this model remains empirically tractable, and have described how the type of semi-parametric
estimation technique that has been applied in simpler job search models may be generalized
to this setting. We provide estimation results using UK data, and compare the results obtained
from the semi-parametric procedure to alternative parametric speciﬁcations.
The model developed provides a useful benchmark model for conducting many types
of policy experiment, and we provide some illustrative simulations which use our estimated
model to explore the equilibrium effect of actual UK minimum wage legislation. In Chapter
3 of this thesis, we extend this model further and use it to provide a detailed equilibrium
assessment of a UK tax credit programme.
Chapter 1 Appendix
2.A Proof of Proposition
Suppose ﬁrst that A(w) < 1, κe > 0, and that there is no binding minimum wage. In any
equilibrium of the labour market, the ﬁrst order conditions to the ﬁrms’ maximization prob-
lem may be written as (p − w)l′(w) = l(w). This formulation equates the marginal beneﬁt of
a small increase in the wage (in terms of the increased ﬁrm size) to its cost (a higher wage bill
for all existing workers). Firm size l(w) is as deﬁned in equation 2.12 in the main text; the
derivative of ﬁrm size with respect to the wage w is given by:
l′(w) =
2κe f(w)(κeA(w) + (κu − κe)uAu(w))
(1+ κeF(w))3 +
κuA′(w)
(1+ κuF(w))(1+ κeF(w))
. (2.32)
Now, suppose that an equilibrium of the wage posting game exists with w = K(p) and
f(w) > 0. Since f(w) = 0 for all w < w, it is straightforward to verify from equations 2.12 and
2.32 that limǫ↓0 l′(w − ǫ) < l′(w) and limǫ↓0 l(w − ǫ) = l(w) by the continuity of both F and
H (and therefore A). This means that if (p − w)l′(w) = l(w) then if the least productive ﬁrm
deviates by offering wage w− ǫ (for some small ǫ > 0) then the marginal beneﬁt from a wage
reduction must exceed the marginal cost: (p− w + ǫ)l′(w− ǫ) < l(w − ǫ). This contradicts w
being the optimal wage for the productivity p ﬁrm. Hence, only f(w) = 0 is compatible with
a wage posting equilibrium of the labour market. Since K′(p) = γ(p)/f(K(p)) this result also
implies that K′(p) = +∞. Differentiating equation 2.9 we have:
(1− u)g(w)[1+ κeF(w)] = f(w)[κuuAu(w) + κe(1− u)G(w)] (2.33)
so clearly f(w) = 0 implies g(w) = 0.2.B. Numerical Algorithm 86
In the case that A(w) = 1 in equilibrium (all unemployed workers accept all wage offers),
it is straightforward to show that l(w) ∝ (1+κeF(w))−2 so that the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order condition
reduces to:
2κef(w)(p− w) = (1+ κeF(w)).
This implies that the offer density must satisfy:
f(w) =
1 + κe
2κe(p − w)
> 0
and by setting w = w in equation 2.33 this yields:
g(w) = f(w)
κuu + κe(1− u)
(1+ κe)(1− u)
> 0,
which completes the proof of the proposition.
2.B Numerical Algorithm
This appendix sketches the numerical algorithm that is used when solving for the equilibrium
of the model as presented in Section 2.2. It can be appropriately modiﬁed for the extensions
that are later considered. The equilibrium of the model is solved by iterating on the wage
policy function K(p). Here we perform a change of variable so that the integration is always
performed over p, although this may not always be necessary in practice. The algorithm
proceeds as follows:
1. Discretize p on support [p, p] and calculate Γ(p) and γ(p) for all p.
2. Provide an initial guess of the wage policy function: w0 = K0(p) < p for all p on support
[p, p], with w0 strictly increasing in p.
3. Given the current guess of the wage policy function wn = Kn(p) calculate the inverse
reservation wage equation:
φ−1
n (Kn(p)) =
1+ ρ/δ + κuΓ(p)
1 + ρ/δ + κeΓ(p)
Kn(p)− (κu − κe)(1+ ρ/δ)
  p
p
Kn(x)dΓ(x)
(1+ ρ/δ + κeΓ(x))2.
4. Calculate the reservation wage distribution in the whole population as An(Kn(p)) =
Hn(φ−1
n (Kn(p)).
5. Calculate the ﬁrm size at given wage policy guess Kn(p) as:
ln(Kn(p)) = κu
 
An(Kn(p))
(1+ κuΓ(p))(1+ κeΓ(p))
−
(κu − κe)
(1+ κeΓ(p))2
  p
p
An(Kn(x))dΓ(x)
(1+ κuΓ(x))2
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6. For some step size 0 < sn ≤ 1 update the guess of the lowest wage offer w∗
n using:
w∗
n = Kn(p) + sn ×
 
p −
An(Kn(p))
A′
n(Kn(p))
− Kn(p)
 
where A′
n(Kn(p)) = H′
n(Kn(p)) × (1+ ρ/δ + κu) × (1+ ρ/δ + κe)−1.
7. Obtain the updated guess of the wage policy function Kn+1(p) using:
Kn+1(p) = Kn(p)+sn×
 
p −
 
(p − w∗
n)ln(Kn(p)) +
  p
p
ln(Kn(x))dx
 
1
ln(Kn)
− Kn(p)
 
.
8. If for some distance metric d(Kn+1(p),Kn(p)) < ǫtol then the wage policy function has
converged and we have an equilibrium of the labour market. Otherwise, return to step
3. If the distance measure is exploding, then reduce the step size sn+1.
Parametric Estimation
The algorithm developed above can be modiﬁed easily for the estimation procedure. Here,
we take the support of wages as ﬁxed and solve for the inverse of the wage policy function
K−1(w). The modiﬁed algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Discretize w on support [w,w].
2. Provide an initial guess of the inverse wage policy function: p0 = K−1
0 (w) > w for all w
on support [w,w], with p0 strictly increasing in w.
3. Given the ﬁnite parameter vector characterising the distribution of ﬁrm productivity   θΓ
and the current guess of the inverse wage policy function, calculate Γn(p) and γn(p) on
support [K−1
n (w),K−1
n (w)]. Set Fn(w) = Γ(K−1
n (w)).
4. Calculate the inverse reservation wage equation:
φ−1
n (w) = w − (κu − κe)
  w
w
Fn(x)
1+ ρ/δ + κeFn(x)
dw.
5. Given φ−1
n (w) calculate the reservation wage distribution in both the whole population
An(w) = Hn(φ−1
n (w)), and among unemployed workers:
unAn(w) =
1
1+ κu
An(w) +
  w
w
dAn(x)
1 + κuFn(x)
where A′
n(w) = H′
n(φ−1
n (w)) × (1+ ρ/δ + κuFn(w)) × (1+ ρ/δ + κeFn(w))−1.
6. Calculate the ﬁrm size at given inverse wage policy guess K−1
n (w) as:
ln(w) =
κeAn(w)
(1 + κeFn(w))2 +
(κu − κe)
(1+ κeFn(w))2
 
1
1 + κu
An(w) +
  w
w
dAn(x)
1 + κuFn(x)
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7. For some step size 0 < sn ≤ 1 update the guess of the lowest ﬁrm productivity level p∗
n
using:
p∗
n = K−1
n (w) + sn ×
 
w +
An(w)
A′
n(w)
− K−1
n (w)
 
.
8. Obtain the updated guess of the inverse wage policy function K−1
n+1(w) using:
K−1
n+1(w) = K−1
n (w)
+ sn ×
 
w +
 
(p∗
n − w)ln(w) +
  w
w
ln(x)K−1
n (w)
′
dx
 
1
ln(w)
− K−1
n (w)
 
.
where:
K−1
n
′
(w) =
(1+ κeFn(w))
κeγ(K−1
n (w))
1
K−1
n (w) − w
−
κu(1+ κeFn(w))A′
n(w)
(1 + κuFn(w))(κeAn(w) + (κu − κe)unAun(w))
9. If for some distance metric d(K−1
n+1(w),K−1
n (w)) < ǫtol then the inverse wage policy
function has converged and we have an equilibrium of the labour market. Otherwise,
return to step 3. If the distance measure is exploding, then reduce the step size sn+1.
Remark The main potential difﬁculty when estimating the model parametrically is that for a
given parametrization of the productivity distribution   θp, there may not exist a productivity
level that is consistent with the empirical support of wages. Good initial values are essential,
and this also necessitates a solver that can deal with the occasional discontinuities in the
objective function that this may introduce.
2.C The Pearson Type IV Distribution
The Pearson (Pearson, 1895) family of distributions were developed to approximate all uni-
modal distributions.24 The Pearson Type IV distribution allows for varying degrees of skew-
ness and kurtosis, and so is ideally suited for many economic applications where distributions
of interest are often asymmetric with extensive tails. The distribution is characterized by four
parameters,   θk = {k1,k2,k3,k4}, and these uniquely determine the ﬁrst four moments of the
distribution (see Stuart and Ord, 1994).
Despite these desirable properties, the distribution has been little exploited in the eco-
nomics literature. Its sparsity in the literature is perhaps due to the difﬁculty in calculating
the density and distribution functions. For k1 > 1/2, Nagahara (1999) showed that the prob-
ability density function of the Pearson Type IV distribution can be expressed by:
p(x) = K(k1,k2,k3) ×
 
1+
 
x − k4
k3
 2 −k1
exp
 
−k2 tan−1
 
x − k4
k3
  
. (2.34)
24This section draws heavily on Heinrich (2004), which should be consulted for further details.2.C. The Pearson Type IV Distribution 89
The parameters k3 and k4 in (2.34) are scale and location parameters, whereas the parameters
k1 and k2 are shape parameters that jointly determine the degree of skewness and kurtosis
of the distribution. The kurtosis of the distribution is decreasing in the parameter k1, and
the distribution is negatively (positively) skewed whenever k2 > 0 (k2 < 0). Note that when
k2 = 0 the distribution reduces to Student’s t-distribution with 2k1 − 1 degrees of freedom
(and so the Normal distribution when additionally k1 → ∞). More generally, the Pearson
Type IV distribution can be considered as an asymmetric version of Student’s t-distribution.
Before describing how the normalization factor and distribution function may be calcu-
lated in the general case, note that in our application we can calculate p(x) up to a scale
parameter on [p, p] by ﬁrst setting the normalization factor K = 1, and then numerically in-
tegrate p(x) on its support to obtain the cumulative distribution function P(x) (again, up to
a scale parameter). Dividing both the density and distribution function by P(p) will produce
the required quantities. More generally, to calculate the density function in equation (2.34) it
is ﬁrst necessary to calculate the normalization factor K(k1,k2,k3) which is given by:
K(k1,k2,k3) =
Γ(k1)
√
πk3Γ(k1 − 1/2)
 
 
 
 
Γ(k1 + ik2/2)
Γ(k1)
 
 
 
 
2
(2.35)
where i =
√
−1 and Γ is the Gamma function (not to be confused with the productivity distri-
bution in the main text). While the normalization factor (2.35) can be calculated by evaluating
the complex Gamma function directly, Heinrich (2004) proposed calculating the squared mod-
ule in (2.35) by exploiting its relationship with the 2F1 hypergeometric function, and by using
a recursion relationship. This then allows K to be calculated to machine precision very efﬁ-
ciently.
Heinrich (2004) demonstrated that the cumulative distribution function itself can also be
expressed in terms of the hypergeometric function. Speciﬁcally, it can be shown that:
P(x)
p(x)
=
k3
2k1 − 1
 
i −
x − k4
k3
 
2F1

1,k1 +
iν
2
;2k1;
2
1− i
x−k4
k3

 (2.36)
which converges absolutely when x < k4 − k3
√
3. When x > k4 + k3
√
3 we apply the symme-
try identity P(x|k1,k2,k3,k4) ≡ 1− P(−x|k1,−k2,k3,−k4), and in the case that |x−k4| < k3
√
3
we apply a “linear transformation” as described in Abramowitz and Stegun (1965). For-
tran and MATLAB numerical routines to calculate the distribution and density functions
are available form http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ uctpajs/software.htm. These numerical routines
evaluate the hypergeometric function in equation (2.36) using the method described in
Michel and Stoitsov (2008).Chapter 3
Equilibrium Search and Tax Credit Reform
3.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades earned income tax credit programmes have grown substantially
in the UK, US and many other countries.1 These programmes are typically motivated by a
desire from policy makers to increase labour market participation among target groups, and to
alleviate in-work poverty. While the effect of these policies on labour supply has been studied
extensively, much less is known regarding the incidence of these tax credit programmes and
the broader general equilibrium impact. The objective of this paper is to develop an empirical
equilibrium job search model that provides us with an appropriate framework to address
these issues, and to apply it in our analysis of the British Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC)
reform.
Tax credit programmes, such as EITC in the U.S. and WFTC (together with its predeces-
sors and recent successor) in the UK, have received considerable attention in the economics
literature. The employment impacts of these programmes have been evaluated in a number
of empirical studies, which have typically adopted either a difference-in-differences (see for
example, Eissa and Liebman, 1996) or structural discrete choice model approach (for exam-
ple, Blundell et al., 2000). While the magnitudes of the estimated or simulated impacts do
differ somewhat across these studies, there appears to be a general consensus that tax credit
programmes like WFTC have had positive effects on the employment of lone mothers, while
there is somewhat less agreement concerning the effect of these reforms on men and women
in couples.2
Despite the wealth of labour supply studies, there is surprisingly little evidence regarding
the equilibrium impact of these reforms. Exceptions include the recent tax credit incidence
studies of Azmat (2006b), Leigh (2009), and Rothstein (2008, 2009). Using data from the
federal expansion in the mid-1990s, Rothstein (2008) examined the effect of the US EITC
on labour market participation and equilibrium wages. Using his central elasticity estimates,
1See Hotz and Scholz (2003) for EITC in the US, and Blundell and Hoynes (2004) for the British WFTC and its
predecessors.
2Studies which have evaluated the employment impact of WFTC include Azmat (2006a), Blundell et al. (2004a),
Brewer et al. (2006), Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004), Gregg and Harkness (2003), and Leigh (2007). See also
Section 1.5.4 from Chapter 1 in this thesis. These will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.5.5.3.1. Introduction 91
and assuming a distinct labour market for single women, he simulated a $1 expansion in EITC
payments and found that pre-tax earnings of eligible workers fell by $0.30 while the earnings
of ineligible workers fell by $0.43. Leigh (2009) exploited state variation in EITC supplements
over the period 1989–2002 to examine the effect of the tax credit on wages, and found that
a one percent increase in the generosity of the programme reduced gross hourly wages by
0.5% for high school dropouts, 0.2% for those with a high school diploma, and had no effect
on college graduates. Azmat (2006b) examined the incidence of the British WFTC and found
evidence to suggest that ﬁrms discriminate by cutting the wage of claimant workers relative
to similarly skilled non-claimant workers, and that there are spill-over effects on the wages of
similarly skilled non-eligible workers.
The policy context of this paper is the UK earned income tax credit reform in October
1999, when the government replaced the existing Family Credit (FC) programme – the main
form of in- work support for lower income families with children – with Working Families’ Tax
Credit. While WFTC represented a continued expansion of in-work programmes of support,
it was considerably more generous than its predecessor, offering higher credits and a lower
withdrawal/taper rate. Since the presence of dependent children is a central eligibility criteria
for the receipt of WFTC, families without children (who act as a control group in the quasi-
experimental employment impact studies) may also ﬁnd themselves affected by the reform, if
say, wages were to adjust. Consequently, the government’s view regarding the desirability of
such reforms – and more generally how such programmes should be designed – may depend
crucially upon the nature and quantitative importance of these equilibrium effects.
In order to address these important issues we require a model in which both employment
and the distribution of wages emerges as an equilibrium outcome. While a competitive model
of the labour market is able to generate wage dispersion if individuals differ in their marginal
productivity of labour, and may also generate equilibrium price effects following adjustments
in labour supply (see for example, the model presented in Rothstein, 2008), there is empirical
evidence that suggests that labour markets are characterised by substantial search frictions
(see for example, van den Berg and Ridder, 2003). Departing from the competitive paradigm
may have important implications for our understanding of tax credit reforms. In particular, if
ﬁrms set wages then the presence of search frictions gives ﬁrms some degree of monopsony
power. Thus, one possible equilibrium effect of the reform is that ﬁrms may attempt to
extract a greater share of the rent by lowering the wages that they offer. If this mechanism
is important, then the effective transfer to eligible individuals may be reduced, while non-
eligible workers may be made worse off.
The equilibrium job search literature allows us to capture these and other effects in a dy-
namic and imperfectly competitive economy that is characterized by search frictions.3 Here
3Our analysis remains partial equilibrium to the extent that capital is ignored, as is the product market and the
possible effect of the reform on outcomes such as education and fertility. However, the model is equilibrium in the
sense that employment, the distribution of wages, and the arrival rate of job offers are determined within the model.3.1. Introduction 92
it is the competition between ﬁrms that is the fundamental determinant of wages, with the
extent of this competition limited by the presence of search frictions. We consider a model
with ex-ante wage posting – ﬁrms set wages before meeting potential workers, which workers
can then either accept or reject. Manning (2003) argues that while wage posting is not appro-
priate in all contexts, it is likely to provide a good characterisation of wage determination in
many applications. This is likely to be particularly true when we are focussing on low-skilled
labour markets, as we examine in this paper. Hall and Krueger (2008) present recent US sur-
vey evidence which suggests that while other forms of wage formation are also important,
wage posting is much more prevalent in less skilled occupations (see also the discussion in
Manning, 2003, chapter 5).4
It is instructive to consider brieﬂy the conditions under which a dispersed offer distri-
bution may be supported in an equilibrium with wage posting.5 Diamond (1971) showed
that if workers are homogeneous, and workers are unable to search while employed, then
the equilibrium wage offer distribution would collapse to a degenerate distribution equal
to the common reservation wage. The literature offers two standard ways of generating
wage dispersion as an equilibrium outcome. The ﬁrst is to assume that workers them-
selves are heterogeneous in their opportunity cost of employment (Albrecht and Axell, 1984;
Eckstein and Wolpin, 1990). Since this ex-ante heterogeneity translates into heterogeneity in
reservation wages, ﬁrms now face a trade-off between offering a low wage and just attract-
ing workers with low reservation wages, or offering a high wage and attracting workers with
both low and high reservation wages. In equilibrium ﬁrms will be indifferent between offering
these wages, so that a dispersed wage distribution may emerge.
An alternative approach that generates wage dispersion as an equilibrium outcome main-
tains the homogeneous worker assumption, but allow workers to continue searching for
jobs when employed (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). For employed workers, their reserva-
tion wage will equal their current wage, so that ﬁrms are now able to attract more workers
(through job-to-job transitions) by offering a higher wage. Hence, on-the-job search gener-
ates ex-post heterogeneity among ex-ante identical agents so that wage dispersion can be
supported in equilibrium. If all ﬁrms are equally productive, then the model implies increas-
ing wage offer and earnings densities. This apparent empirical failing can be overcome to
some extent by allowing for heterogeneity in ﬁrm productivity. Building upon the analy-
sis of Mortensen (1990), which demonstrated that more productive ﬁrms offer higher wages,
Bontemps et al. (2000) allowed for a continuous distribution of ﬁrm productivity and showed
that the model can induce empirical wage distributions by allowing for an appropriately
4Lise et al. (2005) simulate the general equilibrium effect of a wide scale implementation of the Canadian Self-
Sufﬁciency Project (SSP) in a model with ex-post worker-ﬁrm bargaining. They ﬁnd substantial general equilibrium
effects, which reverse the positive cost-beneﬁt conclusions of their partial equilibrium evaluation. Kolm and Tonin
(2006) consider the impact of introducing an in-work beneﬁt in an analytical framework using a Pissarides (2000)
search model. Here general equilibrium effects reinforce the employment impact of the programme through job
creation.
5Also see the more detailed review provided in Chapter 2.3.1. Introduction 93
skewed distribution of ﬁrm productivity.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that an empirical equilibrium job search model
has been used to analyse a policy reform of this kind. Our analysis advances the existing
literature in several dimensions, with our model designed to capture key features of the UK
labour market and to allow for the possibility of rich equilibrium effects following reforms
such as WFTC. Firstly, since one of the objectives of the reform was to increase labour supply,
it is necessary to have a model with reservation wage heterogeneity so that at least some
workers may accept some wage offers and reject others. Such a model was presented in
Bontemps et al. (1999) which allowed for continuous distributions of ﬁrm productivity and
worker opportunity costs with the restriction that the job offer arrival rate is independent of
employment status. This over-identifying restriction simpliﬁes the analysis as it implies that
the optimal strategy of unemployed workers is independent of the equilibrium wage offer
distribution (see Section 3.3.2). This restriction led to a poor ﬁt of the duration data in their
application, as empirically job arrival rates for unemployed workers are often estimated to
exceed that of the employed. Building a model which relaxes this arrival rate restriction,
similar to that which we developed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, will be an important part of
our analysis.
A pertinent feature of the UK labour market is that certain groups of individuals – most
notably women with children – work part-time at some point in their lifetime. Since the pres-
ence of children is a central eligibility criteria for receipt of WFTC, it is therefore necessary
to incorporate hours into our model. While the use of the canonical labour supply model
may be pervasive, there is a body of empirical work that challenges the view that individu-
als are able to freely choose their hours of work at a ﬁxed hourly wage (Altonji and Paxson,
1988; Lundberg, 1985; Martinez-Granado, 2005; Mofﬁtt, 1984; Stewart and Swafﬁeld, 1997).
Blundell et al. (2008) use British Household Panel Survey data to study the impact of a series
of in-work beneﬁt reforms in the UK during the 1990s, and found that the introduction of
WFTC had positive effects on hours worked, but this increase was largely driven by women
who changed job. That jobs sequentially arrive as wage-hours packages is an assumption that
will be maintained throughout this paper. This is important not only in its ability to describe
that apparent lack of hours ﬂexibility within jobs, but also in its ability to potentially capture
the so-called part-time penalty. Manning and Petrongolo (2008) document recent British evi-
dence for female workers. We do not attempt to provide rich micro-foundations for this, but
rather assume it is a purely technological description of ﬁrms – ﬁrms are able to offer either
full-time jobs, or part-time jobs, but not both.
Within this framework we incorporate detailed representations of the UK tax and transfer
system. Since we are interested in how WFTC affected different groups of workers, we build
upon the model developed in Chapter 2 allow for demographic heterogeneity to inﬂuence the
key structural parameters of our model as well as the tax and transfer schedules. Crucially3.2. The Working Families’ Tax Credit Reform 94
– and in contrast to the segmented markets approach adopted by van den Berg and Ridder
(1998) – we assume that workers of all types operate within the same labour market. This
allows us to capture rich equilibrium effects and to study possible unintended consequences
of the tax credit reform within our model.
We develop a three step semi-non-parametric estimation technique similar to that pro-
posed by Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) and extended in Chapter 2 of this thesis, and estimate
our model using UK Labour Force Survey data shortly before WFTC was introduced. Us-
ing the structural parameters we then simulate the equilibrium impact of WFTC, holding the
structural parameters and the distribution of ﬁrm productivity ﬁxed. This allows us to inves-
tigate the impact of the reform on employment, hours of work, unemployment durations, and
the entire distribution of wages. Recognizing the role that ﬁrms may play as both wage setters
and job creators, we follow Mortensen (2000) by complementing our model with aggregate
matching functions, which then allows us to endogenize rate at which workers encounter job
offers at the macroeconomic level. We ﬁnd that the introduction of WFTC, together with other
accompanying changes to the tax and transfer system between April 1997 and April 2002, in-
creased employment for most groups, with lone mothers experiencing the largest increase.
Our main simulations suggest that while equilibrium considerations do play a role in this
particular reform, the changes in employment and earnings are dominated by the direct effect
of changing job acceptance behaviour. We also show how the type of equilibrium effects con-
sidered have the potential to be much more important for tax reforms which are less targeted.
We demonstrate that the equilibrium effects of the same reforms may be much larger if we
consider a labour market solely comprised of lone mothers, one of the main beneﬁciaries of
WFTC.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 brieﬂy describes the WFTC reform, while
Section 3.3 presents our model and describes the optimal strategies of ﬁrms and workers.
In Section 3.4 we describe the estimation and identiﬁcation of our model, derive the likeli-
hood function and discuss our data and estimation results. In Section 3.5 we present our
main simulation exercises and compare our predictions to the actual employment changes
observed over the relevant period, as well as the ﬁndings from other studies. Finally, Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Working Families’ Tax Credit Reform
The UK has a long history of in-work beneﬁts, starting with the introduction Family Income
Support (FIS) in 1971. Over the years, these programmes became more generous, and in Octo-
ber 1999, Working Families’ Tax Credit was introduced, replacing a similar, but less generous,
tax credit programme called Family Credit. Both WFTC and FC shared a similar eligibility
structure, requiring recipients work for at least 16 hours per week, and with the credit ta-
pered away with household earnings above a threshold. Both also offered a further credit
when recipients worked at least 30 hours a week. There were essentially ﬁve ways in which3.2. The Working Families’ Tax Credit Reform 95
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Figure 3.1: Tax credit awards under FC and WFTC. FC refers to Family Credit as of April
1997; WFTC refers to Working Families’ Tax Credit as of April 2002. Figure assumes a lone
parent with a single child aged 10, and a constant hourly wage rate of £3.50. All incomes
expressed in April 1997 prices.
WFTC increased the level of in-work support relative to the FC system: (i) it offered higher
credits, especially for families with younger children; (ii) the increase in the threshold meant
that families could earn more before it was phased out; (iii) the tax credit withdrawal rate was
reduced from 70% to 55%; (iv) it provided more support for formal childcare costs through a
new childcare credit; (v) all child maintenance payments were disregarded from income when
calculating tax credit entitlement. These changes meant that the largest potential beneﬁciaries
of WFTC were those families who were just at the end of the FC beneﬁt withdrawal taper (see
Figure 3.1). The combined increases in generosity and caseload resulted in nominal spending
on WFTC rising to £4.6 billion by 2000/1 and £6.3 billion by 2002/3 compared to £2.4 billion
on FC in 1998/9. Table 3.1 presents the main parameters of FC and WFTC.6
When analysing the effect of programmes such as WFTC it is necessary to take an inte-
grated view of the tax system. This is because tax credit income is counted as income when
calculating entitlements to other beneﬁts. Families in receipt of such beneﬁts would gain less
from the WFTC reform than otherwise-equivalent families not receiving these beneﬁts. Fur-
thermore, there were other notable changes to the tax system affecting families with children
that coincided with the expansion of tax credits, therefore making the overall labour market
impact more difﬁcult to predict. In particular, there were increases in the generosity of Child
Beneﬁt (a cash beneﬁt available to all families with children regardless of income), as well as
notable increases in the child additions in Income Support (a welfare beneﬁt for low income
families working less than 16 hours a week). For many families with children, these increases
6There were also important administrative changes between FC and WFTC. In particular, while FC was paid direct
to recipients as a cash beneﬁt, WFTC was typically paid by employers through the wage packet.3.3. The Model 96
Table 3.1: Parameters of FC/WFTC
April 1999 October 1999 June 2000 June 2002
(FC) (WFTC) (WFTC) (WFTC)
Basic Credit 49.80 52.30 53.15 62.50
Child Credit
under 11 15.15 19.85 25.60 26.45
11 to 16 20.90 20.90 25.60 26.45
over 16 25.95 25.95 26.35 27.20
30 hour credit 11.05 11.05 11.25 11.65
Threshold 80.65 90.00 91.45 94.50
Taper rate 70% after income tax
and National Insur-
ance
55% after income tax
and National Insur-
ance
55% after income tax
and National Insur-
ance
55% after income tax
and National Insur-
ance
Childcare Expenses up to £60
(£100) for 1 (more
than 1) child under
12 disregarded when
calculating income
70% of total expenses
up to £100 (£150) for
1 (more than 1) child
under 15
70% of total expenses
up to £100 (£150) for
1 (more than 1) child
under 15
70% of total expenses
up to £135 (£200) for
1 (more than 1) child
under 15
Notes: All monetary amounts are in pounds per week and expressed in nominal terms. Minimum tax credit award
is 50p per week in all years above.
in out-of-work income meant that despite the increased generosity of in-work tax credits, re-
placement rates remained relatively stable. There were also changes to the tax and transfer
system that affected families both with and without dependent children during the lifetime
of WFTC: a new 10% starting rate of income tax was introduced; the basic rate of income tax
was reduced from 23% to 22%; there was a real rise in the point at which National Insurance
(payroll tax) becomes payable.7
3.3 The Model
This section lays out the theoretical model that we use to study the impact of the WFTC
reform. It is an extension of the model presented in Chapter 2, which itself built upon the
analysis of Bontemps et al. (1999). We begin by setting out the core assumptions, and derive
the optimal job acceptance strategies of workers. We then characterise the steady state ﬂows
and close the model by deriving the optimal wage setting and job creating behaviour of ﬁrms.
A summary of the subsequent notation used is presented in Appendix 3.C.
3.3.1 Model Assumptions
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals with a population size normalized to
unity. These individuals may differ with regards to observable demographic characteristics
(for example, gender, marital status and the presence of children) that are ﬁnite in number
7There were also important non-tax related reforms over this period, which we do not consider in our analysis.
Various “New Deal” programmes were introduced which aimed to improve both the incentives and the ability of the
long-term unemployed to obtain employment (see Blundell et al., 2004b). Furthermore, a national minimum wage
was introduced in April 1999, at a rate of £3.00 per hour for those aged 18-21 (the development rate) and at the
higher rate of £3.60 per hour for those aged 22 and over. Since their introduction, both the main and the development
rates have been subject to a number of above-inﬂation increases. The equilibrium impact of the introduction of the
minimum wage was considered in Chapter 2 of this thesis.3.3. The Model 97
and indexed by i ∈ I. In our analysis these will be treated as being ﬁxed and time invariant,
and we let ni denote the fraction of type i individuals, with ∑i ni = 1. As shall become
clear, while all such individuals will operate in the same labour market, these demographic
characteristics will be allowed to inﬂuence both the tax and transfer system (reﬂecting the
conditioning performed by the UK tax authorities) as well as the transitional parameters of
the model. Time is continuous and individuals live forever with the constant discount rate
ρi > 0. There is no access to either saving or borrowing technology. These individuals
(or workers) can be either employed or unemployed, and we use e and u to index these
respective states. Jobs are characterised by a wage rate w and required hours of work h. We
assume that the required hours of work within a job is a technological characterisation of
ﬁrms, with ﬁrms offering either part-time jobs (hours h0) or full-time jobs (hours h1 > h0),
but not both.8 The particular hours sector that ﬁrms operate in is exogenously determined.9
Mirroring the conditioning that is performed by the UK government, hours can directly affect
the tax schedule, with Th
i (wh) denoting the (potentially negative) net taxes paid by a employed
worker with observable characteristics i at earnings wh and hours sector h ∈ {0,1}. Similarly,
the net transfer paid to an unemployed worker with characteristics i is given by −Tu
i . We
assume that the tax schedule Th
i (wh) is continuously differentiable.
There is an exogenous distribution of ﬁrm productivity in both part-time and full-time
sectors. The cumulative distribution of part-time ﬁrm productivity is given by Γ0 on sup-
port [p
0, p0] while the cumulative distribution of full-time ﬁrm productivity is Γ1 on support
[p
1, p1]. While workers are assumed to be equally productive at a given ﬁrm, they differ in
their unobserved opportunity cost of employment b which has the cumulative distribution
function Hi on support [bi,bi]. To simplify some of the exposition we assume that bi is sufﬁ-
ciently low so that in equilibrium all ﬁrms are active in the labour market. In the presences
of taxes, the ﬂow utility of an unemployed individual is given by b − Tu
i , whereas for em-
ployed workers ﬂow utility is assumed linear in net-income and a monetary dis-utility of
work: wh − Th
i (wh) − Ch
i , with Ch
i denoting the monetary dis-utility of work at hours h. From
the outset we shall impose the location normalization C0
i = 0 for all i.
Individuals encounter part-time (full-time) job offers at the exogenous (to the worker) rate
λ0
ui (λ1
ui) when unemployed, and λ0
ei (λ1
ei) when employed. To maintain focus on the decisions
faced by workers, we postpone any discussion concerning how these arrival rates may depend
upon the overall state (or tightness) of the labour market, but return to this issue in Section
3.3.5.10 Employment spells end at rate δi regardless of whether individuals are employed in
8The framework we develop generalizes to more than two hours choices, and can also be applied in the context
of other non-wage amenities. See Hwang et al. (1998) for an analysis of non-wage amenities in an equilibrium search
framework.
9Note that we are implicitly assuming an indivisibility in the production technology; two part-time workers are
not a substitute for a single full-time worker.
10A more realistic approach would also endogenize the job offer arrival rates λh
ji at the micro-level by relating them
directly to an endogenously determined worker search effort, as in Christensen et al. (2005). In our analysis we do
not allow the search effort of workers to vary with their current wage or to directly respond to any changes in the tax
system. Non-hours labour supply responses to tax reforms, such as search effort, may be quantitatively important as3.3. The Model 98
part-time of full-time jobs. Here and throughout this paper, we place no restrictions on the
relative magnitude of these quantities, but note that the assumption that the job destruction
and job arrival rates when employed are independent of whether individuals are currently
engaged in part-time or full-time work should be considered an over-identifying restriction.
Regardless of observed characteristics i or unobserved characteristics b, all workers are
assumed to sample part-time (full-time) wage offers from the distribution F0 (F1), with the
lowest wage offer denoted w0 (w1) and the highest wage offer w0 ≥ w0 (w1 ≥ w1). The
density functions of these distributions are given by f0 ≡ F′
0 and f1 ≡ F′
1 respectively. Since
these do not depend on worker type this implies that, while the government may be able
to condition taxes and transfers on demographic characteristics i, ﬁrms are unable to do so.
We justify this assumption by the presence of anti-discrimination laws, such as the Equal Pay
Act 1970, Sex Discrimination Act 1975, and various Employment Equality Regulations, which
outlaw such practices. Note that this assumption does not imply that workers of all types
will have the same distribution of earnings. This is because workers may differ in their job
acceptance behaviour, and may also gravitate towards higher paying jobs at different rates. As
noted in the introduction, assuming that workers operate in the same labour market permits
interesting spill-over effects, so that workers who are not targeted by a particular tax reform
(in our case, childless families) can still be indirectly affected by it.
We assume that there is wage posting: employers post wages prior to forming matches
with potential employees, who can then either accept or reject the wage offer. Furthermore,
ﬁrms may post job vacancies that affect the rate at which these ﬁrms encounter workers.
Wages are assumed constant throughout an individual’s employment spell within a given
ﬁrm. In contrast to the papers surveyed above, jobs are no longer completely characterized
by the wage that they offer, so the behaviour of individuals will now be summarized by
a slightly more complicated reservation wage strategy which will depend on the required
hours of work. These strategies are discussed in the following section.
3.3.2 Worker Strategies
In this section we describe the optimal strategies of unemployed and employed workers;
formal derivations are presented in Appendix 3.A. To proceed we deﬁne qi(w) such that the
value to a type i individual holding a full-time job paying wage w is the same as the value
of a part-time job paying wage qi(w). Since the job destruction rate and the arrival rates for
both full-time and part-time jobs are assumed independent of current hours of work, it can
be shown that in order to determine qi(w) it sufﬁcient to compare the instantaneous utility
ﬂows between part-time and full-time employment. In other words qi(w) solves:
wh1 − T1
i (wh1) − C1
i = qi(w)h0 − T0
i (qi(w)h0) (3.1)
emphasized by the new-tax responsiveness literature (Feldstein, 1995). However, incorporating this into our model is
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Table 3.2: Worker acceptance strategies
Full-time offer Part-time offer
Unemployed w′ ≥ φi(b) w′ ≥ qi(φi(b))
Employed, full-time w′ > w w′ > qi(w)
Employed, part-time w′ > q−1
i (w) w′ > w
Notes: Assumes a current wage w and either a full-time or part-time wage offer w′. qi(w) is as deﬁned in equation
3.1; φi(b) is as deﬁned in equation 3.2.
which has a unique solution provided that conditional on hours of work marginal tax rates
are always strictly less than one (an assumption that we maintain throughout), in which case
we have dqi(w)/dw > 0. So while employed workers with wage w will accept any wage offer
w′ from their current hours sector that is (by convention) strictly greater than their current
wage, a full-time worker would ﬁnd a part-time job offer acceptable if and only if qi(w′) > w.
Similarly, a part-time worker would ﬁnd such a full-time wage offer acceptable if and only if
q−1
i (w′) > w.
Unemployed workers also follow a reservation wage strategy, that will again vary de-
pending on whether or not a full-time or part-time offer is received. We let φi(b) denote the
reservation wage for full-time work conditional on observed type i and unobserved leisure
cost b. This takes a similar form to the standard reservation wage equation with on-the-job
search (see, for example, Mortensen and Neumann, 1988), but is here modiﬁed both by the
presence of taxes and because workers are now sampling offers from two distributions; in
particular, taxes act to discount future earnings by the net-of-tax rate. In Appendix 3.A we
show that φi(b) is the solution to:
φi(b)h1 − T1
i (φi(b)h1) − C1
i = b − Tu
i + h1
  ∞
φi(b)
Bi(w)dw (3.2)
where:
Bi(w) ≡
 
1 − T1
i
′(wh1)
  
(κ0
ui − κ0
ei)F0(qi(w)) + (κ1
ui − κ1
ei)F1(w)
 
1 + ρi/δi + κ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + κ1
eiF1(w)
and where κh
ji = λh
ji/δi, with j ∈ {u,e} and h ∈ {0,1}. From our discussion above, it follows
that the lowest acceptable wage offer for a part-time job is simply given by qi(φi(b)). Before
we proceed note that in the case where κh
ui = κh
ei for h ∈ {0,1}, we have Bi(w) = 0 for all
(w,i) so that the optimal strategy of unemployed workers is independent of the equilibrium
wage offer distributions. This is the case analysed in Bontemps et al. (1999). For reference, we
summarize the job acceptance strategy of all individuals in Table 3.2.
3.3.3 Steady State Flows
This section derives a number of steady state objects by using ﬂow equations. For now, we
treat the distributions of wage offers and their arrival rates as being given, but will later show
how they emerge as an equilibrium outcome.3.3. The Model 100
Distribution of Reservation Wages
In deriving steady state ﬂows it is necessary to consider the distribution of (full-time) reser-
vation wages for each demographic group (denoted Ai) which is related to the distribution
of work opportunity costs according to Ai(w) = Hi(φ−1
i (w)). We denote the distribution of
full-time reservation wages amongst the stock of unemployed and employed workers as Aui
and Aei respectively, and these are related to Ai according to:
Ai(φ) = uiAui(φ) + (1− ui)Aei(φ). (3.3)
In order to describe the equilibrium of the labour market, it is necessary to determine the
distribution of reservation wages amongst the unemployed Aui, so that we are able to describe
the ﬂows from the unemployment pool into employment at a given wage. This also allows
us to determine the equilibrium unemployment rate. In steady state we require that the ﬂow
of layoffs must exactly equal the ﬂow out of the unemployment pool to either part-time or
full-time employment. Since unemployed workers accept any wage that is at least as high as
their reservation wage we have,
δi(1 − ui)Aei(φ) = λ0
uiui
  φ
−∞
F0(qi(w))dAui(w) + λ1
uiui
  φ
−∞
F1(w)dAui(w). (3.4)
Notice that the wage offer distributions (F0 and F1) are the only quantities in the above that
do not vary with observable worker type i. By differentiating equation 3.4 we obtain a re-
lationship between the densities of employed and unemployed worker reservation wages,
which when combined with equation 3.3 allows us to derive the following expression for the
distribution of φ amongst the unemployed:
uiAui(φ) =
  φ
−∞
dAi(w)
1 + κ0
uiF0(qi(w)) + κ1
uiF1(w)
. (3.5)
If we deﬁne wi ≡ min{w1,q−1
i (w0)} and wi ≡ max{w1,q−1
i (w0)}, and let φ → ∞ in
equation 3.5 then we obtain the following expression for the steady-state unemployment rate
for workers of a given demographic type:
ui =
1
1+ κ0
ui + κ1
ui
Ai(wi) +
  wi
wi
dAi(w)
1 + κ0
uiF0(qi(w)) + κ1
uiF1(w)
+ (1 − Ai(w)) (3.6)
which decomposes the unemployment rate into three parts; those individuals who accept all
job offers, those who accept some and reject others, and those who reject all job offers.
Between Jobs
In what follows we need to consider the fraction of workers currently employed in part-time
and full-time jobs, and denote these respective quantities as m0i and m1i so that m0i + m1i =
1 − ui. We also let G1i(w) denote the fraction of full-time workers of type i with a wage no3.3. The Model 101
greater than w, and similarly deﬁne G0i(w). The respective density functions are given by
g1i ≡ G′
1i and g0i ≡ G′
0i, and we shall now determine these objects. Since individuals will
only accept jobs that offer a value strictly greater than the value associated with their current
wage-hours package, the number of individuals who leave a full-time job paying wage w
(whether through their job being destroyed, or receiving a higher valued offer from a part-
time or full-time ﬁrm) must exactly equal the number of individuals who accept such a job.
Hence,
m1ig1i(w)
 
δi + λ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
eiF1(w)
 
= f1(w)
 
λ1
uiuiAui(w) + λ1
eim0iG0i(qi(w)) + λ1
eim1iG1i(w)
 
. (3.7)
Similarly, we can derive an analogous expression for part-time jobs paying wage w:
m0ig0i(w)
 
δi + λ0
eiF0(w) + λ1
eiF1(q−1
i (w))
 
= f0(w)
 
λ0
uiuiAui(q−1
i (w)) + λ0
eim0iG0i(w) + λ0
eim1iG1i(q−1
i (w))
 
. (3.8)
Both equations 3.7 and 3.8 will also feature later when we discuss identiﬁcation and
present our semi-non-parametric estimation technique. Integrating equation 3.7 and equation
3.8 (the LHS of both equations are integrated by parts) we obtain the following alternative
representations of these ﬂow equations:
m1iG1i(w)
 
δi + λ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
eiF1(w)
 
+ λ0
eim1i
  w
−∞
G1i(x)dF0(qi(x))
= λ1
uiui
  w
−∞
Aui(x)dF1(x) + λ1
eim0i
  w
−∞
G0i(qi(x))dF1(x) (3.9)
and:
m0iG0i(w)
 
δi + λ0
eiF0(w) + λ1
eiF1(q−1
i (w))
 
+ λ1
eim0i
  w
−∞
G0i(x)dF1(q−1
i (x))
= λ0
uiui
  w
−∞
Aui(q−1
i (x))dF0(x) + λ0
eim1i
  w
−∞
G1i(q−1
i (x))dF0(x). (3.10)
While expressions for G0i and G1i from above are both individually complicated, an appro-
priately weighted average term, that features prominently in our analysis, has a considerably
simpler form. To derive this we add equation 3.9 (evaluated at w) and equation 3.10 (evaluated
at qi(w)) so that we are able to eliminate the terms where we integrate over the cross-sectional
distributions of part-time and full-time wages. This delivers the following average condition:
(m1iG1i(w) + m0iG0i(qi(w)))
 
δi + λ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
eiF1(w)
 
= λ0
uiui
  w
−∞
Aui(x)dF0(qi(x)) + λ1
uiui
  w
−∞
Aui(w)dF1(x). (3.11)3.3. The Model 102
Using equation 3.4 we note that the RHS of equation 3.11 can be written as:
δi(1 − ui)Aei(w) − uiAui(w)
 
λ0
uiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
uiF1(w)
 
= δiAi(w) − uiAui(w)
 
δi + λ0
uiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
uiF1(w)
 
(3.12)
so by combining equation 3.12 with equation 3.11 and dividing through by δi we then obtain:
(m1iG1i(w) + m0iG0i(qi(w)))
 
1 + κ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + κ1
eiF1(w)
 
= Ai(w) − uiAui(w)
 
1+ κ0
uiF0(qi(w)) + κ1
uiF1(w)
 
(3.13)
which can be substituted into equations 3.7 and 3.8 to eliminate the averaged earnings dis-
tributions and yield expressions for the earnings densities g0i and g1i. These may then be
integrated to obtain the respective cumulative distribution functions (G0i and G1i) and em-
ployment shares (m0i and m1i).
3.3.4 Firm Behaviour
In this section we characterize the optimal behaviour of ﬁrms. In addition to choosing a wage
policy, we allow ﬁrms to exercise a role as job creators. The expansion of recruiting effort
(here referred to as “job vacancies”) allows ﬁrms of a given productivity level to increase
their visibility in the labour market, with changes in the supply of job vacancies affecting the
arrival rate of job offers at the macroeconomic level through an aggregate matching function
(see Section 3.3.5).
The ﬂow cost of a full-time productivity p ﬁrm with v job vacancies is given by c1(p,v).
We assume that this function is strictly convex in v with c1(p,0) = 0. The proﬁt ﬂow of a ﬁrm
with strategy (w,v) is given by (p − w)h1L1(w,v) − c(p,v) where L1(w,v) ≡ ∑i nil1i(w,v) is
the steady-state employment of such a ﬁrm, and where l1i(w,v) is the steady-state employ-
ment of a type i worker. Letting V1 denote the aggregate stock of full-time job vacancies,
l1i(w,v) solves the ﬂow equation:
(δi + λ0
eiF0(qi(w))+ λ1
eiF1(w))l1i(w,v) =
v
V1
 
λ1
uiuiAui(w) + λ1
eim0iG0i(qi(w)) + λ1
eim1iG1i(w)
 
which balances the number of workers who enter and exit employment, and reﬂects the
assumption that vacancies affect the sampling probability of ﬁrms. Given that v enters
the above expression for l1i(w,v) multiplicatively, it is convenient in what follows to write
l1i(w,v) = l1i(w)v/V1, and similarly let L1(w) ≡ ∑i nil1i(w), with:
l1i(w) =
κ1
eiAi(w) +
 
κ1
ui(1+ κ0
eiF0(qi(w))) − κ1
ei(1+ κ0
uiF0(qi(w)))
 
uiAui(w)
 
1 + κ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + κ1
eiF1(w)
 2 (3.14)
which is obtained by substituting equation 3.13 in the ﬂow equation for l1i(w,v) to eliminate3.3. The Model 103
the cross-sectional wage distributions. Each full-time ﬁrm chooses its optimal wage policy
K1(p) and optimal recruiting policy v1(p) to maximize its steady state proﬁt ﬂow,11 taking
the arrival rate of job offers, together with the behaviour of other ﬁrms (both part-time and
full-time) and workers as given. Hence:
(K1(p),v1(p)) = argmax
(w,v)
π1(p,w)
v
V1
− c1(p,v)
where:
π1(p,w) = (p − w)h1L1(w). (3.15)
The optimal vacancy level v1(p) equates the marginal cost of an additional vacancy to the
expected proﬁt ﬂow from such a vacancy. That is:
∂c1(p,v)
∂v
 
   
 
v=v1(p)
=
π1(p,K1(p))
V1
(3.16)
Rather than working directly with the ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal choice of wages,
we use the envelope theorem to write π1(p) = π1(p,K1(p)) as follows:
π1(p) = π∗
1(p
1) + h1
  p
p
1
L1(K1(y))dy
= (p
1 − w∗
1)L1(w∗
1) + h1
  p
p
1
L1(K1(y))dy
where w∗
1 maximizes equation 3.15 for the lowest productivity full-time ﬁrm (p = p
1). Setting
the above equal to 3.15 (evaluated at w = K1(p)) we obtain:
K1(p) = p −


π∗
1(p
1) + h1
p  
p
1
L1(K1(y))dy


×
1
h1L1(K1(p))
(3.17)
which is a form that we exploit when we numerically solve for the equilibrium of our model.
Of course, directly analogous expressions holds for the wage policy function and recruiting
efforts of part-time ﬁrms. Note that equation 3.17 (and the corresponding expression for
part-time ﬁrms) will depend upon the entire distribution of both part-time and full-time
wage offers. Once these wage policy functions have been calculated, it is also necessary to
verify whether the second-order conditions of ﬁrms in both sectors hold, so that the candidate
equilibrium is indeed implementable.
3.3.5 Equilibrium
In order to close the model we endogenize the arrival rate of job offers by complementing
it with aggregate matching functions as in Mortensen (2000, 2003). Here, the total ﬂow of
11This implicitly assumes that ﬁrms have a zero rate of time preference.3.3. The Model 104
matches Mh in each sector h ∈ {0,1} depends on the total stock of vacancies Vh:
V0 =
  p0
p
0
v0(p)dΓ0(p) and V1 =
  p1
p
1
v1(p)dΓ1(p) (3.18)
(with vh(p) given in equation 3.16) and the total intensity adjusted search effort of workers
Sh:
Sh = ∑
i
ni
 
sh
uiui + sh
ei(1− ui)
 
(3.19)
where sh
ji denotes the exogenous search effort of workers for each i, j ∈ {u,e} and h ∈ {0,1}.
The matching function in hours sector h is then written as:
Mh
 
Vh,∑
i
ni
 
sh
uiui + sh
ei(1− ui)
 
 
(3.20)
where Mh is assumed to be increasing in both its arguments, concave, and linearly homoge-
neous. The job offer arrival rates for each worker are then related to the ﬂows of matches
according to:
λh
ji =
sh
jiMh
∑i ni(sh
uiui + sh
ei(1− ui))
. (3.21)
The market equilibrium of the economy is now deﬁned in the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2. A market equilibrium in the economy is deﬁned by {F0, F1,v0,v1} such that simulta-
neously:
1. The arrival rates of job offers {λ0
ui,λ0
ei,λ1
ui,λ1
ei}i∈I are given by equation 3.21
2. The distribution of wage offers in the economy is:
F0(K0(p)) =
  p
p
0
v0(p)dΓ0(p)
V0
and F1(K1(p)) =
  p
p
1
v1(p)dΓ1(p)
V1
with V0 and V1 as deﬁned in equation 3.18.
3. Each worker of type (b,i) follows the strategy described in Table 3.2.
4. The strategy of each type-p ﬁrm is to choose a vacancy level and wage that maximizes proﬁts
given the job offer arrival rates, strategies of other ﬁrms’ and workers’:
(K1(p),v1(p)) = argmax
(w,v)
π1(p,w)
v
V1
− c1(p,v)
(K0(p),v0(p)) = argmax
(w,v)
π0(p,w)
v
V0
− c0(p,v)
where πh(p,w) is as deﬁned in equation 3.15.
That the wage offer distributions (see part 2 of Deﬁnition 2) are equal to a vacancy
weighted distribution of ﬁrm productivity follows from the observation that more produc-3.4. Estimation 105
tive ﬁrms pay higher wages in equilibrium. See for Chapter 2 of this thesis, or Mortensen
(2003), for a simple proof.
3.4 Estimation
In this section we discuss the structural estimation of our model using longitudinal survey
data. We ﬁrst derive the log-likelihood function, and then proceed to discuss the identiﬁcation
of our model and the three step estimation procedure that we adopt. We then discuss our
application of the UK tax and transfer system and the data used in estimation. Results are
presented in Section 3.4.6.
3.4.1 Likelihood Function
We now derive the likelihood contribution for individuals in different labour market positions,
and with different initial transitions. The derivation closely follows that of Bontemps et al.
(1999), and here we continue to use u and e to index the respective states of unemployment
and employment, and 0 and 1 to denote part-time and full-time jobs. Note that we do not use
any information beyond the ﬁrst observed transition. In what follows elapsed and residual
durations are given by:
tub = elapsed unemployment duration
tuf = residual unemployment duration
dub = 1 if unemployment duration left-censored, otherwise 0
duf = 1 if unemployment duration right-censored, otherwise 0
teb = elapsed employment duration
tef = residual employment duration
deb = 1 if employment duration left-censored, otherwise 0
def = 1 if employment duration right-censored, otherwise 0
while earned and accepted wages are denoted as follows:
wu = full-time wage accepted by unemployed individuals
qi(wu) = part-time wage accepted by unemployed individuals
du = 1 if wu unobserved, otherwise 0
we = full-time wage of employees at date of ﬁrst interview
qi(we) = part-time wage of employees at date of ﬁrst interview
de = 1 if we unobserved, otherwise 03.4. Estimation 106
current employment is indexed by:
h0
e = 1 if employed work in the part-time sector, otherwise 0
h1
e = 1 if employed work in the full-time sector, otherwise 0
and initial transitions are indexed by:
v0
u = 1 if unemployed accept a part-time job, otherwise 0
v1
u = 1 if unemployed accept a full-time job, otherwise 0
v0
e = 1 if employed accept a part-time job, otherwise 0
v1
e = 1 if employed accept a full-time job, otherwise 0.
We ﬁrst derive the likelihood function contribution for currently unemployed workers; fol-
lowing this, we derive the contribution for workers who are employed. In both cases, the
initial conditions use the steady state quantities and distributions ﬁrst derived in Section 3.3.
Unemployed Workers
Using the above notation, we ﬁrst derive the likelihood contribution for unemployed work-
ers of demographic type i. The exact form that this will take will depend upon whether
an accepted wage is observed, and whether or not the residual and elapsed unemployment
durations are subject to any censoring. If an unemployed worker is observed to exit unem-
ployment to either a full-time job paying wage wu, or a part-time job paying wage qi(wu),
then we have du = 0 and duf = 0. The respective likelihood contribution is therefore given
by:
(λ0
ui + λ1
ui)2−dub exp
 
−
 
λ0
ui + λ1
ui
 
(tub + tuf)
  Ai(wi)
1 + κ0
ui + κ1
ui
×
(λ0
uif0(qi(wu)))v0
u(λ1
uif1(wu))v1
u
λ0
ui + λ1
ui
+
    wu
wi
(λ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + λ1
uiF1(b))2−dub
× exp
 
−
 
λ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + λ1
uiF1(b)
 
(tub + tuf)
 
×
(λ0
uif0(qi(wu)))v0
u(λ1
uif1(wu))v1
u
λ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + λ1
uiF1(b)
dAi(b)
1 + κ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + κ1
uiF1(b)
 
where we have integrated over the range of possible reservations wages for unemployed
workers using equation 3.5.
If instead we do not observe a wage accepted by the unemployed worker (so that du = 1),
but we nonetheless have dub + duf < 2, then the worker can not be permanently unemployed.
Hence, it still must be the case that the full-time reservation wage of such an unemployed
worker is no greater than wi, and so it is only necessary to integrate over the distribution
of reservation wages no greater than this amount. It therefore follows that their likelihood3.4. Estimation 107
contribution is:
(λ0
ui + λ1
ui)2−dub−duf exp
 
−(λ0
ui + λ1
ui)(tub + tuf)
  Ai(wi)
1 + κ0
ui + κ1
ui
×
 
(λ0
ui)v0
u(λ1
ui)v1
u
λ0
ui + λ1
ui
 1−duf
+
   wi
wi
(λ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + λ1
uiF1(b))2−dub−duf
× exp
 
−
 
λ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + λ1
uiF1(b)
 
(tub + tuf)
 
×
 
(λ0
uiF0(qi(b)))v0
u(λ1
uiF1(b))v1
u
λ0
uF0(qi(b)) + λ1
uiF1(b)
 1−duf
dAi(b)
1+ κ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + κ1
uiF1(b)



.
Finally, if we have both du = 1 and dub + duf = 2, then individuals are never observed in
the employment state so we must also consider the probability that such individuals have a
full-time reservation wage that is greater than wi. The likelihood contribution then becomes:
exp
 
−(λ0
ui + λ1
ui)(tub + tuf)
  Ai(wi)
1+ κ0
ui + κ1
ui
+
   wi
wi
exp
 
−
 
λ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + λ1
uiF1(b)
 
(tub + tuf)
 
×
dAi(b)
1 + κ0
uiF0(qi(b)) + κ1
uiF1(b)
+ (1 − Ai(wi))
 
.
Employed Workers
The likelihood contribution of a type i individual working full-time (part-time) at wage we
(qi(we)) is similarly given by:
{m0ig0i(qi(we))}
h0
e {m1ig1i(we)}
h1
e
 
δi + λ0
eiF0(qi(we)) + λ1
eiF1(we)
 2−deb−def
× exp
 
−
 
δi + λ0
eiF0(qi(we)) + λ1
eiF1(we)
 
(teb + tef)
 
×

δ
1−v0
e−v1
e
i (λ0
eiF0(qi(we)))v0
e(λ1
eiF1(we))v1
e
δi + λ0
eiF0(qi(we)) + λ1
eiF1(we)


1−def
.
Note that in the above we do not use any information on the wage accepted following a job-to-
job transition. The reason for adopting such a limited information approach is that the model
we have developed does not permit transitions associated with lower job values.12 Finally, if
the wage of an employed worker were missing (de = 1), then the likelihood contribution is
simply given by m1i if they are a full-time worker, m0i if working part-time, or 1 − ui if hours
of work is also unobserved.13
12The model can be extended to allow for job-to-job transitions associated with lower values by introducing a
reallocation shock as in Jolivet et al. (2006). These shocks are draws from the wage offer distributions for which the
only alternative to acceptance is to become unemployed. The presence of reservation wage heterogeneity would
mean that some individuals may wish to exercise the unemployment option upon receiving such a shock.
13By construction of the data, if the hourly wage is known then so too is the hours of work.3.4. Estimation 108
3.4.2 Identiﬁcation
The logic behind the non-parametric identiﬁcation of the model is the same as was discussed
in Chapter 2 of this thesis, and for completeness we repeat the main argument here.
We therefore ﬁrst consider a special case of our model: we abstract from the presence
of a tax system, we suppose that the distribution of opportunity costs collapses to a degen-
erate distribution (i.e. workers are homogeneous), and we assume that there is only a single
sector in the economy. This is the model analysed in Bontemps et al. (2000). Conditional on
transitional parameters, identiﬁcation of the wage offer distribution follows directly from a
steady state relationship between the wage offer and earnings distributions (a simpler form of
equation 3.9 presented here) that permits a simple inversion. Moreover, in such a setting all
job offers will be accepted by all unemployed workers so that the accepted wage distribution
will coincide with the wage offer distribution. This special case of our more general model is
therefore over identiﬁed.
Regardless of its source, once we allow for heterogeneity in the reservation wage of un-
employed workers the distribution of accepted wages will no longer equal the wage offer
distribution. This is because workers are selective in the wages that they are willing to ac-
cept, so that the distribution of accepted wages will stochastically dominate the wage offer
distribution. We are still able to establish non-parametric identiﬁcation in this case because
we observe as many distributions (starting wages and cross-sectional earnings) as distribu-
tions that we wish to recover. If we observe further distributions, such as the distribution of
wages that the employed receive in their next job, then we once again will have over identiﬁ-
cation.14 These ideas are presented more formally in Appendix 3.B, and are closely related to
the estimation procedure that we now present.
3.4.3 Three Step Estimation Procedure
We estimate our model using a three step procedure similar to that proposed by
Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) and extended in Chapter 2 of this thesis. While we no longer
have a simple inversion between the observed earnings distributions and the unobserved
wage offer distributions, it nonetheless remains possible to perform an inversion by iterating
on the relevant ﬂow equations. More speciﬁcally:
1. We estimate {w0, w0} as the sample minimum and maximum values of we amongst
part-time jobs (h = h0) and {w1, w1} as the sample minimum and maximum values of
we amongst full-time jobs (h = h1). None of these estimates condition upon worker type.
We then calculate estimates of the unconditional earnings densities in each sector using
non-parametric (kernel) techniques. We denote these estimated densities as ˆ g0 and ˆ g1.
2. We assume a parametric form for the distribution of opportunity costs Hi(b) with a ﬁnite
14This is related to the approach taken by Barlevy (2008) and Barlevy and Nagaraja (2006) who using record-value
theory demonstrate identiﬁcation of the wage offer distribution by tracking the wage growth of workers as a function
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parameter vector θ = {θi}i∈I. Since workers are assumed to sample wage offers from the
same distributions F0 and F1 regardless of their demographic type i, we weight equations
3.7 and 3.8 by ni and sum across types to obtain appropriately averaged equations of
the form:
f1(w) =
∑i nim1ig1i(w)
∑i nil1i(w)
(3.22)
and:
f0(w) =
∑i nim0ig0i(w)
∑i nil0i(w)
(3.23)
with l1i(w) (deﬁned in equation 3.14) and the similarly deﬁned l0i(w) both depend-
ing upon the set of transitional parameters, the reservation wage distribution, and the
distribution of full-time and part-time wage offers. We then replace the numerators
of equations 3.22 and 3.23 by m1 ˆ g1(w) and m0 ˆ g0(w) respectively, where here we have
m1 = ∑i nim1i and m0 = ∑i nim0i. To recover the part-time and full-time offer distribu-
tions that induce our estimates of the unconditional empirical earnings distributions, we
provide an initial guess of f0 and f1 and then repeatedly (and simultaneously) iterate
on these two equations, exploiting the conditional linearity seen above. At each itera-
tion step we scale the densities by a normalization factor to ensure that we have proper
distribution functions, and then verify that these normalization factors converge to 1.
Conditional on the set of transitional parameters and distribution of opportunity costs,
we then obtain consistent estimates of the offer distributions which we denote ˆ F0 and
ˆ F1. These estimates (together with the corresponding density functions, ˆ f0 and ˆ f1) are
then substituted into the likelihood function, and are also used to calculate the condi-
tional employment shares and earnings densities: ui( ˆ F0, ˆ F1), mhi( ˆ F0, ˆ F1), and ghi( ˆ F0, ˆ F1)
for all i ∈ I and h ∈ {0,1}. Note that we are able to assess the ﬁt of our model by its
ability to explain differences in the part-time and full-time earnings distributions across
demographic types through variation in the tax schedule, transitional parameters and
opportunity cost distribution (see the discussion in Section 3.4.6).
3. Given a parametric form for the matching functions Mh and the vacancy cost functions
ch(p,v), we obtain the implied distribution of ﬁrm productivity and the supply of job va-
cancies by ﬁrst rewriting the ﬁrst order conditions from the ﬁrms maximization problem
as:
p1 = K−1
1 (w1) = w1 + L1(w1)/L
′
1(w1)
p0 = K−1
0 (w0) = w0 + L0(w0)/L
′
0(w0)
and then using equations 3.16, 3.20, and 3.21, together with the two relationships
F1(K1(p)) =
  p
p
1
v1(p)/V1dΓ1(p) and F0(K0(p)) =
  p
p
0
v0(p)/V0dΓ0(p) from Deﬁnition 2.
If the discount rate ρi is assumed known, then the distribution of opportunity costs Hi
can then be recovered using equation 3.2.3.4. Estimation 110
We construct conﬁdence intervals by bootstrapping the entire three stage estimation pro-
cedure. The advantages of this three step procedure versus a completely parametric approach,
are essentially threefold.15 Firstly, it is considerably easier to perform this numerical inver-
sion than it is to solve the full model at every evaluation of the likelihood function. Secondly,
it permits greater ﬂexibility than simple parametric forms for the productivity distribution.
Thirdly, the estimates of the transitional parameters and wage offer distributions will be valid
under a range of models. Conversely, the main disadvantage of this approach compared to
a completely parametric speciﬁcation, is that it does not guarantee a monotonically increas-
ing relationship between wages and productivity (in which case the empirical distribution
of wages can not be an equilibrium outcome from our model), and in general it may not be
possible to constrain the structural parameters of the model to achieve such monotonicity.
3.4.4 Applying the UK Tax and Transfer System
Our empirical application seeks to accurately represent the main features of the UK tax and
transfer system so that we may consider the impact of the WFTC reform.16 We allow for both
income tax and National Insurance (payroll tax), council tax and council tax beneﬁt (a local
property based taxation and the corresponding beneﬁt received by lower income families),
Income Support and income-based Job-seekers Allowance, FC/WFTC, child beneﬁt (a cash
beneﬁt available to all families with children irrespective of income), free school meals, and
additional tax allowances given to couples and families with children. The underlying tax
and transfer schedules are calculated prior to estimation using FORTAX (see Appendix A.1 in
this thesis), and reﬂect the complex interactions between the tax and transfer system, varying
accurately with earnings, hours of work and demographic characteristics.17
To economize on the number of groups that we need to consider in our analysis (and
potentially structural parameters to estimate), we make a number of further assumptions
regarding the set of demographic types I. Speciﬁcally, we do not allow taxes and transfers to
vary by the age of the claimant or by the age of any children. Taxes and transfers are calculated
as if the claimant were at least 25 years old, and as if any children are aged 10 years. Families
with more than two children are treated as there were only two children. Since some beneﬁts
have asset tests, we also assume that no families in our sample are affected by them. All
families are assigned average band C council tax.18
The model developed in Section 3.3 assumed the presence of a single economic decision
maker. This presents difﬁculties for our empirical application because beneﬁts and in-work tax
15See Chapter 2 of this thesis for more details on parametric estimation of wage posting models with two-sided
heterogeneity, and a comparison of results obtained using parametric and semi-parametric approaches.
16Recent surveys of the UK tax and transfer system are provided by Adam and Browne (2009) and O’Dea et al.
(2007).
17A potentially important beneﬁt that we do not consider is housing beneﬁt. While this is modelled by FORTAX,
the Labour Force Survey data that we use in our empirical application (see Section 3.4.5) does not contain any
information on rents. Since tax credit income results in housing beneﬁt entitlement being withdrawn, families in
receipt of housing beneﬁt would gain less from the tax credit reform than otherwise equivalent families not in receipt
of housing beneﬁt.
18The Labour Force Survey data does not contain information on the council tax band that households are subject
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credits are assessed on family income in the UK. A complete treatment of couples is beyond
the scope of this paper (see Guler et al., 2009 for a characterization of the reservation wage
strategy of couples with income pooling). Rather than providing a detailed characterisation
of the household decision making process, we take an admittedly limited approach, by con-
ditioning upon the current employment status and (discretized) earnings of the individuals’
partner. We then subsume partner earnings in the tax-schedule, but allow this tax schedule
to accurately vary with the earnings of both individuals. In our empirical application we dis-
cretize the empirical distribution of partner earnings (conditional on gender and the presence
and number of children) into ten groups, including non-employment (zero earnings); actual
partner earnings are then replaced with those observed at either the 10th, 20th,..., or 90th
percentile point of the relevant empirical distribution.
The above categorization requires that we consider 64 different worker types in our em-
pirical analysis. Conditional on hours of work, the resultant tax schedules for each of these
groups i as a function of the wage rate will be a piecewise linear function, with possible
discontinuities. We ﬁrst remove these (small) discontinuities by appropriately modifying
parameters of the tax and transfer system.19 The modiﬁed marginal tax rate schedule for
ﬁxed hours is then approximated by a differentiable function using the method proposed by
MaCurdy et al. (1990). The smoothed tax schedule is then obtained by integration.20
3.4.5 Data
We estimate our model using a sub-sample of the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS
is a quarterly survey of around 60,000 households in Great Britain, with these households
followed for ﬁve successive quarters or “waves”. When individuals ﬁrst enter the survey they
are in wave one, so that in any given quarter, there are roughly equal proportions of individu-
als in each interview wave. This rolling panel structure means that there is approximately an
80% overlap in the samples for successive quarters. The short panel dimension of the LFS is
of some concern, as relatively few transitions and accepted wages are observed. While alter-
native panel data sets, such as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), provide us with a
much more extensive panel, the resultant sample sizes are unfortunately too small, especially
if we wish to capture demographic heterogeneity in our model.
The LFS provides us with very rich information concerning the respondents labour mar-
ket status. Crucially, we observe employment status and spell durations, together with hours
and earnings information (in the ﬁrst and ﬁfth waves since 1997) for workers. Our pre-reform
19Given it is not possible for working families to receive Income Support with our choice of discrete hours (see
Section 3.4.5) this essentially involves setting the minimum payment for all beneﬁts to zero, and starting employee
National Insurance payments at slightly lower earnings to remove the entry fee discontinuity.
20With K tax brackets, the marginal tax rate approximation at hours h and earnings wh for a type i individual is
given by MTRh
i (wh) = ∑
K
k=1[Φh
i(k)(wh) − Φh
i(k+1)(wh)]τh
i(k)(wh), where τh
i(k) is the marginal tax rate at the kth bracket
and Φh
i(k) is the normal cumulative distribution function with a mean equal to the value of the kth tax bracket and
with variance σ2
ki. The value of σki determines how quickly the marginal rates change in the neighbourhood of the
break points, with a small value ﬁtting the underlying step function more closely. We set σki = 20 which produces a
relatively smooth tax schedule, but our results are not sensitive to this choice.3.4. Estimation 112
estimation is performed using data shortly before WFTC was introduced. We follow individ-
uals who are observed in the ﬁrst quarter of 1997 until (at the latest) the ﬁrst quarter of 1998.
We calculate incomes and construct the likelihood function (see Section 3.4.1) as if individuals
always faced the April 1997 system during this period so that the environment is stationary.
While we may observe long elapsed spell durations, we nonetheless impose left censoring for
durations greater than 24 months as it would be difﬁcult to justify the assumption that they
were generated from the same steady state.
We classify individuals as being employed if they have a job, and non-employed if they do
not. Since we do not distinguish between the states of unemployment and non-participation,
our deﬁnition of non-employment is therefore much broader than the standard ILO deﬁnition
of unemployment. Amongst the employed, women who report working for less than 30 hours
per week are classiﬁed as being part-time workers, while those working at least 30 hours per
week classiﬁed as full-time workers. In our model, all part-time workers are treated as if they
worked for 20 hours per week, whereas all full-time workers are treated as if they worked 40
hours per week. These hours points correspond well to the respective conditional averages.
Empirically, very few men are observed to work part-time, so we treat all male workers as
working 40 hours per week regardless of their reported hours of work.21 In both cases, we
calculate gross wages using the reported hours of work, but then proceed to calculate incomes
as if they were working at the relevant discrete hours point.
Individuals who are aged below 21 or above 55 are excluded from our sample, as are
individuals who are in receipt of disability related beneﬁts, or are either self-employed or in
full-time education. Given the assumption that workers are equally productive at any given
ﬁrm, we additionally restrict our sample to those individuals whose highest qualiﬁcation is
O-level (or equivalent) or below, and assume that any higher educated individuals operate in
a separate labour market. After sample selection, we have roughly 23,000 observations. Table
3.3 presents some summary statistics.
While the tax and transfer schedules potentially vary with each observable type i ∈ I,
we only allow the structural parameters of the model to vary with a subset of demographic
types. For couples we do not allow the parameters to vary with the earnings and labour
market status of their partner; for parents we do not allow them to vary with the number
of their children. The distribution of work opportunity costs Hi is assumed to be Normally
distributed, with mean  i and variance σ2
i . This gives us 47 parameters to estimate.
3.4.6 Estimation Results and Model Fit
Given our maximum likelihood parameter estimates (Table 3.4), the implied wage policy
functions K0(p) and K1(p) that are obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions to the ﬁrms’
21The derivation of worker behaviour and the ﬂow equations are less complicated when there is a single sector.
Nonetheless, the relevant steady-state quantities and distributions can be obtained from our earlier exposition when
the job arrival rates in the part-time sector approaches zero. Note also that with a single hours sector it is not possible
to identify C1
i so we normalize it to be zero for these groups.3
.
4
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
1
1
3
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics
Unemployed Employed
#Nu u → h0 u → h1 #wu #N0
e #N1
e e → h0 e → h1 e → u #w0
e #w1
e
single men 1481 – 135 72 – 2560 – 136 112 – 1573
married men, no kids 441 – 43 32 – 1931 – 67 49 – 1391
married men, kids 888 – 85 54 – 3077 – 131 108 – 2163
single women 1031 28 37 36 372 1828 11 72 65 254 1237
lone mothers 1793 85 16 73 676 408 31 14 62 488 306
married women, no kids 579 21 16 25 578 1215 15 47 62 442 916
married women, kids 1713 100 25 78 1444 808 59 35 115 1083 608
Notes: #Nu refers to the number of unemployed observations in a given category; #N0
e and #N1
e respectively refer to the number of part-time and full-time employment observations. #wu refers
to the number of observed accepted wages from unemployment; #w0
e and #w1
e refer to the number of cross-sectional wage observations in part-time and full-time employment. i → j refers to the
numbers of observed transitions from state i to state j, with states u, e, h0 and h1, denoting unemployment, overall employment, part-time employment, and full-time employment respectively.3
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Table 3.3: (continued)
Part-time wages Full-time wages
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 mean SD
single men – – – – – – – 3.43 4.16 5.39 7.03 9.28 5.94 2.55
married men, no kids – – – – – – – 4.02 4.93 6.32 8.29 10.74 6.97 2.90
married men, kids – – – – – – – 3.74 4.90 6.34 8.46 11.12 6.97 2.99
single women 2.72 3.23 3.85 4.90 6.43 4.27 1.69 3.34 4.04 5.29 6.98 9.26 5.84 2.49
lone mothers 2.70 3.18 3.72 4.66 6.12 4.13 1.62 3.47 4.13 5.28 6.79 8.44 5.68 2.20
married women, no kids 2.81 3.37 3.95 4.96 6.45 4.35 1.66 3.40 4.14 5.09 6.55 8.48 5.63 2.24
married women, kids 2.87 3.37 4.00 5.20 6.77 4.46 1.69 3.31 4.00 5.03 6.45 8.06 5.45 2.03
Notes: All wages are hourly and are expressed in April 1997 prices. P10, P25, P50, P75, and P90 respectively refer to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of the cross-sectional hourly wage
distribution; SD refers to the standard deviation.3
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Table 3.4: Maximum likelihood estimation results
1/δi 1/λ0
ui 1/λ1
ui 1/λ0
ei 1/λ1
ei  i σi C1
i
single men 94.5 – 19.7 – 32.6 18.7 87.8 –
[88.4,102.3] [15.6,24.2] [25.9,38.6] [-12.7,35.5] [57.9,135.2]
married men, no kids 195.4 – 14.5 – 23.9 49.6 66.7 –
[176.4,217.8] [10.8,18.7] [19.8,29.0] [37.2,60.3] [53.8,83.2]
married men, kids 177.3 – 21.1 – 19.3 37.6 48.1 –
[163.7,190.7] [17.5,24.8] [15.5,23.5] [24.3,51.4] [31.5,65.2]
single women 141.9 42.5 38.8 117.2 54.2 -39.8 126.3 24.0
[128.0,157.0] [27.5,60.5] [25.9,56.8] [62.6,375.8] [43.1,68.2] [-156.7,-13.0] [84.1,248.6] [13.0,33.1]
lone mothers 66.1 54.0 337.7 118.4 55.2 41.7 28.9 37.0
[60.1,72.6] [43.0,81.5] [188.1,664.7] [74.1,230.9] [41.3,72.5] [36.3,45.7] [12.9,41.7] [33.2,42.1]
married women, no kids 171.8 23.4 68.0 147.8 74.7 4.7 71.6 36.7
[154.2,192.2] [16.5,32.9] [39.1,133.1] [100.4,250.4] [60.3,92.2] [-10.1,17.8] [60.3,85.6] [25.5,48.0]
married women, kids 99.4 29.2 280.5 37.8 115.6 36.8 36.8 27.7
[92.1,106.4] [23.4,35.9] [174.9,416.5] [31.0,46.0] [93.6,135.9] [33.1,39.9] [31.9,41.5] [23.6,34.2]
Notes: All durations are monthly. Incomes are measured in pounds per week in April 1997 prices. The distribution of work opportunity costs Hi is assumed to be Normal, with mean  i and
variance σ2
i . The 5th and 95th percentiles of the bootstrap distribution of parameter estimates are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500 replications.3.4. Estimation 116
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Figure 3.2: Wage policy function (pre-reform). Figure shows how optimal wage policy Kh(p)
varies with ﬁrm productivity and hours sector under April 1997 tax and transfer system.
Figure is truncated at ﬁrm productivity greater than p = 140 ≈ K−1
1 (G−1
1 (0.99)).
proﬁt maximization problem are found to be monotonically increasing so that the estimated
empirical distribution of wages can be an equilibrium outcome from our model. That is, the
theoretical model is not rejected by the data.22 These wage policy functions are presented
in Figure 3.2. The ﬁrst notable feature that is evident in this ﬁgure is that the wage policy
function for full-time ﬁrms becomes very ﬂat as the productivity of ﬁrms increases. This
implies that high productivity ﬁrms have a very high degree of monopsony power. Second,
the extent of monopsony power is much lower for part-time ﬁrms at high wages. When
wages are high, the dis-utility of work C1
i becomes small relative to earnings so that part-
time ﬁrms must offer much higher wages if they are to attract workers from full-time jobs.
This additional layer of competition is clearly important for the optimal wage policy of ﬁrms
and will become apparent in our simulation exercises. The underlying distribution of ﬁrm
productivity is shown in Figure 3.3, while the wage offer distributions are shown in Figure
3.4; the latter ﬁgure shows that there is a larger concentration of part-time ﬁrms offering
relatively low wages, while the distribution amongst full-time ﬁrms is more dispersed and
with a longer tail.
The structural parameter estimates suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity across
the different demographic groups. The job destruction rate is highest for lone mothers (ˆ δi =
0.015) with this estimate implying that jobs are exogenously destroyed on average every 66
months (= 1/0.015). The destruction rates are lowest for married men and married women
without dependent children, where they are estimated to be around three times as small. The
22Monotonicity is violated for a small proportion of the bootstrap samples. In order to construct bootstrap conﬁ-
dence intervals for the policy responses we therefore ﬁrst apply a rearrangement procedure (see Chernozhukov et al.,
2007). These violations are not a large concern as they typically occur for very high productivity full-time ﬁrms where
the productivity density is very low.3.4. Estimation 117
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Figure 3.3: Productivity distribution. Distribution of ﬁrm productivity is obtained from pre-
reform estimation by setting vh(p) = 1 for all (h, p). Figure is truncated at ﬁrm productivity
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Figure 3.4: Wage offer distribution (pre-reform). Figure shows distribution of wage offers for
part-time and full-time ﬁrms under April 1997 tax and transfer system.3.4. Estimation 118
arrival rates of job offers also varies considerably across the different demographic groups.
Job offers arrive most frequently for men: for unemployed married men without children we
obtain ˆ λ1
ui = 0.069 which implies that offers arrive on average every 14 months (= 1/0.069);
the arrival rates for unemployed single men and unemployed married men without children
are estimated to be slightly lower (0.051 and 0.047 respectively). Of course, the presence of
reservation wage heterogeneity means that not all of these job offers will be acceptable to all
workers. The estimated total job offer arrival rates ˆ λ0
ui + ˆ λ1
ui for unemployed childless women
is similar to the values of ˆ λ1
ui for men. However, for lone mothers this total rate is estimated
to be around three times as small; for married women with children it is around one and a
half times as small. Note that the arrival rate of full-time offers for unemployed mothers is
especially low with ˆ λ1
ui ≈ 0.003. While our model could potentially explain the proportion of
mothers working part-time by a high value of C1
i (discussed below), this would also require
that the accepted wages of full-time working mothers be much higher than those accepted in
part-time jobs. We do not observe this in our data.
For a number of groups, the estimated job offer arrival rate when employed (ˆ λh
ei) is similar
to that then unemployed (ˆ λh
ui) and in some cases we can not formally reject the null hypothesis
that they are the same. While this is similar to the ﬁnding of van den Berg and Ridder (1998),
it contrasts with Bontemps et al. (2000) which found (using French Labour Force Survey data)
that job offers typically arrive ten times as frequently for the unemployed compared to the
employed. In our estimation we ﬁnd that ˆ λ1
ui is around 1.6 times higher than ˆ λ1
ei for childless
men, but we can not reject the hypothesis that λ1
ui = λ1
ei for married men with children.
Amongst women, we estimate that λ1
ui is around 1.4 times larger than λ1
ei for single women,
very similar for married women without children (no signiﬁcant difference), but ˆ λ1
ei is much
larger than ˆ λ1
ui for both lone mothers (six times larger) and married women with children
(more than twice as large). For all groups of women we estimate ˆ λ0
ei < ˆ λ0
ui, but we can not
reject the hypothesis that they are equal for married mothers.
The monetary dis-utility of full-time work C1
i is estimated to be equal to around £24 per
week for single women, and is somewhat higher for lone mothers and married women (up
to around £37 per week), but none of the differences across groups are especially large. We
obtain considerable dispersion in the unobserved leisure ﬂow for all groups, and this trans-
lates into dispersion in reservation wages. The distribution of (full-time) reservation wages
is shown in Table 3.5. The table shows the proportion of workers of each demographic type
whose reservation wage is below given percentiles of the (full-time) wage offer distribution
and reﬂects uncertainty in all distributions and structural parameters. For all worker types
i we obtain ˆ Ai( ˆ w1) < 1, so that unemployed workers are indeed selective in the wage offers
that they are willing to accept. This feature also implies a negative duration dependence in
the exit rate out of unemployment. Furthermore, the value of ˆ Ai( ˆ w1) is very close to one for
all groups so that essentially all individuals would be willing to accept the highest full-time3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 119
Table 3.5: Reservation wage distribution
Percentile of full-time offer distribution ˆ F1(w)
0 20 40 60 80 100
single men 0.243 0.404 0.523 0.644 0.788 1.000
[0.086,0.441] [0.183,0.572] [0.323,0.654] [0.496,0.735] [0.711,0.856] [1.000,1.000]
married men, no kids 0.145 0.340 0.503 0.651 0.811 1.000
[0.077,0.237] [0.200,0.443] [0.350,0.597] [0.515,0.723] [0.713,0.857] [1.000,1.000]
married men, kids 0.465 0.621 0.702 0.768 0.847 1.000
[0.398,0.540] [0.563,0.672] [0.656,0.750] [0.729,0.813] [0.817,0.892] [1.000,1.000]
single women 0.438 0.571 0.651 0.723 0.806 1.000
[0.175,0.660] [0.318,0.720] [0.464,0.755] [0.603,0.790] [0.741,0.859] [0.995,1.000]
lone mothers 0.232 0.473 0.584 0.659 0.754 1.000
[0.063,0.413] [0.245,0.632] [0.427,0.734] [0.529,0.830] [0.655,0.932] [1.000,1.000]
married women, no kids 0.183 0.479 0.668 0.784 0.882 1.000
[0.086,0.331] [0.265,0.627] [0.472,0.764] [0.657,0.844] [0.813,0.919] [1.000,1.000]
married women, kids 0.270 0.548 0.699 0.793 0.870 1.000
[0.193,0.393] [0.380,0.658] [0.548,0.776] [0.689,0.844] [0.812,0.901] [1.000,1.000]
Notes: Table shows the fraction of individuals whose full-time reservation wage is below various percentiles p of the
full-time wage offer distribution, Ai( ˆ F−1
1 (p)), and is calculated using the maximum likelihood estimates from Table
3.4. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the bootstrap distribution are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500
replications.
wage offer.
Since the wage offer distributions are common to workers of all types i, any difference
in employment states and earnings distributions must be explained by variation in the transi-
tional parameters, opportunity cost distribution, and the tax and transfer system. Overall, we
obtain a good ﬁt to the data. The difference in the empirical and predicted states for the main
demographic groups is small and never exceeds more than around 2 percentage points (see
Table 3.6). Similarly, we do well in replicating the observed distribution of wages (see Figure
3.5); for most groups the ﬁt is very good, but the model does appear to have some difﬁculty
ﬁtting the full-time earnings distribution for married women with children (Figure 3.5(g)).
Finally, we note that the ﬁt is less satisfactory if we compare the empirical and predicted em-
ployment states of individuals in couples conditional on the earnings of their partner. More
speciﬁcally, our model tends to under-predict the non-employment rates for individuals with
a non-working partner. In other words, our model is not able to fully explain employment
patterns within couples of a given demographic type solely by variation in the tax and transfer
system.
3.5 Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms
In this section we simulate the real impact of all changes to the tax and transfer system be-
tween April 1997 (the system operating in our pre-reform sample period) and April 2002. As
discussed in Section 3.2, this captures the introduction of WFTC together with other changes
to the tax and transfer system, including increases in the generosity of out-of-work support for
families with children. We do this by using the estimated structural parameters of our model
and examining how the equilibrium changes when we impose a different tax and transfer
system.3
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Table 3.6: Empirical and predicted employment states
Empirical Predicted
ui m0i m1i ui m0i m1i
single men 0.366 – 0.634 0.346 – 0.654
[0.354,0.379] [0.621,0.646] [0.334,0.356] [0.644,0.666]
married men, no kids 0.186 – 0.814 0.178 – 0.822
[0.175,0.200] [0.800,0.825] [0.167,0.191] [0.809,0.833]
married men, kids 0.224 – 0.776 0.211 – 0.789
[0.214,0.236] [0.764,0.786] [0.202,0.220] [0.780,0.798]
single women 0.319 0.115 0.566 0.307 0.119 0.574
[0.305,0.332] [0.106,0.125] [0.552,0.580] [0.294,0.320] [0.111,0.128] [0.561,0.587]
lone mothers 0.623 0.235 0.142 0.610 0.244 0.146
[0.609,0.638] [0.222,0.248] [0.131,0.153] [0.597,0.623] [0.232,0.256] [0.135,0.158]
married women, no kids 0.244 0.244 0.512 0.241 0.254 0.505
[0.230,0.259] [0.228,0.258] [0.495,0.530] [0.227,0.255] [0.239,0.268] [0.488,0.523]
married women, kids 0.432 0.364 0.204 0.419 0.370 0.211
[0.419,0.445] [0.351,0.377] [0.193,0.214] [0.408,0.432] [0.358,0.383] [0.199,0.221]
Notes: Predicted states are calculated using the maximum likelihood estimates from Table 3.4. Employment states may not sum to one due to rounding. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the
bootstrap distribution of employment states are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500 replications.3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 121
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Figure 3.5: Simulated and empirical earnings by group. Horizontal axis refers to hourly wage
rate in April 1997 prices; Vertical axis refers to wage density. Empirical distributions are
calculated using a Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.6.3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 122
In the simulations we present in this section, we assume a vacancy cost function for each
sector h ∈ {0,1} of the form ch(v, p)=ch(p)v2/2, together with a Cobb-Douglas matching
function Mh(Vh,Sh) = V
θh
h S
1−θh
h , where Sh ≡ ∑ni(sh
uiui + sh
ei(1− ui)) is the total search inten-
sity in sector h. Our main results assume θ0 = θ1 = 1/2 but we do discuss sensitivity with
respect to this parameter. Before we proceed we note that with a ﬁxed distribution of ﬁrms’
productivity and a vacancy cost function that is quadratic in v, our simulation exercises are
invariant to the parametrization of ch(p) provided that ch(p) > 0.23 Without loss of gener-
ality, we therefore assume that vh(p) = 1 for all p and h ∈ {0,1} in the pre-reform period
and recover the values of ch(p) that are consistent with this being an equilibrium. This also
implies that Γh(p) = Fh(Kh(p)) under the base system.
To highlight the relative importance that this set of reforms has on job acceptance be-
haviour and the behaviour of ﬁrms, we present our results in two stages. Firstly, we consider
the impact of the reform holding the distribution of job offers and their arrival rate constant;
secondly we additionally allow ﬁrms to respond optimally by changing their wage policy and
recruiting effort. We refer to the ﬁrst channel as the direct impact of the reform, and the second
channel as the equilibrium impact of the reform.
3.5.1 Direct Impact
We present both the direct and equilibrium impact of the reform on employment states in
Table 3.7, and we ﬁrst discuss the direct effect. The table shows that the (non- tax credit)
reforms had a small positive effect (around 1 percentage point) on the employment of both
singles and couples without children. This increase is mainly due to small reductions in the
real value of IS/income-based JSA for families without children, together with reductions in
income-tax (the introduction of a new lower starting rate, and a penny reduction is the basic
rate – see Section 3.2) which act to raise the value of holding low wage jobs and so lower
reservation wages. Since these changes are only small, there is little impact on durations.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the largest predicted impact of these reforms is on the employ-
ment rate of lone mothers, where we predict an increase of 5.6 percentage points. Despite
both full-time and part-time reservation wages falling,24 this employment increase is almost
entirely due to a movement into full-time work. This is partly because the lower withdrawal
rate of WFTC compared to FC results in full-time incomes increasing by more than part-time
incomes over a large range of wages for this group.25 As such the indifference condition
23This is because the marginal cost of a job-vacancy becomes linear in ch(p)v. If we assume an alternative ch(p)
we will identify a new vh(p) such that ch(p)vVh is unchanged (see equation 3.16), and similarly identify a new value
of γh(p) such that distribution of wage offers is preserved, and the search intensities sh
ji such that the arrival rate
of offers is maintained. The equilibrium effect of tax reforms is invariant to the choice of ch(p) as any effect of the
reform on vh(p) is also scaled by γh(p).
24Any reform that lowers reservation wages necessarily relies on parametric identiﬁcation, as the distribution of
reservation wages is only non-parametrically identiﬁed on the support of pre-reform wages.
25At very low wages the reforms makes part-time work relatively more desirable as tax credit income is counted
as income when determining eligibility to other beneﬁts. Consequently, at these low wages other beneﬁts may be
withdrawn at full-time hours following the reform, but not with the lower earnings associated with part-time hours.
At moderate wages (discussed above) the reduction in the taper rate dominates so that full-time work becomes more
desirable. At high wages (where individuals become eligible for tax credits at full-time hours following the reform),3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 123
qi(w) changes so that more part-time workers accept full-time jobs through on-the-job search,
while the acceptance of part-time jobs by full-time workers also declines. Note also that the
much higher arrival rate of full-time offers relative to part-time offers amongst the employed
(λ1
ei ≫ λ0
ei) is important for the quantitative impact.
In Figure 3.6a we show the impact of the reforms on the (monthly) unemployment exit
rate: dui(b) = λ0
uiF0(qi(φi(b))) + λ1
uiF1(φi(b)); the ﬁgure also shows the distribution of b in
the stock of the unemployed under the base system. The ﬁgure illustrates that the reforms in-
crease the exit rate by a considerable amount relative to the pre-reform level, with correspond-
ing large reductions in unemployment durations.26 Similarly, Figure 3.6b shows the impact
on the separation rates of employed lone mothers in part-time and full-time jobs (respectively,
d0
ei(w) = δi + λ0
eiF0(w) + λ1
eiF1(q−1
i (w)) and d1
ei(w) = δi + λ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
eiF1(w)).27 Apart
from at high wage rates, the separation rate in part-time jobs increases, while it either falls or
remains effectively unchanged in full-time jobs over the entire support of wages. Due to the
increased ﬂows to the full-time sector, the average duration of a part-time job falls by around
5 months, while there is also a half-month reduction for full-time jobs. This latter reduction
reﬂects a compositional change following the inﬂow of workers into low paying jobs where
the job separation rate is higher.
For couples with children the impact of these reforms is more complicated: individuals
in couples with a high earning partner are effectively unaffected by the reform as entitlement
for tax credits depends upon family income; those with a non-working or very low earning
partner partner respond positively with increases in their unemployment exit rate, much like
lone mothers; in intermediate cases, movement into work can taper away tax credit awards
which may induce negative labour supply responses (particularly among the newly eligible
families where there are large relative reductions in the unemployment exit rate). On balance,
these factors lead to a small decrease in the labour supply of married women with children
(a 1.3 percentage point decrease), but increase the employment rate of married men with
children by a little under 3 percentage points. Among married women, the decrease in labour
supply comes primarily through a reduction in those working part-time. Since men have
no choice of part-time hours, there is no change in the job separation function for married
fathers. For married mothers, while there are only small changes in these functions (and
job durations) on average, there are much more pronounced changes once we condition on
partner earnings.
Note that the simulations performed for couples hold constant the distribution of partner
earnings. To understand the importance of this, we use our structural parameter estimates to
perform dynamic simulations whereby we allow both individuals in a couple to sample wage
part-time incomes increase by more than full-time incomes. At very high wages individuals are not-affected by the
tax credit reform, so there are only small changes in the indifference condition due to the other smaller changes to
the tax and transfer system.
26The expected unemployment duration conditional on b is given by the 1/dui(b).
27The distribution of lone mothers’ earnings is shown in Figure 3.5e earlier.3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 124
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Figure 3.6: Lone mother separation rates. Figure shows monthly separation rates for lone
mothers under the April 1997 (base) and April 2002 (reform) tax and transfer systems; reform
simulations refer to the direct impact only. Panel (a) shows the exit rates from unemployment
and is truncated at weekly leisure ﬂows less (greater) than 0 (150); panel (b) shows the job
separation rate from part-time and full-time jobs. See text for deﬁnitions of du, d0
e and d1
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offers, but otherwise maintain the same individualistic behaviour described in Section 3.3.28
That is, we allow each individual to receive wage offers, but then sequentially condition on the
current wage and employment state of their partner (subsumed in the tax schedule as before)
when job acceptance decisions are made. In contrast to the optimal joint search behaviour
analysed in Guler et al. (2009), no voluntary quits are permitted. From this simulation exercise
we obtain direct employment impacts which are essentially the same as those presented in
Table 3.7 and discussed above. Given this ﬁnding, the remainder of our analysis will continue
to present results which condition on partner earnings in the base system.29
Before we discuss the equilibrium effect of the reforms, we brieﬂy discuss the impact
on wages. Note that selection effects alone imply that earnings will change even though the
distribution of wage offers is held ﬁxed. This highlights the fact that attempting to estimate
the incidence of earned income tax credit programmes by comparing changes in observed
wages amongst eligible and non-eligible groups is potentially misleading without carefully
controlling for these selection effects. Indeed, selection alone implies some large reductions in
full-time average wages. Our simulations imply that lone mothers experience a 7% reduction
in average full-time wages and a 1.5% increase in part-time wages, while married men with
children see their earnings fall by 1%; the changes for other groups is negligible. Since it
is only lone mothers who experience sizeable changes in their earnings, the unconditional
(across worker type i) distributions change very little due to these selection effects.
3.5.2 Equilibrium Impact
In Table 3.7 we also present the equilibrium impact of the reform. The ﬁrst immediate thing
to note is that the impacts are extremely similar to those obtained from the direct impact.
That is, equilibrium considerations do not appear to be very important for this particular set of
reforms. Looking more closely we can see that equilibrium considerations tend to increase em-
ployment in full-time jobs, and decrease employment in part-time jobs. To understand these
subtle changes to employment it is useful to consider how the optimal strategy of ﬁrms’ has
changed. Figure 3.7 shows how vh(p) changes following the reform. Full-time ﬁrms are pre-
dicted to increase their recruiting effort over much of the distribution, with the increase most
pronounced in the middle; only among very high (where the density of ﬁrms is particularly
low – see Figure 3.3 earlier) and low productivity ﬁrms is a decrease predicted. In contrast,
the largest increases among part-time ﬁrms is for those with the lowest productivity, while
the upper half of the distribution tend to decrease recruiting effort. Overall these changes
imply that V0 is effectively unchanged, whereas V1 increases by around three percent. Given
these changes, together with the changes in the total search intensities S0 and S1, the ﬂow of
part-time matches M0 is reduced by a negligible amount, while the ﬂow of full-time matches
28There is a slight inconsistency here as our sample selection was performed at the level of the individual and not
of the family.
29Our dynamic simulations were conducted using a population of 100,000 families of each type i ∈ I, with be-
haviour simulated over a period of 1,000 years with a monthly time unit.3
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Table 3.7: Employment impact of reforms
Direct Impact Equilibrium Impact
∆ui ∆m0i ∆m1i ∆ui ∆m0i ∆m1i
single men -0.010 – 0.010 -0.012 – 0.012
[-0.013,-0.007] [0.007,0.013] [-0.015,-0.009] [0.009,0.015]
married men, no kids -0.008 – 0.008 -0.009 – 0.009
[-0.009,-0.007] [0.007,0.009] [-0.010,-0.008] [0.008,0.010]
married men, kids -0.029 – 0.029 -0.030 – 0.030
[-0.042,-0.021] [0.021,0.042] [-0.043,-0.022] [0.022,0.043]
single women -0.008 -0.000 0.008 -0.008 -0.003 0.011
[-0.010,-0.004] [-0.001,0.001] [0.005,0.011] [-0.011,-0.005] [-0.005,-0.002] [0.008,0.014]
lone mothers -0.056 -0.005 0.061 -0.053 -0.011 0.064
[-0.068,-0.043] [-0.016,0.002] [0.049,0.075] [-0.066,-0.041] [-0.022,-0.002] [0.052,0.079]
married women, no kids -0.009 -0.002 0.012 -0.009 -0.006 0.015
[-0.011,-0.008] [-0.005,0.001] [0.009,0.014] [-0.010,-0.008] [-0.011,-0.002] [0.012,0.020]
married women, kids 0.013 -0.012 -0.001 0.015 -0.015 -0.000
[0.009,0.016] [-0.014,-0.009] [-0.003,0.001] [0.010,0.020] [-0.019,-0.011] [-0.002,0.003]
Notes: All employment responses are expressed in percentage points. Changes may not sum to zero due to rounding. The direct impact considers all changes to the tax and transfer system
between April 1997 and April 2002, holding the wage offer distributions and arrival rates at their pre-reform levels. The equilibrium impact allows the wage offer distribution and arrival rates to
change.3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 127
 
 
reform v1(p)
reform v0(p)
V
a
c
a
n
c
i
e
s
Productivity
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
Figure 3.7: Change in recruiting policy function. Figure shows the level of vacancies vh(p)
under with April 2002 tax and transfer system. In pre-reform period we set vh(p) = 1 for all
(h, p), so values greater (less) than one correspond to increases (decreases) in recruiting effort.
Figure is truncated at ﬁrm productivity greater than p = 40 ≈ K−1
1 (G−1
1 (0.95)) under base
system.
M1 increases by just 1.6 percent. This increase in full-time matches will beneﬁt all workers,
regardless of whether or not they were directly affected by the introduction of WFTC. These
additional changes only have a very small impact on the separation rates for all types of
workers.
The effect that the reforms have on the optimal wage policy of ﬁrms is difﬁcult to predict
a priori due to the changing competition both within and between sectors. Fixing the optimal
strategies of part-time ﬁrms at their pre-reform levels, the direct effect on full-time ﬁrms
acts to increase employment L1(w) across the distribution of ﬁrm productivity. Despite this,
changes in the indifference condition qi(w) mean that some relatively low productivity full-
time ﬁrms react by increasing the wages that they offer in order to attract workers from low-
wage part-time ﬁrms, while higher productivity ﬁrms decrease wages. Meanwhile, despite
the negligible reductions in overall part-time employment, the direct effect of the reforms
still increases L0(w) for a number of ﬁrms and these ﬁrms respond to this by lowering their
wage offers. On balance these changes mean that the equilibrium effects increase full-time
employment further, whilst decreasing part-time employment. The full equilibrium effect on
the distribution of wage offers is shown in Figure 3.8. The ﬁgure shows that there is a small,
but noticeable, general shift in the distribution of part-time wage offers towards lower wages.
In the full-time sector most changes can be seen to occur in the lower half of the distribution,
with a greater proportion of ﬁrms posting wages that are close to the median wage offer. The
overall effect of the reform on the distribution of part-time and full-time earnings is shown
in Figure 3.9. While the direct impact of the reforms on the overall distribution of earnings
is relatively minor given the small change in part-time employment, equilibrium effects do3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 128
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Figure 3.8: Change in wage offer distribution. Figure shows distribution of wage offers for
part-time and full-time ﬁrms under the April 1997 (base) and April 2002 (reform) tax and
transfer systems.
appear to have a noticeable impact on the shape of the part-time earnings distribution as
the ﬁgure illustrates. To understand these changes further we note that the reason why the
changes in the distribution of full-time offers does not have a larger impact on the full-time
earnings distribution is because we estimate somewhat higher job offer arrival rates for full-
time jobs amongst the employed. This means that workers gravitate to the higher paying
full-time jobs much more quickly than in the part-time sector.
We now comment upon the sensitivity of our results to our calibration of the matching
functions. Given that the equilibrium effect of the tax reforms is dominated by the direct
labour supply effect, it is perhaps unsurprising that our results are not especially sensitive to
the choice of θh. Higher values of θh makes the ﬂow of matches more sensitive to changes
in vh(p) which then acts to increase slightly employment in full-time ﬁrms, decrease employ-
ment in part-time ﬁrms, and raise employment overall. Similarly, lower values of θh have the
opposite effect. The quantitative importance of these changes is relatively modest: for exam-
ple, relative to our baseline results with θ0 = θ1 = 0.5, increasing θh to 0.9 for h ∈ {0,1} only
increases the employment rate of lone-mothers by a further 0.4 percentage points, while de-
creasing θh to 0.1 just decreases it by a further 0.1 percentage points; other groups experience
similar changes.
3.5.3 Aggregation
The very selected nature of sample (see Section 3.4.5) implies that the labour market responses
presented in Table 3.7 can not be applied to the whole population. The education selection cri-
teria in particular, has the largest impact on the representativeness of the sample, although the
impact this has on lone mothers is much smaller relative to other demographic groups. Using
survey frequency weights, and assuming that the employment rates of individuals excluded3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 129
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Figure 3.9: Change in earnings distribution. Figure shows distribution of earnings for part-
time and full-time workers under the April 1997 (base) and April 2002 (reform) tax and trans-
fer systems.
Table 3.8: Empirical and predicted employment changes
Empirical Predicted
∆ui ∆m0i ∆m1i ∆ui ∆m0i ∆m1i
single men -0.030 – 0.030 -0.012 – 0.012
married men, no kids -0.021 – 0.021 -0.009 – 0.009
married men, kids -0.021 – 0.021 -0.030 – 0.030
single women 0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 0.011
lone mothers -0.052 0.027 0.024 -0.053 -0.011 0.064
married women, no kids -0.001 -0.013 0.014 -0.009 -0.006 0.015
married women, kids -0.021 -0.006 0.028 0.015 -0.015 -0.000
Notes: Predicted changes are calculated using the maximum likelihood estimates from Table 3.4 and simulating the
equilibrium effect of replacing the April 1997 system with the April 2002 system. Empirical changes refer to the
observed changes in our data over this period using the sample selection as described in Section 3.4.5. Changes may
not sum to zero due to rounding.
from our sample are unaffected by the reform, our simulations imply that overall employment
increases by 135,000. The majority of this increase is though the increased employment of lone
mothers (60,000) and married men with children (50,000).
3.5.4 Post-reform Comparison
The simulations that we presented in the previous section allowed us to examine the ceteris
paribus labour market impact of the set of tax reforms between April 1997 and April 2002.
Before comparing these predictions to those which were obtained in previous evaluations of
WFTC, we ﬁrst brieﬂy compare them to the actual changes in the labour market. That is, we
ask to what extent did the tax reforms contribute to the observed labour market changes. The
simulated and empirical changes are presented in Table 3.8.
Most groups experienced an increase in employment over this period with the exception
of women without children where essentially no change was observed. Men without children3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 130
experienced an increase in employment of between two and three percentage points over this
period, and while we did predict a small increase in employment for such individuals, these
changes represent a more than doubling of the impact. This therefore suggests that other
changes over this period (including robust productivity growth, changes in the distribution
of partner earnings, a national minimum wage, and various “New Deal” programmes) may
have had a more important effect on employment for this group. The employment increase for
married men with children is very similar to that for married men without children, despite
very different simulated impacts. To reconcile these ﬁndings we therefore require that the
other changes in the economy have had an opposite effect on the employment of married
men with children.
Lone mothers experienced the largest employment increase by far, with employment in-
creasing by 5.2 percentage points. While the overall impact here line up remarkably well with
the simulations, the hours responses differ: the empirical contribution to the increase is ap-
proximately evenly split between movements into both part-time and full-time employment;
this contrasts with our simulations which suggested that it was exclusively due to a move-
ment into full-time work. Despite predicting small increases in employment for single women
and married women without children we effectively see no change for these groups, despite
modest employment growth among men. One possible explanation for this is that the labour
market is perhaps not as “integrated” as we have modelled, with childless women possibly
being more effected by changes in wage offers following the reform than childless men. Of
course, to be a credible explanation this would require substantially larger equilibrium ef-
fects than we obtained in the previous section (see the discussion in Section 3.5.6). Finally,
despite predicting reductions in the employment of married women with children we again
observe a modest increase, which again suggests that other changes in the economy boosted
employment rates.
3.5.5 Other Evaluations of WFTC
We now compare the labour market responses from our study to those obtained in previous
WFTC evaluations. Since our analysis only considers individuals with low levels of educa-
tional attainment (see Section 3.4.5), our sample is typically more selective than in the studies
cited in this section. As such, the comparisons here are considered more indicative than exact,
with the results for lone mothers being most comparable due to lower average education lev-
els for this group. In terms of the employment impact, which is sometime the only outcome
considered in these evaluations, the results for lone mothers are broadly similar to those ob-
tained in these other studies. This is perhaps unsurprising given that we did not ﬁnd evidence
of strong equilibrium effects in our analysis.
The most common method that has been used when analysing the impact of
WFTC on employment outcomes is difference-in-differences. Such existing evaluations
(including Azmat, 2006a; Blundell et al., 2004a; Francesconi and van der Klaauw, 2004;3.5. Simulating WFTC and Contemporaneous Reforms 131
Gregg and Harkness, 2003; Leigh, 2007) have largely (but not exclusively) focussed upon
the impact on lone mothers and essentially involve comparing the changing employment
outcomes of lone mothers, with single women without children. As discussed in Section 3.2,
the introduction of WFTC was accompanied by a number of other changes to the tax and
beneﬁt system. Given this choice of control group, at best these evaluations will be informa-
tive about the effect of the set of reforms that only affected parents. Since we predict that the
changes to Income Tax and National Insurance acted to increase slightly the labour supply of
non-parents, the relevant statistic to compare from our study for lone mothers is an impact
of 4.5 percentage points (= 5.3 − 0.8). Before proceeding further, we note that if equilibrium
effects were quantitatively important, then the usual stable unit treatment value assumption
(or SUTVA) would be violated.
The headline impacts of these estimates on lone mothers (or lone parents) varies some-
what, lying between around 1 and 7 percentage points. The differences across these studies
appears to be largely attributable to two factors: (i) the period considered in the estimation; (ii)
attempts to control for pre-programme differences in employment trends between treatment
and control groups (see Brewer and Shephard, 2004 for a time series). The ﬁrst factor is impor-
tant in any comparison because those studies which focus on the period immediately around
the introduction of WFTC (such as Leigh, 2007), ﬁnd considerably smaller impacts. This is
unsurprising both because WFTC grew in generosity following its introduction in 1999 (see
Table 3.1 earlier), and individuals may require time to obtain an acceptable job. The second
issue is more problematic for these studies as it suggests that the usual common trends as-
sumption invoked in difference-in-differencesmay be violated. Unsurprisingly, studies which
assume that this pre-programme differential employment growth would have stopped had
WFTC not been introduced typically ﬁnd larger effects than those which achieve identiﬁca-
tion through a particular parametric differential time trend speciﬁcation (using an otherwise
similar speciﬁcation, Blundell et al., 2004a report a 4 percentage point increase, compared to
the 2 percentage point impact reported in Azmat, 2006a).
Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004) offer an interesting interpretation of this pre-
reform employment growth, attributing it to an “anticipation effect” so that the pre-
programme growth in employment is due to the programme itself. Such effects are possible
because the main details of WFTC were announced over a year earlier in the government’s
March 1998 Budget. Under such an assumption, Francesconi and van der Klaauw estimate
that WFTC increased employment by around 7 percentage points, which is somewhat higher
than the other evaluations cited here (as well as our simulations for this group). Such ef-
fects would be a qualitative implication of a non-stationary labour market search model with
anticipation, although other forms of non-stationarity (such as the arrival rate of job offers
depending upon calender time) would also be consistent with these trends (see van den Berg,
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An alternative evaluation methodology that has also been adopted involves the estima-
tion and simulation of a static discrete choice labour supply model (Blundell et al., 2000;
Blundell and Shephard, 2009; Brewer et al., 2006). These models, which assume away the
presence of equilibrium effects, identify preferences by relating changing employment pat-
terns to changing ﬁnancial work incentives assuming a constant hourly wage and some ﬁnite
set of work alternatives. Using cross-sectional data from 1997 to 2002, Blundell and Shephard
(2009) predicted that the reforms over this period increased employment by around 4 per-
centage points amongst lone mothers.30 This study, like other ex-post evaluations, relies upon
variation in data caused by the reform itself to obtain this impact.31 In particular, it explains
some of this employment growth by reductions in the “cost” of receiving tax credits.
3.5.6 Why Aren’t Equilibrium Effects More Important?
The analysis performed in section 3.5.2 suggests that equilibrium effects may be small. We
now explore the extent to which this may be due to the integrated nature of the labour market
and the targeted nature of the reforms. As noted previously, lone mothers are the main
beneﬁciaries of the tax credit reforms, and our analysis suggests that labour supply responses
are by far the greatest for this group. However, even amongst our sample of workers with low
education, they only represent a little over 10% of the sample. While allowing all workers to
compete within the same market was a very natural characterisation of the UK labour market,
and one which permitted spillover effects, it does severely limit the potential for equilibrium
effects following a targeted reform like WFTC if ﬁrms are constrained to have a single wage
policy.32
To understand the importance of our assumptions regarding market segmentation, we
re-estimate our model on a sample comprised solely of lone mothers, and perform our sim-
ulation exercises as before. Since the model is re-estimated, there are some differences in
the direct impact. In particular, the positive employment impact of the reform is now more
evenly split between increases in full-time and part-time employment. This is largely due to
estimated differences in the wage offer distributions, and because the arrival rates of part-time
and full-time wage offers when employed are now estimated to be somewhat more similar
(in our previous estimation results, full-time offers arrived more than twice as frequently as
part-time offers amongst employed lone mothers – see Table 3.4). An implication of this is
that selection effects reduce full-time wages by 5%, and reduce part-time wages by 3%.
Once we allow for equilibrium responses we obtain much larger increases in the ﬂows
30Using a similar model, Brewer et al. (2006) reported a similar employment increase for lone mothers, together
with a small reduction in the employment of both men and women in couples with children (around half a percentage
point).
31An ex-ante evaluation using a similar model was provided by Blundell et al. (2000). This predicted a 2 percentage
point increase in the employment of lone mothers, together with a small decline for married women with children
and essentially no change for men in couples. These results are not comparable to the employment responses that
we simulate here as only the “immediate” reform (that is, WFTC in October 1999) was considered.
32In a model with worker and ﬁrm bargaining, wages essentially become individualistic so that the potential
for equilibrium effects is much larger. Lise et al. (2005) used such a model in their analysis of the Canadian Self-
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of matches relative to when the labour market is not segmented: M0 increases by 5% while
M1 increases by almost 18%. Similarly, we obtain much stronger reductions in full-time wage
offers. As a result of these equilibrium responses, full-time (part-time) earnings now fall by
14% (4%) relative to the pre-reform average. Accompanying these changes is a 1 percentage
point reduction in full-time employment, with little change in part-time employment. Overall,
equilibrium considerations have a non-negligible impact in this experiment, and act to reduce
the positive employment impact of the reforms.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has developed an empirical equilibrium job search model with wage posting, and
has used it to analyse the impact of the British Working Families’ Tax Credit reform. Our
model extends the existing literature in a number of important dimensions: we allow for
hours-of-work responses; accurate non-linear tax-schedules; worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity
(without restrictive arrival rate assumptions); and allow workers of different types to all op-
erate within the same labour market. We close our model by endogenizing the rate of job
offer arrivals through aggregate matching functions, and also propose a semi-non-parametric
estimation procedure.
We estimate our model using data from before WFTC was introduced, and use our struc-
tural parameter estimates to simulate the labour market impact of actual tax reforms. Our
analysis suggests that WFTC, together with other reforms to the tax and transfer system be-
tween April 1997 and April 2002, had a positive effect on the employment of most groups;
only amongst married women with children do we predict a fall in employment. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the increase in employment is found to be strongest for lone mothers, where
a 5 percentage point increase is predicted. Our simulations suggest that while equilibrium
considerations do play a role, the changes in employment and earnings for most groups are
dominated by the direct effect of changing job acceptance behaviour. And while the tax re-
forms do appear to be able to explain some of the actual changes in employment over the
relevant period, for some groups other changes in the economy appear more important.
Even though equilibrium effects may not appear very important for this particular set
of reforms, it does not imply that they should always be ignored. Recalling that WFTC is
only available to low income families with children, equilibrium effects have the potential to
be much more important for tax reforms which are less targeted. We demonstrate that the
equilibrium effects of the same reforms may be much larger if we consider a labour market
solely comprised of lone mothers, one of the main beneﬁciaries of WFTC.
We believe that this paper represents an important ﬁrst step in using empirical equilib-
rium job search models to evaluate the impact of tax reform policies. Despite performing
our empirical analysis on individuals with low education levels, it is likely that differences in
worker ability persist within this group. A natural extension could therefore involve incorpo-
rating heterogeneity in worker productivity which necessitates a more careful modelling of3.A. Worker Strategies 134
ﬁrm production technologies. Furthermore, given that the tax and transfer systems of many
countries (including the UK) depend upon family income to some extent, a more detailed
characterisation of the behaviour of couples (building upon the analysis of Guler et al., 2009)
would allow us to explore the impact of tax policies on household labour supply allocations.
Finally, given the importance of labour supply in our simulation exercises, incorporating
micro-level endogenous search intensity (as in Christensen et al., 2005) would create a fur-
ther dimension along which individuals can respond to changing ﬁnancial incentives. While
each of these represent non-trivial extensions, it does suggest a very exciting agenda of future
research.
Chapter 3 Appendix
3.A Worker Strategies
In this appendix we derive the optimal strategies of employed and unemployed workers that
were presented in Section 3.3.2.33 Using the same notation as in the main text, the value of
unemployment Vui must satisfy:
ρiVui = b − Tu
i + λ0
uiEw∼F0 max
 
V0
ei(w) − Vui,0
 
+ λ1
uiEw∼F1 max
 
V1
ei(w) − Vui,0
 
(3.24)
where V0
ei(w) and V1
ei(w) are the values of part-time and full-time employment when receiving
wage w. For workers who are employed in a part-time job (h = h0) we have:
ρiV0
ei(w) = wh0 − T0
i (wh0) + λ0
eiEx∼F0 max
 
V0
ei(x) − V0
ei(w),0
 
+ λ1
eiEx∼F1 max
 
V1
ei(x) − V0
ei(w),0
 
+ δi(Vui − V0
ei(w))
and for workers employed in a full-time job (h = h1):
ρiV1
ei(w) = wh1 − T1
i (wh1) − C1
i + λ0
eiEx∼F0 max
 
V0
ei(x) − V1
ei(w),0
 
+ λ1
eiEx∼F1 max
 
V1
ei(x) − V0
ei(w),0
 
+ δi(Vui − V1
ei(w)).
To proceed we deﬁne qi(w) such that V1
ei(w) = V0
ei(qi(w)). This means that a type i worker is
indifferent between holding a full-time job with wage w and a part-time job with wage qi(w).
Since marginal tax rates conditional on hours of work are always strictly less than one, this
33For notational simplicity, here we do not explicitly write the value functions or the resultant reservation wages
as a function of the work opportunity b.3.A. Worker Strategies 135
will be a function. It therefore follows that the value of a full-time job may be written as:
ρiV1
ei(w) = wh1 − T1
i (wh1) − C1
i + λ0
ei
  w0
qi(w)
(V0
ei(x) − V1
ei(w))dF0(x)
+ λ1
ei
  w1
w
(V1
ei(x) − V1
ei(w))dF1(x) + δi(Vui − V1
ei(w)).
We now wish to obtain the envelope condition V1
ei
′(w). To do this we ﬁrst perform integration
by parts on the above to obtain:
ρiV1
ei(w) = wh1 − T1
i (wh1) − C1
i + λ0
ei
  w0
qi(w)
F0(x)dV0
ei(x)
+ λ1
ei
  w1
w
F1(x)dV1
ei(x) + δi(Vui − V1
ei(w)) (3.25)
which when differentiated with respect to w yields:
ρiV1
ei
′
(w) = h1(1 − T1
i
′
(wh1)) − λ0
eiF0(qi(w))V0
ei
′
(qi(w))q′
i(w) − λ1
eiF1(w)V1
ei
′
(w) − δiV1
ei
′
(w).
Noting that V1
ei
′(w) = V0
ei
′(qi(w))q′
i(w) we may simplify the above equation to obtain:
h1(1 − T1
i
′(wh1)) = (δi + ρi + λ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
eiF1(w))V1
ei
′
(w) (3.26)
and performing a similar set of calculations for part-time jobs we arrive at the analogous
expression:
h0(1 − T0
i
′(wh0)) = (δi + ρi + λ0
eiF0(w) + λ1
eiF1(q−1
i (w)))V0
ei
′
(w). (3.27)
Note also that equating equation 3.25 (evaluated at wage w) with the analogous expression
for part-time employment (evaluated at wage qi(w)) implies that qi(w) is the solution to:
wh1 − T1
i (wh1) − C1
i = qi(w)h0 − T0
i (qi(w)h0)
which is equation 3.1 from the main text. We obtain this simple expression because, con-
ditional on being in employment, the arrival rates for both full-time and part-time jobs are
assumed independent of the individuals current hours of work so that it is only necessary
to compare the instantaneous utility ﬂows.34 We can now calculate the reservation wage for
unemployed workers. Let us denote φi as the lowest acceptable wage offer for full-time work.
Since Vui = V1
ei(φi) = V0
ei(qi(φi)), the lowest acceptable wage offer for part-time work is then
34In the more general case, this indifference condition would depend upon the distributions of wage offers.3.B. Identiﬁcation 136
qi(φi). We can therefore write equation 3.24 as:
ρiVui = b − Tu
i + λ0
ui
  w0
qi(φi)
(V0
ei(w) − Vui)dF0(w) + λ1
ui
  w1
φi
(V1
ei(w) − Vui)dF1(w)
= b − Tu
i + λ0
ui
  w0
qi(φi)
F0(w)dV0
ei(w) + λ1
ui
  w1
φi
F1(w)dV1
ei(w).
Substituting our expressions for V0
ei
′(w) and V1
ei
′(w) from equation 3.27 and equation 3.26 in
to the above:
ρiVui = b − Tu
i + λ0
ui
  w0
qi(φi)
h0(1 − T0
i
′(wh0))F0(w)
δi + ρi + λ0
eiF0(w) + λ1
eiF1(q−1
i (w))
dw
+ λ1
ui
  w1
φi
h1(1− T1
i
′(wh1))F1(w)
δi + ρi + λ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
eiF1(w)
dw.
By deﬁnition of the reservation wage we can set the above equal to ρiV1
ei(φi) (from equation
3.25) to obtain the following implicit equation deﬁning φi in terms of the structural parameters
of our model:
φih1 − T1
i (φih1) − C1
i = b − Tu
i + (λ0
ui − λ0
ei)
  w0
qi(φi)
h0(1 − T0
i
′(wh0))F0(w)
δi + ρi + λ0
eiF0(w) + λ1
eiF1(q−1
i (w))
dw
+ (λ1
ui − λ1
ei)
  w1
φi
h1(1− T1
i
′(wh1))F1(w)
δi + ρi + λ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + λ1
eiF1(w)
dw
dividing both the numerator and denominator of the integral terms by δi, and performing a
simple change of variable, we then obtain the simpliﬁed expression presented in equation 3.2
in the main text.
3.B Identiﬁcation
In Section 3.4.2 we discussed the identiﬁcation of our model, and we now illustrate these ideas
more formally. Here we set out to show that conditional on the set of transitional parameters,
the observed distributions of part-time and full-time wages, together with the distributions
of wages accepted by the unemployed are sufﬁcient to separately identify the wage offer
and reservation wage distributions. Once these are known, the structure of the model then
permits identiﬁcation of the opportunity cost and productivity distributions. In what follows,
we let GU
1i(w) and GU
0i(w) denote the respective cumulative distribution functions of wages
ﬁrst accepted by type i unemployed workers in full-time and part-time jobs. Since individuals
will accept any wage offer that is at least as high as their reservation wage, GU
1i(w) will be
given by:
GU
1i(w) =
  w
−∞
Pr(W1 < w|W1 > x)dAui(x) =
  w
−∞
F1(w) − F1(x)
F1(x)
dAui(x)
= Aui(w) − F1(w)
   w
w
dAui(x)
F1(x)
+ Aui(w)
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similarly the fraction of part-time jobs accepted that pay no more than qi(w) can be shown to
be given by:
GU
0i(qi(w)) = Aui(w) − F0(qi(w))
   w
w
dAui(x)
F0(qi(x))
+ Aui(w)
 
.
If we combine the above two expressions with the respective density functions of accepted
wages, gU
hi(w) ≡ GU
hi
′(w) for h ∈ {0,1}, we can write:
Aui(w; F0) = GU
0i(qi(w)) +
F0(qi(w))gU
0i(qi(w))
f0(qi(w))
(3.28)
Aui(w; F1) = GU
1i(w) +
F1(w)gU
1i(w)
f1(w)
(3.29)
which therefore demonstrates that the distribution of reservation wages amongst the unem-
ployed on support [wi,wi] is identiﬁed given knowledge of the wage offer functions F0 and
F1.35 Furthermore, the requirement that Aui(w; F1) = Aui(w; F0) allows us to identify the work
cost parameter C1
i .
Substituting equations 3.28 and 3.29 into equations 3.7 and 3.8 from the main text, we can
eliminate the unobserved reservation wage distribution to obtain the following differential
equations governing the evolution of the two wage offer distributions:
F′
1(w) =
m1ig1i(w)
 
1 + κ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + κ1
eiF1(w)
 
− uigU
1i(w)κ1
uiF1(w)
κ1
uiuiGU
1i(w) + κ1
ei (m0iG0i(qi(w)) + m1iG1i(w))
(3.30)
F′
0(qi(w)) =
m0ig0i(qi(w))
 
1 + κ0
eiF0(qi(w)) + κ1
eiF1(w)
 
− uigU
0i(qi(w))κ0
uiF0(qi(w))
κ0
uiuiGU
0i(qi(w)) + κ0
ei (m0iG0i(qi(w)) + m1iG1i(w))
. (3.31)
Equations 3.30 and 3.31 deﬁne a system of differential equations, which together with the
initial conditions F1(wi) = 0 and F0(qi(wi)) = 0, establishes non-parametric identiﬁcation of
both wage offer functions conditional on the set of transitional parameters. Identiﬁcation of
the underlying opportunity cost distribution and the productivity distributions then follows
as described in Section 3.4.3.
3.C Notation Summary
Indexing
i ∈ I individual observed type
h ∈ {0,1} hours of work
j ∈ {u,e} employment state
w wages
p ﬁrm productivity
v job vacancies
b unobserved utility ﬂow for unemployed workers
35Recall from Section 3.3.3 that wi ≡ min{w1,q−1
i (w0)} and wi ≡ max{w1,q−1
i (w0)}.3.C. Notation Summary 138
Workers
ni fraction of type i workers
ρi worker discount rate
Ch
i additive dis-utility ﬂow of working h hours
sh
ji exogenous worker search intensity
φi(b) full-time work reservation wage
qi(w) part-time work indifference wage
Hi(b) cumulative distribution of unobserved utility ﬂow b
Ai(w) cumulative distribution of reservation wages
Aui(w) cumulative distribution of reservation wages amongst unemployed
Aei(w) cumulative distribution of reservation wages amongst employed
Transitional Parameters
λh
ji job arrival rates
δi job destruction rate
κh
ji deﬁned as λh
ji/δi
Employment States
ui unemployment rate
m0i part-time work rate
m1i full-time work rate
Taxes
Th
i (wh) net taxes at hours h and earnings wh
Th
i
′(wh) marginal tax rate at hours h and earnings wh
Tu
i net taxes when unemployed
Wage Distributions
Fh(w) distribution of wage offers
Fh(w) deﬁned as 1− Fh(w)
Ghi(w) cumulative distribution of wages amongst employed
ghi(w) density of wages amongst employed
[wh,wh] support of wage distributions
wi deﬁned as min{w1,q−1
i (w0)}
wi deﬁned as max{w1,q−1
i (w0)}3.C. Notation Summary 139
Firms
Γh(p) cumulative distribution of ﬁrm productivity
γh(p) density of ﬁrm productivity
[p
h, ph] support of ﬁrm productivity
Kh(p) optimal wage policy
vh(p) optimal recruiting policy
c(p,v) vacancy ﬂow cost
lhi(w,v) steady state employment of worker i
Lh(w,v) total steady state employment: ∑i nilhi(w)
lhi(w) deﬁned such that lhi(w,v) = lhi(w)v/Vh
Lh(w) deﬁned as ∑i nilhi(w)
π(p,v) steady state proﬁt ﬂow: (p − w)hhLh(w)
Matching Technology
Vh aggregate stock of job vacancies
Sh total search intensity
Mh(Sh,Vh) aggregate matching function
θh matching function elasticity
Further Notation from Appendix
Vui value of unemployment
Vh
ei(w) value of employment
GU
hi(w) cumulative distribution of wages accepted by unemployed
gU
hi(w) density of wages accepted by unemployedAppendix A
FORTAX
A.1 Introduction to FORTAX
The FORTAX project is centered around the development of the FORTAX library, a micro-
simulation tax library programmed in Fortran by Andrew Shephard, with the UK system
implementation programmed by Andrew Shephard and Jonathan Shaw. It provides detailed
representations of UK tax and transfer systems over time (currently covering the period 1991–
2009). The library is efﬁcient and ﬂexible, and is ideally suited to applications where accurate
budget sets or components of income need to be calculated repeatedly. The estimation and
simulation of labour supply models are therefore natural candidates for the use of the FOR-
TAX library. It has been used extensively in Chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis, and in on-going
work by Blundell et al. (2009). Other programs that are part of the FORTAX project, including
FORTAX for Stata (which provides easy access to the library from within Stata), the FORTAX
Calculator (which provides an intuitive graphical environment for calculating and comparing
incomes and budget constraints), and FORTAX Online (an interactive web-based version of
the calculator), all use the FORTAX library. FORTAX is freely available and is released under
the GNU General Public License version 3 (GPLv3). This document provides a guide to using
and developing the FORTAX library, and it should be cited in research that uses FORTAX in
any form. It assumes familiarity with the Fortran programming language and the Fortran
pre-processor (FPP).
A.2 Overview of the FORTAX Library
The FORTAX library contains a number of modules deﬁned within the following ﬁles:
1. fortax type.f90 deﬁnes the main derived types that describe families, the tax sys-
tem, and the information returned by the calculation routines.
2. fortax calc.f90 is the main calculation module. It calculates various measures and
components of income based upon its interpretation of the tax system.
3. fortax prices.f90 provides access to various price uprating routines and date utili-
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4. fortax read.f90 reads ﬁles which describe the tax system into memory.
5. fortax write.f90 writes ﬁles which describe the tax system in the native FORTAX
ﬁle format.
6. fortax util.f90 provides a number of useful support routines and conversion utili-
ties that are used in various parts of FORTAX.
7. fortax kinks.f90 calculates piecewise linear schedules for net-income (or any other
component of income), varying either earnings or hours of work.
8. fortax extra.f90 provides additional functionality by operating on the tax system.
It is speciﬁc to the particular system implementation.
A.2.1 Additional Files
The module contained in fortax realtype.f90 deﬁnes real data types used in FORTAX,
and is used in all the other modules. The tax system read/write capabilities of FORTAX
in fortax read.f90 and fortax write.f90 make use of code from the xml-fortran
project,1 and we do not document them here. The relevant xml-fortran source ﬁles
required by the FORTAX library are read xml prims.f90, write xml prims.f90,
and xmlparse.f90, together with a small number of included ﬁles in the directory
‘includes/xml’. Additionally, the ﬁles xmlfortax t.f90 and xmltaxben t.f90 pro-
vide the template that deﬁnes the ﬁle structure for both TAXBEN and FORTAX system ﬁles,
and these have been generated using programs from the xml-fortran project. Further-
more, a large number of “include” ﬁles are located in the subdirectories ‘includes’ and
‘includes/system’. These are used in conjunction with the Fortran pre-processor (FPP),
and we discuss these in Section A.4.
A.3 FORTAX Source Code
A.3.1 fortax type.f90
The module fortax type deﬁnes the main derived type structures required by FORTAX
and provides various initialization routines. There are three derived types that are of primary
interest here and are used extensively in other modules:
1. fam t deﬁnes the family type structure, containing information on demographic char-
acteristics, earnings, hours of work, and other information. Anything that can affect the
taxes and transfer payments of a family is deﬁned in here.
2. sys t deﬁnes the tax system structure which families of type fam t face. It describes
all the parameters which are interpreted within fortax calc.f90.
1Available to download from http://xml-fortran.sourceforge.net/.A.3. FORTAX Source Code 142
3. net t deﬁnes the information returned following calls to the main calculation routines
within fortax calc.f90. It contains measures of net income, together with various
tax amounts and other components of income.
Note that none of these types are deﬁned “directly” within this module, but are rather
deﬁned through the use of include ﬁles together with preprocessor commands. This is dis-
cussed further in Section A.4. The type fam t is implicitly deﬁned by the contents of the ﬁles
‘includes/fam t.inc’ which is responsible for deﬁning all relevant family characteristics,
and ‘includes/famad t.inc’ which deﬁnes relevant adult level characteristics. Extend-
ing the family structure then just requires that appropriate entries are made to fam t.inc
and/or famad t.inc. Any changes to these ﬁles will be recognized and fully reﬂected in
the entire FORTAX library when compiled. The same applies for type net t which is de-
ﬁned in the ﬁles ‘includes/nettu t.inc’ and ‘includes/netad t.inc’ (respectively
reﬂecting the measures of incomes calculated at the level of the tax unit and individual). Any
additional item added to these include ﬁles will be accessible whenever any variable of type
net t is.
The deﬁnition of the entire tax and transfer system through type sys t is slightly more
complicated than that described above, as there is nested use of the preprocessor. This in-
cludes the ﬁle ‘includes/system/syslist.inc’ which tells it about the main compo-
nents of the tax and transfer system (in the UK context, these would include income support,
income tax, national insurance, and others). The parameters within a given part of the system
are then deﬁned within the relevant include ﬁle (incsup.inc, inctax.inc, natins.inc,
etc.) which are references within syslist.inc. This allows additional parameters, or en-
tirely new parts of a tax system, to be introduced easily. Once such a parameter has been
deﬁned in the relevant ﬁles, it is then only necessary to provide the corresponding code in
the main calculation module to interpret these parameters. An implication of this is that it
is straightforward to extend FORTAX to implement the tax systems of other countries, or
indeed, completely hypothetical systems.
Finally, note that the maximum number of children that information can be stored for
is determined by the integer parameter maxkids. By default this is equal to 10, but it can
easily be changed at compile time by appropriately deﬁning the macro maxkids . We now
describe the functions and subroutines of this module.
fam init will initialize the family variable fam of type fam t, setting logical variables to
.false., integer variables to 0, and real(dp) variables to 0.0 dp.2 If these initializations
are not appropriate, then they should be coded here explicitly. Current exceptions to this de-
fault initializations are: ad(1)%age = 25 (single adult, aged 25), tenure = 1 (own prop-
erty outright), region = 1 (standard region, North East), ctband = 4 (council tax band
2Note that dp is deﬁned within fortax realtype.f90.A.3. FORTAX Source Code 143
D), banddratio = 1.0 dp (average band amount), and intdate = 19900101 (interview
date, 1st September 1990).
elemental subroutine fam_init(fam)
type(fam_t), intent(inout) :: fam
end subroutine
fam gen will return the variable fam of type fam t, setting any characteristics to the values
that are speciﬁed. It will ﬁrst call fam init so that any parameters that are not explicitly
referenced will be given their default values. If optional correct is equal to .false. then
it will not attempt any consistency checks. Otherwise, it will ensure that any implicit de-
pendencies between the parameters are satisﬁed (for example, if second adult information is
passed it will set fam%couple=.true. even if couple is not explicitly speciﬁed). Note that
adult information should be passed by adding a sufﬁx 1 or 2 for the respective adult number,
e.g. fam = fam gen(age1=25,age2=30).
pure function fam_gen(...,correct)
type(fam_t) :: fam_gen
logical, optional :: correct
end function
fam desc will display the information contained in the family variable fam of type fam t. If
the optional ﬁlename fname is speciﬁed then it will write this information to the ﬁle fname,
otherwise it will be outputted to the default unit.
subroutine fam_desc(fam,fname)
use fortax_util, only : getunit, inttostr, fortaxerror
use, intrinsic :: iso_fortran_env
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
character(len=*), optional :: fname
end subroutine
net init will initialize the variable net of derived type net t. It will initialize logical
variables to .false., integer variables to 0, and real(dp) variables to 0.0 dp. The structure
net t should be suitably deﬁned so that these make sense as default values.
elemental subroutine net_init(net)
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine
sys init will initialize the system variable sys of derived type sys t. It will initialize
logical variables to .false., integer variables to 0, and real(dp) variables to 0.0 dp. The
structure sys t should be suitably deﬁned so that these make sense as default values.
subroutine sys_init(sys)
type(sys_t), intent(inout) :: sys
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sys saveF90 will save the system variable sys of derived type sys t as Fortran source code
with ﬁle name fname. If fname is not speciﬁed, then the output will be directed to the default
output unit.
subroutine sys_saveF90(sys,fname)
use fortax_util, only : getUnit, fortaxError
use, intrinsic :: iso_fortran_env
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
character(*), intent(in), optional :: fname
end subroutine
This output of this subroutine allows the systems to be “hard-coded”, rather than
reading in system ﬁles. The output ﬁle assumes the system name is sys and dp from
fortax realtype must be visible. Sample output is displayed below.
Extract from sys saveF90 output
! .f90 FORTAX system; generated using sys_saveF90
call sys_init(sys) !deallocates arrays and sets values to default
!inctax
sys%inctax%numbands=2
sys%inctax%pa=63.3653846153846_dp
sys%inctax%mma=33.0769230769231_dp
sys%inctax%ctc=0.000000000000000E+000_dp
...
fam saveF90 will save the family variable fam of derived type fam t as Fortran source code
with ﬁle name fname. If fname is not speciﬁed, then the output will be directed to the
default output unit. The output ﬁle assumes the family variable name is fam and dp from
fortax realtype must be visible. Sample output follows the interface.
subroutine sys_saveF90(sys,fname)
use fortax_util, only : getUnit, fortaxError
use, intrinsic :: iso_fortran_env
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
character(*), intent(in), optional :: fname
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Extract from fam saveF90 output
! .f90 FORTAX family; generated using fam_saveF90
call fam_init(fam) !deallocates arrays and sets values to default
!family
fam%couple=.true.
fam%married=.false.
fam%ccexp=40.000000000000000E+000_dp
fam%maint=10.000000000000000E+000_dp
fam%nkids=2
...
A.3.2 fortax prices.f90
The module fortax prices provides date and price uprating capabilities. It is useful for
manipulating tax systems, and (when appropriate) determining which tax system was oper-
ational for given family types based upon the value of fam%intdate. The module deﬁnes
some variables and a type structure that are private to fortax prices. For purposes of price
uprating it stores the arrays rpidate and rpiindex that deﬁne YYYYMMDD dates and the
associated price index. For the purposes of accessing systems, it deﬁnes the type sysindex t
which provides easy look up capabilities for system ﬁles.
module fortax_prices
integer, allocatable :: rpidate(:)
real(dp), allocatable :: rpiindex(:)
type sysindex_t
logical :: indexinit = .false.
integer, allocatable :: date0(:), date1(:)
character(255), allocatable :: fname(:)
end type
contains
end module
loadindex loads a price index ﬁle saved as a comma separated values (CSV) ﬁle. If
filename is not speciﬁed it defaults to ‘prices/rpi.csv’. Note this default path is
relative to the executable, and not from where the FORTAX library is actually compiled. If
no price uprating is to be performed through FORTAX, then it is not necessary for such a
ﬁle to be present. Otherwise, the ﬁrst record of this ﬁle should contain the number of date
entries in this ﬁle. It then proceeds in the form date,index where date is an integer of the form
YYYYMMDD and where index is a double precision number representing the respective price
index level. The list should be sorted by the YYYYMMDD date (in ascending order), and
FORTAX does not attempt any consistency checks. An example is provided in the following
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Extract from prices/rpi.csv
261,
19870101,100.0
19870201,100.4
19870301,100.6
19870401,101.8
19870501,101.9
...
Subroutine loadindex then allocates an integer array rpidate(:) and a real(dp) array
rpiindex(:) which are private to fortax prices, and copies this information to them.
subroutine loadindex(filename)
fortax_util, only : getunit
character(len=*), intent(in), optional :: filename
end subroutine
getindex returns the price index associated with the supplied YYYYMMDD date. It accesses
data from rpidate(:) and rpiindex(:) and therefore requires that loadindex() is
called before.
real(dp) elemental function getindex(date)
integer, intent(in) :: date
end function
upratefactor uprates prices from date0 to date1 prices (both in YYYYMMDD format). It
calls the function getindex and therefore requires that loadindex() has previously been
called.
real(dp) elemental function upratefactor(date0,date1)
integer, intent(in) :: date0, date1
end function
upratesys will uprate the prices in the system ﬁle sys by the uprating factor factor. If
present, it will replace the date in sys%desc%prices with newdate. This makes use of
preprocessor commands to automatically perform uprating depending on the original var-
type description of the tax system elements (see Section A.4). It currently uprates anything
declared as being either amount or minamount through the relevant tax system include ﬁles.
subroutine upratesys(sys,factor,newdate)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
use fortax_util, only : fortaxwarn
type(sys_t), intent(inout) :: sys
real(dp), intent(in) :: factor
integer, intent(in), optional :: newdate
end subroutine
checkdate returns .true. or .false. depending on whether date is a valid YYYYM-
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logical pure function checkdate(date)
integer, intent(in) :: date
end function
freesysindexdeallocates the data structures stored in sysindex%date0,sysindex%date1,
sysindex%fname, and sets sysindex%indexinit to .false. It may be called if the index
ﬁles are no longer needed by the program calling the FORTAX library.
subroutine freesysindex(sysindex)
type(sysindex_t), intent(inout) :: sysindex
end subroutine
loadsysindex will return sysindex of type sysindex t using the information con-
tained within sysindexfile. If sysindexfile is not speciﬁed it will default to the ﬁle
‘systems/sysindex.csv’. The ﬁrst line of the CSV ﬁle sysindexfile should equal the
number of records in the ﬁle. Subsequent lines should be of the form date0,date1,sysname.
Both date0 and date1 should be of the form YYYYMMDD, and refer to the start (date0) and
end (date1) dates that the system sysname operated from. Note that sysname should not con-
tain either a ﬁle path or ﬁle extension, as these will be determined by systemformat when
getsysindex is called. An example is provided below.
Extract from systems/sysindex.csv
28
19900401,19910331,April90
19910401,19920331,April91
19920401,19930331,April92
19930401,19940331,April93
19940401,19950331,April94
...
subroutine loadsysindex(sysindex,sysindexfile)
type(sysindex_t), intent(out) :: sysindex
character(len=*), intent(in), optional :: sysindexfile
end subroutine
getsysindex returns information which allows the user to easily identify which sys-
tem operated at any given YYYYMMDD date as speciﬁed in sysindex. systemformat
refers to the ﬁle format of the required system ﬁle. As well as its native format
(systemformat=’fortax’), FORTAX can also read the undocumented system ﬁles used
by the IFS tax and beneﬁt model, TAXBEN (systemformat=’taxben’), although not all
system parameters may be understood if not reﬂected in the FORTAX code. The use of the
native FORTAX format is strongly recommended. It returns the relative ﬁle path for this
system ﬁle in sysfilepath, and the sequence number within sysindex as sysnum. This
subroutine calls checkdate to verify the consistency of date before searching for the relevant
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subroutine getsysindex(sysindex,date,systemformat, sysfilepath,sysnum)
use fortax_util, only : lower
type(sysindex_t), intent(in) :: sysindex
integer, intent(in) :: date
character(len=*), intent(in) :: systemformat
character(255), intent(out) :: sysfilepath
integer, intent(out) :: sysnum
end subroutine
A.3.3 fortax read.f90
readtaxparams reads tax parameters from systemfile into a sys t type structure sys.
systemformat refers to the ﬁle format of the system ﬁle to be loaded. It can currently be
either equal to ‘fortax’ for the native FORTAX ﬁle format (recommended) or ‘taxben’ for
the undocumented system ﬁles used in the IFS tax and beneﬁt model, TAXBEN. If optional
integer prices is speciﬁed, it will set sys%desc%prices to equal this value (which should
be speciﬁed as YYYYMMDD). If sysfix is set to .true. then it will call taxbensysfix
if systemformat is ‘taxben’, otherwise it is ignored. If the optional YYYYMMDD system
date is speciﬁed then taxbensysfix will also apply further corrections to TAXBEN system
ﬁles.
For non-native formats it is necessary to interpret any parameter value into the equivalent
element in the sys t structure. The reading code for the native FORTAX format is completely
self-maintaining and does not need to be changed even if further elements (or completely new
structures) are added to tax system deﬁnition in sys t. This is performed through the use of
pre-processing. If an element deﬁned in sys t is not present in the system ﬁle, then they will
default to .false. if a logical variable, 0 if an integer, and 0.0 dp if real(dp). The FORTAX
system ﬁles are XML documents (described in Section A.6), and call XML reading routines to
provide the relevant reading capabilities. The FORTAX library makes use of code from the
xml-fortran project (see Section A.2.1).
subroutine readtaxparams(sys,systemfile,systemformat, prices,sysfix,sysdate)
use xml_data_xmltaxben_t, only : read_xml_file_xmltaxben_t, object, &
namedFields_t, field_t
use xml_data_xmlfortax_t, only : read_xml_file_xmlfortax_t, system
use fortax_util, only : StrToDouble, StrToInt, StrToLogical, lower
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, sys_init
type(sys_t), intent(out) :: sys
character(len=*), intent(in) :: systemfile
character(len=*), intent(in) :: systemformat
integer, optional, intent(in) :: prices
logical, optional, intent(in) :: sysfix
integer, optional, intent(in) :: sysdate
end subroutine
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ﬁles. In particular, it sets values for some necessary parameters that are not contained
within the relevant TAXBEN system ﬁle, and so are not set when reading. It is called by
readTaxParams if sysfix=.true..
subroutine taxbensysfix(sys,sysdate)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
type(sys_t), intent(inout) :: sys
integer, intent(in), optional :: sysdate
end subroutine
Additional subroutines are provided through fortax read assign, which is used when
reading the native FORTAX system ﬁles. They are used in the subroutine readtaxparams
in conjunction with various preprocessor commands, and are private to the module
fortax read.
interface fortax_read_assign
module procedure assign_integer
module procedure assign_logical
module procedure assign_double
module procedure assign_integer_array
module procedure assign_logical_array
module procedure assign_double_array
end interface fortax_read_assign
A.3.4 fortax write.f90
fortaxwrite writes the system ﬁle sys to disk with ﬁle name fname in the native FOR-
TAX ﬁle format (see the description in Section A.6). This writing code is completely self-
maintaining and does not need to be changed even if further elements (or completely new
structures) are added to tax and transfer system deﬁnition in sys t. This is performed
through the use of pre-processing.
subroutine fortaxwrite(sys,fname)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
use xmlparse, only : xml_parse, xml_open, xml_close
character(len=*), intent(in) :: fname
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
end subroutine
fortaxprint outputs a summary of the tax system sys to the default output unit if fname
is not speciﬁed. Otherwise, this output summary will be written to disk with the ﬁle name
fname. Note that the ﬁle it saves is not the FORTAX ﬁle format, but is rather outputted in a
format that is easy to read. This printing code is completely self-maintaining and does not
need to be changed even if further elements (or completely new structures) are added to tax
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subroutine fortaxprint(sys,fname)
use, intrinsic :: iso_fortran_env
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
use fortax_util, only : upper, getunit
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
character(len=*), intent(in), optional :: fname
end subroutine
Additional subroutines are provided through ftxmlwrite and ftprint, and are used when
calling the subroutines fortaxwrite and ftprint respectively. They are used in conjunc-
tion with pre-processor commands and are private to fortax write.
interface ftxmlwrite
module procedure xml_write_finteger
module procedure xml_write_fdouble
module procedure xml_write_flogical
module procedure xml_write_fintegerarray
module procedure xml_write_fdoublearray
module procedure xml_write_flogicalarray
end interface
interface ftprint
module procedure ftprint_finteger
module procedure ftprint_fdouble
module procedure ftprint_flogical
module procedure ftprint_fintegerarray
module procedure ftprint_fdoublearray
module procedure ftprint_flogicalarray
end interface
A.3.5 fortax calc.f90
The module fortax calc performs the main tax and transfer calculations. All functions and
subroutines in this module should be declared as pure and should not alter either the tax
system variable sys or the family variable fam. The only public subroutine is calcnetinc.
This returns net-income net of type net t given a family fam of type fam t, and tax system
sys of type sys t. It calls a large number of other subroutines which correspond to the
various parts of the tax and transfer system. These are discussed in Section A.7 when we
describe the implementation of the UK system.
pure subroutine CalcNetInc(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(out) :: net
end subroutine
Since FORTAX may be used in applications where incomes are only required to be calculated
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optimizations to be performed. Currently, it deﬁnes the macros famcouple , fammarried
and famkids which default to fam%couple, fam%married and fam%nkids>0 respec-
tively. If FORTAX is only required to calculate net incomes for lone parents, say, then these
can be replaced with .false., .false. and .true. which will remove the need for these
expressions to be evaluated at run-time. If the calculation routines are extended (or new ones
introduced), then they should use these macro deﬁnitions rather than referring to the derived
family type directly.
A.3.6 fortax kinks.f90
The module fortax kinks provides support programs that have been integrated into the
main FORTAX library due to their general applicability and usefulness. These particular sup-
port programs produce piecewise linear schedules, varying either earnings (for ﬁxed hours)
or hours (for a ﬁxed hourly wage) by repeatedly calling the main calculation routines and
using a bisection method to identify the location of any marginal rate changes or discontinu-
ities. This can be performed on any component with the tax system structure of type sys t.
The module deﬁnes integer parameter maxkinks which is equal to the maximum number
of “kink” points the program will consider (by default this is equal to 200, but it can be set
at compile time by appropriately deﬁning the macro maxkids ), as well as a type structure
bcout t which stores the relevant summary information for the piecewise linear schedule:
the actual number of kink points kinks num, together with the hours kinks hrs, earnings
kinks earn, tax component amount kinks net, and marginal rate of this tax component
kinks mtr. Both maxkinks and bcout t are publicly visible.
module fortax_kinks
# ifndef _maxkinks_
integer, parameter :: maxkinks = 200
# else
integer, parameter :: maxkinks = _maxkinks_
# endif /* _maxkinks_ */
# undef _maxkinks_
type :: bcout_t
integer :: kinks_num
real(dp), dimension(maxkinks) :: kinks_hrs, kinks_earn, kinks_net, kinks_mtr
end type bcout_t
contains
end module
kinkshours calculates a piecewise linear schedule under the tax system sys for a family
fam of type fam t by varying hours of work from hours1 to hours2 with a ﬁxed hourly
wage wage. In the case of a couple, you may specify which adult this is to be applied to by
setting ad=1 or ad=2. The piecewise linear schedule of type budcon t is stored in bcout. By
default, it will output total family net income net%tu%dispinc. It can output different mea-
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net t%ad(1), and net t%ad(2)) and taxout which determines the income measure in
net t. Note that if either taxout or taxlevel is speciﬁed, then both must be speciﬁed.
taxout is an array, which allows the user to combine income measures which are summed
by default. The pre-ﬁx operators + and - can be included in taxout to explictly control any
addition or subtraction of income measures. For example, taxout=(/’+a’,’-b’/) will
produce a piecewise linear constraint for the income measure a-b. Optional logical correct
performs some rounding to the ﬁnal schedule, while logical verbose=.true. prints the
schedule to the default unit. Note that any positive (negative) discontinuities in the schedule
will have marginal rates reported as 9.99999 dp (-9.99999 dp).
subroutine kinkshours(sys,fam,ad,wage,hours1,hours2,bcout, &
taxlevel,taxout,correct,verbose)
use fortax_type, only : fam_t, sys_t, net_t
use fortax_util, only : lower, inttostr, fortaxerror
use fortax_calc, only : calcnetinc
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
integer, intent(in) :: ad
real(dp), intent(in) :: wage
real(dp), intent(in) :: hours1, hours2
type(bcout_t), intent(out) :: bcout
character(len=*), intent(in), optional :: taxlevel
character(len=*), intent(in), optional :: taxout(:)
logical, intent(in), optional :: correct
logical, intent(in), optional :: verbose
end subroutine
kinksearn calculates a piecewise linear schedule under the tax system sys for a family fam
of type fam t by varying earnings from earn1 to earn2 with ﬁxed hours of work hours.
The calling syntax is otherwise identical to kinkshours as detailed above.
subroutine kinksearn(sys,fam,ad,hours,earn1,earn2,bcout, &
taxlevel,taxout,correct,verbose)
use fortax_type, only : fam_t, sys_t, net_t
use fortax_util, only : lower, inttostr
use fortax_calc, only : calcnetinc
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
integer, intent(in) :: ad
real(dp), intent(in) :: hours
real(dp), intent(in) :: earn1, earn2
type(bcout_t), intent(out) :: bcout
character(len=*), intent(in), optional :: taxlevel
character(len=*), intent(in), optional :: taxout(:)
logical, intent(in), optional :: correct
logical, intent(in), optional :: verbose
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Note: A (double precision) parameter maxstep is deﬁned in both of the module subrou-
tines kinksearn and kinkshours. This controls the initial hours/earnings steps used to
identify changes in marginal rates prior to bisection methods being used. Higher values will
typically require fewer calls to the main calculation routine (although sufﬁciently values will
likely require more calls), but may result in the respective routines failing to detect certain
kink points. The default parameters values appear to work well with UK tax systems, but
they can be reduced if the routine fails to identify all the kinks.
evalKinksHours uses the piecewise linear budget constraint structure bcout as calculated
in kinkshours to evaluate the respective income measure at hours hours. It returns the
earnings earn, income measure net and marginal tax rate mtr that are associated with this
hours level. If optional iin is not speciﬁed then it will use bisection to search through bcout
to identify the relevant linear section. Otherwise, an incremental search will be performed
from index iin. If optional iout is speciﬁed, the index of the relevant linear section for hours
hours will be returned. If hours is out-of-range, linear extrapolation will be performed.
pure subroutine evalKinksHours(bcout,hours,earn,net,mtr,iin,iout)
type(bcout_t), intent(in) :: bcout
real(dp), intent(in) :: hours
real(dp), intent(out) :: earn,net,mtr
integer, intent(in), optional :: iin
integer, intent(out), optional :: iout
end subroutine
evalKinksEarn uses the piecewise linear budget constraint structure bcout as calculated in
kinksEarn to evaluate the respective income measure at earnings earn. The calling syntax
is as in evalKinksHours.
pure subroutine evalKinksEarn(bcout,earn,hours,net,mtr,iin,iout)
type(bcout_t), intent(in) :: bcout
real(dp), intent(in) :: earn
real(dp), intent(out) :: hours,net,mtr
integer, intent(in), optional :: iin
integer, intent(out), optional :: iout
end subroutine
A.3.7 fortax extra.f90
setminamount will set any element of the tax system sys whose vartype is speciﬁed as
minamt (in the relevant include ﬁle – see Section A.4) to equal minamt. It makes use of the
Fortran pre-processor.
subroutine setminamount(sys,minamt)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
type(sys_t), intent(inout) :: sys
real(dp), intent(in) :: minamt
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abolishnifee will modify the tax system sys so that any national insurance entry fee
(whereby national insurance is paid on total earnings once a threshold is reached) is abolished.
This therefore removes a discontinuity in the budget constraint.
subroutine abolishnifee(sys)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
use fortax_util, only : fortaxwarn
type(sys_t), intent(inout) :: sys
end subroutine
fsminappamt will modify the tax system sys so that the value of free school meals is in-
cluded in the applicable amount for income support calculations when taper=.true.. This
therefore removes a discontinuity in the budget constraint, as entitlement to free school
meals is lost when income support is completely tapered away. Default behaviour is ob-
tained when when taper=.false.. An alternative to calling this subroutine is to simply set
sys%extra%fsminappamt to be either .true. or .false..
subroutine fsminappamt(sys,inappamt)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
type(sys_t), intent(inout) :: sys
logical, intent(in) :: inappamt
end subroutine
tapermatgrant will modify the tax system sys so that the value of maternity grant is in-
cluded in the applicable amount for income support calculations when taper=.true.. This
therefore removes a discontinuity in the budget constraint, as entitlement to maternity grant
is lost when income support is completely tapered away. Furthermore, the value of mater-
nity grant is also tapered away with tax credit entitlement when taper=.true.. Default
behaviour is obtained when when taper=.false.. An alternative to calling this subroutine
is to set sys%extra%matgrant to be either .true. or .false..
subroutine tapermatgrant(sys,taper)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
type(sys_t), intent(inout) :: sys
logical, intent(in) :: taper
end subroutine
A.3.8 fortax util.f90
A number of support utilities are available in fortax util, as well as generic error han-
dling routines. Function inttostr returns the integer N as a variable length string. It uses
intToStrLen to calculate the required length.
pure function intToStr(N)
integer, intent(in) :: N
character(intToStrLen(N)) :: intToStr
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intToStrLen returns the length of string representing the integer N. It is called by
intToStr.
pure function intToStrLen(N)
integer, intent(in) :: N
integer :: intToStrLen
end function
strToDouble returns input string as a double precision number. It does not perform any
user input checks to verify whether string contains a valid numeric type.
pure function strToDouble(string)
character(len=*), intent(in) :: string
real(dp) :: strToDouble
end function
strToInt returns input string as an integer number. It does not perform any user input
checks to verify whether string contains a valid numeric type.
pure function strToInt(string)
character(len=*), intent(in) :: string
integer :: strToInt
end function
strToLogical returns input string as a logical data type. It interprets the string "0" to
be .false., and anything else to be .true..
pure function strToLogical(string)
character(*), intent(in) :: string
logical :: strToLogical
end function
lower returns a string of the same length as str with all characters converted to lower case.
This can be useful for case insensitive string comparisons.
pure function lower(str)
character(len=*), intent(in) :: str
character(len(str)) :: lower
end function
upper returns a string of the same length as str with all characters converted to upper case.
This can be useful for case insensitive string comparisons.
pure function upper(str)
character(len=*), intent(in) :: str
character(len(str)) :: upper
end function
compact modiﬁes the original string str, converting multiple spaces and tabs to single
spaces, deleting control characters and removing any initial spaces.
pure subroutine compact(str)
character(len=*), intent(inout) :: str
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trimZero modiﬁes the original string str by trimming any leading zeros. It does not per-
form any user input checks to verify whether string contains a valid numeric type.
pure subroutine trimZero(str)
character(len=*), intent(inout) :: str
end subroutine
getunit returns a free ﬁle unit number funit that can be used for ﬁle input and output. It
searches for free units from one above the standard output unit number to 99.
subroutine getunit(funit)
use, intrinsic :: iso_fortran_env
integer, intent(out) :: funit
end subroutine
fortaxError displays the error message errmsg and halts execution of the program. If
funit is speciﬁed it will output this error message to ﬁle unit funit. Otherwise, it will be
displayed in the default unit.
subroutine fortaxError(errmsg,funit)
character(len=*), intent(in) :: errmsg
integer, optional, intent(in) :: funit
end subroutine
fortaxWarn displays the warning message errmsg and then continues execution of the pro-
gram. If funit is speciﬁed it will output this warning message to ﬁle unit funit. Otherwise,
it will be displayed in the default unit.
subroutine fortaxWarn(errmsg,funit)
character(len=*), intent(in) :: warnmsg
integer, optional, intent(in) :: funit
end subroutine
A.4 Include Files and the Fortran Pre-processor
FORTAX makes extensive use of included source ﬁles, saved in the relative path ‘includes’,
which are then processed using the Fortran pre-processor (FPP). These allow the user to easily
modify parts of FORTAX, by extending and changing the main derived types, sys t, net t
and fam t. These are not written in Fortran. The role of the pre-processor is to interpret these
ﬁles into Fortran source code, and to do this differently depending on the context in which
these ﬁles are encountered.
All the main parts of the tax and transfer system (income tax, national in-
surance, child beneﬁt, income support, etc.) are deﬁned within the include ﬁle
‘includes/system/syslist.inc’. Whenever FORTAX is performing an operation on
the entire tax system it will make use of this include ﬁle to cycle through the structures. If a
new part is added to the tax system, then it should be reﬂected in this list. It is structured as
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Code extract from includes/system/syslist.inc
#undef _$typelist
#define _$typelist inctax
#include ’includes/system/inctax.inc’
#undef _$typelist
#define _$typelist natins
#include ’includes/system/natins.inc’
...
The include ﬁles which then deﬁne the various parts of the tax system (for example,
‘includes/system/inctax.inc’) begin with $header and end with $footer. These
allow speciﬁc operations to be performed when ﬁrst entering, and then exiting, a given in-
clude ﬁle. Parts of the tax system are then deﬁned in the form storagetype(varname,vartype)
when storagetype is either $integer, $double or $logical (corresponding to the For-
tran types integer, real(dp) and logical). When they are deﬁned in the form stor-
agetype(varname,vartype,vardim), then storagetype is either $integerarray, $doublearray
or $logicalarray. In both cases varname will refer to the internal variable name, whereas
vartype tells FORTAX something about what this variable represents in the tax system; for ex-
ample, it could be speciﬁed as a rate or amount. These speciﬁcations allow various operations,
such as price uprating which we discuss below, to be performed very efﬁciently and do not
require large data structures to be held in memory. When vardim is present it refers to the one
dimensional array size, either a valid storage size, or ‘:’ for an allocatable array. The main
contents of the ﬁle ‘includes/system/inctax.inc’ is shown below.
Code extract from includes/system/inctax.inc
...
_$header
_$integer(numbands,range)
_$double(pa,amount)
_$double(mma,amount)
_$double(ctc,amount)
_$double(ctcyng,amount)
_$double(mmarate,rate)
_$double(ctctaper,rate)
_$double(c4rebate,rate)
_$doublearray(bands,amount,:)
_$doublearray(rates,rate,:)
_$footer
...
A simple example of the use of preprocessing in FORTAX is illustrated by the subroutine
upratesys from the module fortax prices. Here, an uprating factor factor is passed
to the subroutine, and the subroutine deﬁnes parameters (which correspond to vartype as
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attempt to uprate these tax parameters by scaling by factor. In this case, uprating is only
performed if vartype is equal to amount or minamount.
Code extract from subroutine upratesys
subroutine upratesys(sys,factor,newdate)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t
use fortax_util, only : fortaxwarn
type(sys_t), intent(inout) :: sys
real(dp), intent(in) :: factor
integer, intent(in), optional :: newdate
logical, parameter :: null = .false.
logical, parameter :: range = .false.
logical, parameter :: scale = .false.
logical, parameter :: rate = .false.
logical, parameter :: amount = .true.
logical, parameter :: minamount = .true.
if (present(newdate)) sys%desc%prices = newdate
# include ’includes/fortax_uprate.inc’
end subroutine
The actual uprating is then performed by including and processing the ﬁle
‘includes/fortax uprate.inc’. The main body of this code is presented below.
Code extract from includes/fortax uprate.inc
...
#define _$logical(x,y) if (y) call fortaxwarn(’can’’t uprate logical ’//#x)
#define _$integer(x,y) if (y) sys%_$typelist%x = factor*sys%_$typelist%x
#define _$double(x,y) if (y) sys%_$typelist%x = factor*sys%_$typelist%x
#define _$logicalarray(x,y,z) if (y) call fortaxwarn(’can’’t uprate logicalarray
’//#x)
#define _$integerarray(x,y,z) if (y) sys%_$typelist%x = factor*sys%_$typelist%x
#define _$doublearray(x,y,z) if (y) sys%_$typelist%x = factor*sys%_$typelist%x
#define _$header
#define _$footer
#include ’includes/system/syslist.inc’
...
As fortax uprate.inc includes ‘includes/system/syslist.inc’, it is able
to operate on all the individual elements of the tax system deﬁned in type sys t. To
understand what this code does, note that before the ﬁle inctax.inc which appears
in syslist.inc is included, $typelist is deﬁned as inctax. Therefore, the line
$integer(numbands,range) from inctax.inc will be replaced with the line of For-
tran code if (.false.) sys%inctax%numbands=factor*sys%inctax%numbands,A.5. Compiling FORTAX 159
Table A.1: FORTAX ﬁle dependencies
File Depends
xmlparse
read xml prims xmlparse, <includes/xml>
write xml prims xmlparse
xml taxben t xmlparse, read xml prims
xml fortax t xmlparse, read xml prims, write xml prims
fortax realtype
fortax util fortax realtype
fortax type fortax realtype, includes/sys t.inc, includes/sys init.inc, includes/fam t.inc, in-
cludes/famad t.inc, includes/nettu t.inc, includes/netad t.inc, <includes/systems>
fortax calc fortax realtype, fortax type
fortax extra fortax realtype, fortax util, fortax type, includes/fortax minamt.inc, <includes/system>
fortax prices fortax realtype, fortax util, fortax type, includes/fortax uprate.inc, <includes/system>
fortax read xmltaxben t, xmlfortax t, fortax realtype, fortax util, fortax type, fortax calc, includes/for-
tax typeread.inc includes/fortax read.inc, <includes/system>
fortax write xmlparse, fortax realtype, fortax util, fortax type, includes/fortax write.inc, includes/for-
tax print.inc, <includes/system>
fortax kinks fortax realtype, fortax util, fortax type, fortax calc, includes/nettu t.inc, includes/netad t.inc
Notes: <includes/xml> and <includes/system> refer to the ﬁles contained within the respective ﬁle directories. File
extension is .f90 unless stated otherwise.
and will therefore do nothing. Moreover, because .false. is a known parameter
at compile time, an efﬁcient compiler would remove this statement if suitable opti-
mizations are enabled, so that no evaluation would be performed here. Similarly, the
line $integer(pa,amount) would be replaced with the line of code, if (.true.)
sys%inctax%pa=factor*sys%inctax%pa, in which case an operation would be per-
formed. Once again, compiler optimizations may remove the initial logical evaluation as this
is known at compile time.
A.5 Compiling FORTAX
A makeﬁle is provided to perform compilation. The provided makeﬁle assumes the use of
the Intel Fortran Compiler, although other compilers can be used by modifying the relevant
macro deﬁnitions. The ﬁle dependencies of FORTAX are shown in table A.1 and are reﬂected
in the provided makeﬁle. Microsoft Windows users using Microsoft Visual Studio with Intel
Visual Fortran integration may easily include these ﬁles in a project. It is generally preferable
to compile FORTAX as a library, and then link the library to your particular application.
A.6 FORTAX System File Format
FORTAX saves system ﬁles as XML documents. Note that if the tax system is extended
in any way, then this will automatically be recognized by FORTAX such that no changes
in the read/write routines will be required. An example portion of the system ﬁle is
shown below. Here basename corresponds to the main parts of the tax system as con-
tained in the ﬁle ‘include/system/syslist.inc’, while the individual name param-
eters correspond to the description contained in the respective include ﬁles (for example,
‘includes/system/inctax.inc’). The storagetypes $integer, $double, $logical,
$integerarray, $doublearray, and $logicalarray, are respectively referred to asA.7. Implementation of the UK Tax System 160
finteger, fdouble, flogical, fintegerarray, fdoublearray, and flogicalarray
in the system ﬁle.
Extract from example FORTAX system ﬁle
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<fortax>
<system basename="inctax">
<finteger name="numbands" value="3"/>
<fdouble name="pa" value="88.7500000000000"/>
<fdouble name="mma" value="0.000000000000000E+000"/>
<fdouble name="ctc" value="10.1730769230769"/>
<fdouble name="ctcyng" value="10.1730769230769"/>
<fdouble name="mmarate" value="0.100000000000000"/>
<fdouble name="ctctaper" value="6.666666666666667E-002"/>
<fdouble name="c4rebate" value="0.000000000000000E+000"/>
<fdoublearray name="bands" value="36.9230769230769 575.000000000000
19230.7692307692"></fdoublearray>
<fdoublearray name="rates" value="0.100000000000000 0.220000000000000
0.400000000000000"></fdoublearray>
</system>
<system basename="natins">
<finteger name="numrates" value="2"/>
...
</system>
....
</fortax>
A.7 Implementation of the UK Tax System
FORTAX currently models UK tax systems from April 1990 to April 2009. This section de-
scribes the implementation of the systems, and in doing so brieﬂy describes some of the main
features. It does not attempt to provide a detailed guide to how individual parts of the tax
and transfer system are calculated and how they interact. Recent surveys of the the UK tax
and transfer system are provided in Adam and Browne (2009) and O’Dea et al. (2007). Before
we proceed we note that the current implementation is incomplete. In particular it does not
currently model any disability related beneﬁts, or incomes for the non-working-age popu-
lation. It also ignores non-dependants and anything to do with capital and capital income.
Whether or not these are a limitation will depend upon the speciﬁc application of FORTAX.
We now describe the implementation. These are discussed in the order in which they
are modelled by FORTAX and so reﬂect the dependencies between parts of the UK tax and
transfer system. These routines are all called directly or indirectly from calcNetInc within
the fortax calc module. Typically these routines and functions require that the tax system
sys of type sys t and family structure fam of type fam t are passed to them and are not
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of type net t is also passed and is modiﬁed as calculations are performed (intent is set to
inout). Note that the subroutines and functions may refer to previously calculated elements
of net t.
A.7.1 National Insurance
National insurance contributions (NICs) are taxes paid by employees and employers on
earnings. Individuals who have made sufﬁcient contributions are entitled to certain (“con-
tributory”) transfer payments. It is necessary to calculate national insurance before in-
come tax because the rebate for Class 4 contributions between April 1985 and April 1995
reduces taxable income. The subroutine natIns calculates the NICs of adult i in fam-
ily fam. National insurance is deﬁned in sys%natins and stores class 1, 2 and 4 con-
tributions in net%ad(i)%natinsc1, net%ad(i)%natinsc2 and net%ad(i)%natinsc4.
The sum of these NICs components is then stored in net%ad(i)%natins. Note that
sys%natins%rates(1) acts as the “entry fee” (up to April 1999) if earnings exceed
sys%natins%bands(1).
pure subroutine natIns(sys,fam,net,i)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
integer, intent(in) :: i
end subroutine
A.7.2 Income Tax
Income tax operates through a system of allowances and bands of income. Each individual
has a personal allowance, which is deducted from total income before tax to give taxable
income. Age related personal allowances are ignored in our implementation because we
currently only consider working-age individuals. Before the amount of income tax payable
is calculated, subroutine tearn calculates taxable earnings for the tax unit. It subtracts the
income tax personal allowance from individual earnings, and where relevant also deducts a
rebate for class 4 NICs and pre-April 1994 deducts married couples allowance and additional
person allowance (more below). The relevant system parameters are deﬁned in sys%inctax.
Individual level taxable earnings are stored in net%ad(:)%taxable.
pure subroutine tearn(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine
Income tax for adult i is then calculated in incTax. The relevant system parameters are
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pure subroutine incTax(sys,net,i)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
integer, intent(in) :: i
end subroutine
Children’s tax credit was only available in two years, 2001/02 and 2002/03, and reduced
the tax liability of those with children by a ﬂat-rate amount (tapered away for higher-rate
taxpayers). The amount of tax after children’s tax credit is calculated by the subroutine
taxAfterCTC. The system parameters are deﬁned within sys%inctax and it modiﬁes the
values of net%ad(:)%inctax.
pure subroutine taxAfterCTC(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine
Until April 1994 married couple’s allowance (MCA) was available to married couples. Up un-
til April 1993, MCA was set against the income of the husband (with any unused allowance
transferable to the wife). From April 1993, half or all of the MCA could be transferred to
the wife (any unused allowance could still be transferred to the other member of the cou-
ple). Since April 1990, the additional personal allowance (APA) – an allowance available to
lone parents and unmarried couples with children – has been equal to the MCA. Between
April 1994 and April 2000, both MCA and APA reduced tax payable rather than acting as
an allowance, while in April 2000 both were abolished for people born after 1935. While the
pre-April 1994 allowances are calculated in tearn, in later years these are calculated in the
subroutine taxAfterMCA. In both cases the relevant parameters are deﬁned in sys%inctax
and subroutine taxAfterMCA modiﬁes the value of net%ad(:)%inctax.
pure subroutine taxAfterMCA(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine
After calling these subroutines, it sets the values of both net%ad(:)%posttaxearn and
net%tu%posttaxearn which are referenced by subsequent routines.
A.7.3 Child Beneﬁt
Child Beneﬁt (deﬁned in sys%chben) is a universal beneﬁt available for families with chil-
dren. A child is someone aged under 16, or aged 16-18 and in full-time education. The lone
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abolished from 6 July 1998 except for existing claimants. FORTAX ignores the fact that the
lone parent rate can still be claimed by existing claimants. It sets net%tu%chben.
pure subroutine chben(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine
A.7.4 Family Credit and Working Families’ Tax Credit
Family Credit (up to October 1999) and Working Families’ Tax Credit (from October 1999 up
to April 2003) are means tested in-work beneﬁts/tax-credits payable to families with children.
They both have minimum hours conditions, with a further payment for full-time work. They
are calculated by the subroutine famCred, which calls maxFCamt to determine the maximum
pre-taper entitlement level (which depends upon the number and age of children, together
with childcare expenditure). The subroutine FCdisreg calculates the earnings disregard for
childcare expenditure. The system parameters are deﬁned in sys%fc and it sets the values of
both net%tu%fc and net%tu%chcaresub.
pure subroutine famCred(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine
pure subroutine maxFCamt(sys,fam,net,MaxFC)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
real(dp), intent(out) :: MaxFC
end subroutine
real(dp) pure function FCDisreg(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
A.7.5 New Tax Credits
The new tax credits (working tax credit and child tax credit) were introduced in April 2003.
Working Tax Credit provides in-work support for low-income working families both with
children (when at least one adult works at least 16 hours per week) and without children
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childcare credit. Child tax credit is payable to families with children, and comprises a family
element with additional elements for each child. A joint CTC/WTC means tested is applied
and depends on family level income. For both these tax credits FORTAX ignores any disabil-
ity related payments, and also the working tax credit supplement for the over 50s who are
returning to work. Entitlement for the new tax credits is calculated by the subroutine NTC.
This ﬁrst calls maxWTCamt, maxCTCfam and maxCTCkid to determine the respective maxi-
mum pre-taper entitlement for working tax credit, and both the family and child elements
of the child tax credit. The subroutine NTCtaper then applies the taper, assuming receipt
for the entire year. The entire new tax credits system is deﬁned in sys%ntc, sys%wtc, and
sys%ctc. It sets the values of net%tu%wtc, net%tu%ctc, and net%tu%chcaresub.
pure subroutine NTC(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine
real(dp) pure function maxCTCfam(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
real(dp) pure function maxCTCkid(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
pure subroutine maxWTCamt(sys,fam,net,maxWTC)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
real(dp), intent(out) :: maxWTC
end subroutine
pure subroutine NTCtaper(sys,fam,net,maxWTC, maxCTCFam,maxCTCKid)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
real(dp), intent(in) :: maxWTC,maxCTCFam,maxCTCKid
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A.7.6 Income Support and Income-based JSA
Income support is a means-tested beneﬁt paid to people on low incomes and is not available
to those in full-time work. Families are eligible if a measure of net family income (less any
disregards) is less than their “applicable amount”. The applicable amount is equal to the sum
of a personal allowance, together with lone parent and family premiums and child additions.
Income support entitlement is then equal to the amount of income required such that the sum
of net family income and income support is equal to the applicable amount. Note that up
until October 1996, unemployed workers who satisﬁed the relevant contributory conditions
received unemployment beneﬁt, while those who did not could claim income support. In
October 1996, unemployment beneﬁt was renamed contributory job seekers allowance (JSA),
and, for those who did not work, income support was renamed income-based JSA. Income
support entitlement is calculated in subroutine incSup, which calls the functions ISappamt
and ISdisreg to calculate the relevant applicable amount and income disregard. The income
support parameters in the following subroutines and functions are deﬁned in sys%incsup
and it sets the values of net%tu%incsup.
pure subroutine incSup(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine
real(dp) pure function ISappAmt(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
real(dp) pure function ISdisreg(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
A.7.7 Maternity Grant
Sure start maternity grant (formerly known as the maternity expenses payment), is a one-off
payment for families with a new baby. Families can receive it if they receive Income Support,
income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance, FC/WFTC (up to April 2003), or more than the family
element of Child Tax Credit (from April 2003). Receipt due to receipt of disability related
beneﬁts or Pension Credit is not modelled by FORTAX.
pure subroutine matGrant(sys,fam,net,calcmax)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
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type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
logical, intent(in), optional :: calcmax
end subroutine
A.7.8 Local Taxation
Council tax was introduced in April 1993 and is the current form of local taxation in Eng-
land, Scotland and Wales (varying with local authority area) and is based on the value of the
property occupied according to some council tax “band”, with certain discounts and exemp-
tions applied. It does not apply to Northern Ireland where domestic rates still exist. Council
tax liabilities are calculated in the subroutine ctax, with the relevant parameters deﬁned in
sys%ctax. It sets the value of net%tu%ctax.
pure subroutine ctax(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t, &
ctax_banda, ctax_bandb, ctax_bandc, ctax_bandd, &
ctax_bande, ctax_bandf, ctax_bandg, ctax_bandh
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine ctax
Between April 1990 and April 1993, the community charge (poll tax) operated in Eng-
land, Scotland and Wales, and was a ﬂat rate that also depended on the local authority area.
Community charge liabilities are calculated by the subroutines polltax, with the relevant
parameters deﬁned in sys%ccben. It sets the value of net%tu%polltax.
pure subroutine polltax(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
end subroutine polltax
A.7.9 Housing Beneﬁt, Council Tax Beneﬁt, and Community Charge Ben-
eﬁt
Since housing beneﬁt, council tax beneﬁt, and community charge beneﬁt are all calculated
in much the same way, FORTAX reduces the number of calculations that need to be per-
formed by ﬁrst calling the subroutine prelimCalc. It returns the applicable amount appamt
by calling the function HBappAmt, the standard earnings disregard disreg1 by calling the
function stdDisreg, the sum of the full-time and childcare disregard disreg2 by call-
ing the functions FTdisreg and chcareDisreg, and the maintenance disregard by calling
maintDisreg. These are discussed further below.
pure subroutine prelimCalc(sys,fam,net,appamt,disreg1, disreg2,disreg3)
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type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
real(dp), intent(out) :: appamt,disreg1,disreg2, disreg3
end subroutine
real(dp) pure function HBappAmt(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
real(dp) pure function stdDisreg(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
real(dp) pure function FTdisreg(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
real(dp) pure function chcareDisreg(sys,fam,net)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(in) :: net
end function
real(dp) pure function maintDisreg(sys,fam)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
end function
Housing beneﬁt is a means tested beneﬁt payable to families with low incomes who rent
their homes (for home owners, income support may provide support for mortgage interest
payments). Families who receive income support, income-based jobseeker’s allowance or
the guarantee credit element of the pension credit (currently not modelled by FORTAX) are
automatically entitled to the maximum level of housing beneﬁt. This maximum level is equal
to “eligible rent” minus possible deductions. If sys%rebatesys%docapis .false. then the
level of eligible rent is interpreted to be their actual rent. Otherwise, a rent cap is imposed for
private renters (as identiﬁed by fam%tenure), so that eligible rent is equal to the minimum
of fam%rent and fam%rentcap. Families are eligible to receive housing beneﬁt if a measure
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less than their “applicable amount”. As with income support, the applicable amount is equal
to the sum of a personal allowance, together with lone parent and family premiums and
child additions. Housing beneﬁt entitlement is calculated by the subroutine HBen and is
equal to the amount of income required such that the sum of net family income and housing
beneﬁt is equal to the applicable amount. The parameters of housing beneﬁt are deﬁned in
sys%rebatesys and it sets the value of housing beneﬁt in net%tu%hben.
pure subroutine HBen(sys,fam,net,appamt,disreg1, disreg2,disreg3)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
real(dp), intent(in) :: appamt,disreg1,disreg2, disreg3
end subroutine
The function HBfull returns value .true. if the family is entitled to the full amount of their
eligible rent, and .false. otherwise.
logical pure function HBfull(sys,fam,net,appamt,disreg1, disreg2,disreg3)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(in) :: net
real(dp), intent(in) :: appamt,disreg1,disreg2,disreg3
end function
Council tax beneﬁt is payable to families with low incomes who are liable to pay council tax
on a property in which they are resident. Many of the conditions for claiming are the same
as those for housing beneﬁt and the beneﬁt is calculated by the subroutine ctaxBen. The
relevant parameters are deﬁned in sys%rebatesys and sys%ctax and it sets the value of
net%tu%ctaxben.
pure subroutine ctaxBen(sys,fam,net,appamt,disreg1, disreg2,disreg3)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
real(dp), intent(in) :: appamt,disreg1,disreg2,disreg3
end subroutine
The community charge beneﬁt is calculated by subroutine polltaxBen. The relevant param-
eters are deﬁned in sys%ccben and it sets the value of net%tu%polltaxben.
pure subroutine polltaxBen(sys,fam,net,appamt,disreg1, disreg2,disreg3)
use fortax_type, only : sys_t, fam_t, net_t
type(sys_t), intent(in) :: sys
type(fam_t), intent(in) :: fam
type(net_t), intent(inout) :: net
real(dp), intent(in) :: appamt,disreg1,disreg2, disreg3
end subroutineA.8. Example Code 169
A.7.10 Net Income
Following the calculation of these income components, FORTAX proceeds to construct a
number of summary income measures: net%tu%tottax (total tax paid by the tax unit),
net%tu%pretax (pre-tax income of the tax unit), net%tu%dispinc (disposable income of
the tax unit). It also calculates the values of net%ad%pretaxearn (pre-tax earnings of each
adult – same as net%fam%ad%earn) and net%tu%pretaxearn (pre-tax earnings of the tax
unit).
A.8 Example Code
This section illustrates the basic use of FORTAX. It deﬁnes a family (in this case, a lone parent
with two children aged 2 and 10, rent of £50 per week, childcare expenditure of £20 per
week, and council tax band C) by calling fam gen. Any unspeciﬁed components will be set
to their default values. Note also that it will automatically satisfy the relevant dependencies
in fam, so setting the appropriate number of children (fam%nkids=2), and age of youngest
child (fam%yngkid=2). It uses readTaxParams to load the systems April98.xml and
April02.xml into sys(1) and sys(2) respectively. We now want to modify sys(1) so
that it is expressed in the same prices as sys(2). We do this by ﬁrst loading the price
index via loadindex (default is ‘prices/rpi.csv’). We then calculate the uprating factor
factor using upratefactor and by referencing the prices information saved in the system
ﬁles. To demonstrate the use of the system ﬁle writing procedure, We call fortaxwrite
which saves the modiﬁed system sys(1) as ‘April98rpi02.xml’. We then loop over
the range of hours, from hrs1 to hrs2 with nhrs steps. At each cycle We modify the
hours and earnings information in fam%ad(1), using the wage deﬁned earlier in wage. The
subroutine calcNetInc is called twice (once for each system) to calculate incomes under the
respective systems, which are then saved in net(1) and net(2). The values of hours and
net disposable income under sys(1) and sys(2) are then written to the default unit. The
loop then continues.
Example code using FORTAX
program fortaxexample
!load the required modules
use fortax_realtype
use fortax_type
use fortax_read
use fortax_write
use fortax_calc
use fortax_prices
implicit none
type(fam_t) :: famA.8. Example Code 170
type(sys_t) :: sys(2)
type(net_t) :: net(2)
integer :: i, nhrs
real(dp) :: wage, hrs1, hrs2, hrstep, factor
!generate a family
fam = fam_gen(kidage=(/2,10/),rent=50.0_dp, ccexp=20.0_dp,ctband=3)
!hourly wage rate, and hours range
wage = 5.0_dp
hrs1 = 0.0_dp
hrs2 = 100.0_dp
nhrs = 100
!step size when looping over hours
hrstep = (hrs2-hrs1)/real(nhrs-1,dp)
!load fortax system files
call readTaxParams(sys(1),’systems/fortax/April98.xml’, ’fortax’)
call readTaxParams(sys(2),’systems/fortax/April02.xml’, ’fortax’)
!load the price index to perform uprating
call loadindex()
!uprate prices so April 98 system is in April 02 prices
factor = upratefactor(sys(1)%extra%prices, sys(2)%extra%prices)
call upratesys(sys(1),factor,sys(2)%extra%prices)
!write the uprated system. this is not necessary here,
!but allows new system to be used directly in future
call fortaxwrite(sys(1),’systems/fortax/April98rpi02.xml’)
!loop over the range of hours, from hrs1 to hrs2
do i = 1, nhrs
!modify the hours and earnings information in fam
fam%ad(1)%hrs = hrs1 + (i-1)*hrstep
fam%ad(1)%earn = wage*fam%ad(1)%hrs
!call the main calculation routine
call calcNetInc(sys(1),fam,net(1))
call calcNetInc(sys(2),fam,net(2))
!write hours, and net income from both systems
write (*,’(3(F12.4,2X))’) fam%ad(1)%hrs, net(1)%tu%dispinc, net(2)%tu%dispinc
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